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ARTICLES
TEXTUAL GERRYMANDERING: THE
ECLIPSE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
IN AN ERA OF STATUTORY POPULISM
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.† & VICTORIA F. NOURSE‡
We have entered the era dominated by a dogmatic textualism—albeit one that is
fracturing, as illustrated by the three warring original public meaning opinions in
the blockbuster sexual orientation case, Bostock v. Clayton County. This Article
provides conceptual tools that allow lawyers and students to understand the deep
analytical problems faced and created by the new textualism advanced by Justice
Scalia and his heirs. The key is to think about choice of text—why one piece of text
rather than another—and choice of context—what materials are relevant to confirm
or clarify textual meaning. Professors Eskridge and Nourse apply these concepts to
evaluate the new textualism’s asserted neutrality, predictability, and objectivity in its
canonical cases, as well as in Bostock and other recent textual debates.
The authors find that textual gerrymandering—suppressing some relevant texts
while picking apart others, as well as cherry-picking context—has been pervasive.
Texts and contexts are chosen to achieve particular results—without any law-based
justification. Further, this Article shows that, by adopting the seemingly benign “we
are all textualists now” position, liberals as well as conservatives have avoided the
key analytic questions and have contributed to the marginalization of the nation’s
premier representative body, namely, Congress. Today, the Supreme Court asks
how “ordinary” populist readers interpret language (the consumer economy of statutory interpretation) even as the Court rejects the production economy (the legislative authors’ meaning).
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Without returning to discredited searches for ephemeral “legislative intent,” we propose a new focus on legislative evidence of meaning. In the spirit of Dean John F.
Manning’s suggestion that purposivists have improved their approach by imposing
text-based discipline, textualists can improve their approach to choice of text and
choice of context by imposing the discipline of what we call “republican evidence”—evidence of how the legislative authors explained the statute to ordinary
readers. A republic is defined by law based upon the people’s representatives; hence
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the name for our theory: “republican evidence.” This Article concludes by
affirming the republican nature of Madisonian constitutional design and situating
the Court’s assault on republican evidence as part of a larger crisis posed by populist movements to republican democracies today.
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1 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); see also George F. Will, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s
Decision on LGBTQ Protections Shows the Conflicting Ideas of Textualism, WASH. POST
(June 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-courts-decisionon-lgbtq-protections-shows-the-conflicting-ideas-of-textualism/2020/06/16/c6979b76-aff811ea-8758-bfd1d045525a_story.html.
2 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738, 1741.
3 See id. at 1755–56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (charging that the “Court’s opinion is like a
pirate ship,” sailing “under a textualist flag,” but in reality doing nothing but updating “old
statutes so that they better reflect the current values of society”); id. at 1836 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (charging the majority with following “a novel form of living literalism to
rewrite ordinary meaning and remake American law”).
4 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (predicting that Scalia-style
textualism will allow judges to engage in cherry-picking to achieve the outcomes they
desire); Victoria F. Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice Scalia, 70
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County catapulted textualism from legal arcana to national news.1 Justice
Gorsuch, writing for a 6–3 Court, ruled that the 1964 Civil Rights Act
bars employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity, astonishing liberals with his method and confounding
conservatives with the result. His majority opinion insisted that the
“ordinary public meaning” of the text resolved the case.2 Justices
Alito and Kavanaugh argued passionately in dissent that Justice
Gorsuch had forsaken textualism.3 The intense methodological debate
among the three originalists befuddled some Court-watchers. Could
the textualist methodology yield liberal results? Was original public
meaning more dynamic than people thought? Given the sharp, heartfelt disagreement among the Justices, is textualism less objective,
determinate, and neutral than advertised?4
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As Bostock illustrates, textualism is fracturing, dividing itself into
camps.5 It is time to think much harder and deeper about textualism’s
methodology, its meta-theoretical foundations, and its overall legitimacy within our constitutional democracy. To begin with, and contrary to its presentation by proponents, “orthodox textualism” (now
called “original public meaning” by some Justices) is far from a
mechanical jurisprudence, where judges applying its method are
driven inexorably toward a single answer.6 As this Article suggests, in
any difficult case, the textualist judge starts with two potentially
outcome-determinative decisions: a choice of text—the scope of text
the judge decides to focus on when interpreting a statute—and a
choice of context surrounding this text. Though both choices involve
text, the normative decisions which underlie these choices are not
themselves grounded in the text. And the way judges make both of
those decisions is changing: Context, for example, once meant judicial
consideration of legislative purpose and history, but in federal and
many state courts today, choice of context is more likely to canvas the
whole act, the whole code, and the larger corpus of statutory law.7
Whatever text and context have been selected will be framed by
the judge’s choice among dozens of canons of statutory construction.
It turns out that, once one focuses on these choices—of text and context—one can begin to see the process we dub “gerrymandering.” All
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12/23/2021 09:17:08

ALA. L. REV. 667 (2019) (arguing that the Court’s nominal commitment to textualism will
not lead to unified results).
5 See Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 266 (2020)
(“Bostock revealed something more: important tensions within textualism.”). From a
linguistic point of view, Justice Gorsuch’s “compositional” textualism (focusing on
individual words and then assembling them into a plain meaning) in Bostock and other
cases is a different methodology from Justice Alito’s and Kavanaugh’s “holistic” textualism
(focusing on phrases and sentences) in this and other cases. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel
Applications, and Original Public Meaning, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 1519–20 (2020).
Although he joined Justice Alito’s dissent in Bostock, Justice Thomas’s preferred method
is decidedly compositional. See, e.g., County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct.
1462, 1479–80 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (focusing on the meaning of the individual
word “addition” and then combining it with the meanings of the words “from” and “to”);
Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 (2019) (interpreting and then stringing
together small portions of the phrase “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction”).
6 Note that we distinguish what we call “orthodox textualism,” “high textualism,” or
“original public meaning” from traditional “plain meaning” textualism. This Article and its
critique focus specifically on orthodox textualism.
7 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 313 (2014) (documenting the Court’s shift and critiquing the constitutional
reasoning for that shift); MCI Tel. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228–32
(1994) (Scalia, J.) (framing the judicial inquiry into statutory context merely as one that
assumes, when faced with equally plausible meanings of the same term, courts’ first tool
must be context).
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8 Anya Bernstein & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Populism, 106 MINN. L. REV. 283, 287
(2021); see also William D. Araiza, Samuel Alito: Populist, 103 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE
14 (2017) (discussing the populist attributes of legal writing); Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 661 (2009) (describing the populist features of originalism);
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (articulating a
concern that originalism is used to pander to populism).
9 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1927) (arguing that democracy must be participatory and communal).
10 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1767–71 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1829, 1831 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). On the relevance of Title VII’s
statutory history (the EEOC’s application, Supreme Court precedent, and Congress’s 1972,
1978, and 1991 amendments), see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and
the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322
(2017) [hereinafter Eskridge, Title VII].
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interpreters, whether conservative or liberal, textualist or not, make
choices about text, and make choices about context. The important
question is whether the interpreter sees and defends those choices.
When they do not defend them, we call it “gerrymandering”—line
drawing that purports to be neutral but risks partisanship—and, as we
will see, this is true of both liberal and conservative judges who search
vainly for a single “ordinary meaning.”
In this Article, we frame this statutory interpretation debate in
terms of production and consumption economies: Should interpreters
focus on the readers and consumers of statutes (We the People), or
the authors and producers of statutes (Congress)? Or should interpreters consider both, as has been the traditional practice of American
judges? On its face, the now-dominant Supreme Court approach elevates the consumer perspective and belittles or ignores that of the producers. This is an alarming development, for a number of reasons.
Anya Bernstein and Glen Staszewski argue that the more dogmatic
textualism of the last generation is an example of judicial populism;
like political populism, dogmatic textualism is anti-pluralist (believing
there is one method and one right answer), anti-institutionalist (denigrating legislative and administrative deliberation), and Manichean
(pitting virtuous champions of the people against corrupt elites).8 If
their characterization is true, we risk losing our constitutional tradition of representative democracy, whose legitimacy rests upon public
and legislative deliberation.9 Among the Bostock Justices, only Justice
Alito and Justice Kavanaugh (in separate dissenting opinions) paid
any attention to congressional and administrative deliberations, but
even they gave it short shrift and ignored the full statutory history of
Title VII.10
There is a deeper similarity between statutory textualism and
political populism: Each lays claim to democratic legitimacy by
invoking a search for the “true will” of the people. Bostock illumi-
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11 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)
[hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism].
12 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws (expanding on his
own Tanner Lectures), in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION]; OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989) [hereinafter OLP, MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY];
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); see also JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON,
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 22–23, 55–79, 203–28 (3d ed.
2017) (providing a synthesis of the new textualism).
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nates this vividly, as the Justices joust for the true “ordinary” or popular meaning, even as they disagree about that very meaning. If
textualism’s acolytes cannot decide on the “true” meaning of a text, it
is possible—and we think likely—that at least some of their choices
reflect more about their judicial perspective than about the will of the
people. Because textualists reject institutional reflections of the popular will (namely, legislative expectations, agency practice, and even
practical application of statutory schemes), such judges, like populist
politicians, risk attributing their own interests or values to the will of
the people. Our concern here is not with the populist outcome of particular cases, but with a method that seeks “ordinary” meaning in the
eyes of a public as it resides in the imagination of elite judges who
themselves disagree, as they did in Bostock, about the content of that
“true will” of the people.
Accordingly, orthodox textualism and original public meaning
pose a triple threat to the rule of law: substituting judicial for legislative evidence, marginalizing public deliberation, and introducing
uncertainty and instability into statutory regimes. Our critical stance
toward orthodox textualism does not lead us to revive old-fashioned
purposivism: We believe that purposivism can suffer from some of the
same problems when deployed by willful judges. Rather, it impels us
to propose legislative or republican evidence as relevant and important
sources for applying statutes to new factual circumstances, as an antidote to judicial populism’s darker side.
The foregoing is our argument in a nutshell, but we now situate
the argument historically. When Judge Frank Easterbrook, Justice
Antonin Scalia, and allied thinkers propounded a fresh theory of statutory interpretation in the 1980s, we dubbed it the “new textualism.”11
They maintained that judges should do nothing more, and nothing
less, than apply statutory text.12 Under this method, interpreters
should never revise, narrow, or broaden the ordinary or plain meaning
of statutes to fit evidence of “legislative intent,” to carry out the statu-
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13 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 15–16; accord NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF
YOU CAN KEEP IT 10 (2019); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law
of the Past, 37 LAW & HIST. REV. 809 (2019).
14 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738–39; id. at 1767–68 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at
1825–29 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
16 See Scalia, supra note 12, at 16–23; infra Table 1; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 97 (2017)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Absence of Method] (arguing that, given judges’ limited
resources and tendency to pick which legislative history to use, reliance on legislative
history is futile); John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397 (2017) (providing a history of legislative “intent skepticism”); Ryan D. Doerfler,
High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 (2018) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s tendency to “treat statutory text as more malleable in big cases” in which “the
practical stakes are raised”).
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tory purpose, or to avoid unreasonable consequences. Judges were
admonished against showing any interest in materials about the production of the statute by Congress; interpretation should focus only on
the reasonable consumption of its language by the public, or the socalled “ordinary meaning.” Justice Scalia further argued that the textualist inquiry should probe the ordinary meaning understood by the
public when enacted, or the “original public meaning.”13 Each of
Bostock’s three opinions claimed to follow these instructions,14 but
arrived at different results.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 tells employers not to
“discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s
. . . sex.”15 As Justice Scalia maintained, an approach grounded in the
legislative process offers the interpreter several choices, each of which
can be manipulated to yield a stingy interpretation (for example, that
discrimination because of gender identity or sex of partner is not covered by Title VII) or a broad one (that it is covered).16 Thus, the interpreter might ask whether Congress specifically intended Title VII to
protect transgender persons or “homosexuals,” to which the answer
would be “no.” But a “yes” answer would be more likely if the inquiry
were whether Congress intended to render illegal any classification
entailing “sex.” Or the interpreter could pitch the intent inquiry at an
even higher level of generality: What was Congress’s general intent, or
purpose? The answer to that question could be understood narrowly
(for example, that Congress’s purpose was to integrate women into
the workplace) or broadly (that the purpose was to eliminate genderstereotyping in the workplace). Justice Scalia’s influential critique was
that legislative intent and purpose were malleable sources, freeing
judges to read their own values into statutes. The “trick” to using legislative materials, one of his colleagues cracked, “is to look over the
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heads of the crowd and pick out your friends.”17 Table 1 summarizes
this critique.
TABLE 1. THE MALLEABILITY

Specific Intent

OF

LEGISLATIVE INTENT/PURPOSE

Narrow

Broad

Congress did not intend to
protect this class, e.g.,
“homosexuals.”

Congress did intend to bar this
particular classification (“sex”) from
job decisions.

Congress’s purpose was to open
General Intent
up jobs for women, not to
radically change the workplace.

Congress’s purpose was to uproot
gender stereotyping that arbitrarily
withheld opportunities from workers
of all sexes.

The new textualists claimed that focusing on text would avoid
purposivism’s elasticity, constrain judges,18 respect and implement legislative compromises,19 and lead to predictable outcomes.20 As
Bostock’s three different textualist opinions suggest, these claims
exaggerate. Some scholars were not surprised to see Bostock’s fracture: They had predicted that textualism was not as determinate or
objective as its followers alleged.21 Not only have skeptics questioned
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17 Scalia, supra note 12, at 36; see also Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1833, 1835, 1853–59 (1998) (arguing that in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892), for example, “the Court overlooked the surrounding context of the timing
of the reports and the critical floor statements by sponsors of the bill” at issue in the case).
18 See Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of
Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 905, 910 (2016) (describing the founders as
enshrining a judicial power “constrained by its dependence on the adversarial system to
identify the issues and arguments for decision” rather than one that accommodates “the
outer limits of the judicial imagination”); Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 11, at
648, 674 (summarizing the early new textualists’ arguments about judicial discretion).
19 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 74 (2006) (“[T]extualists have contended that the final wording of a statute may reflect
an otherwise unrecorded legislative compromise.”); see also Margaret H. Lemos, The
Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 884 (2014) (reviewing
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 132–33 (2009).
20 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 16; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006) (describing textualists as having “a strong constitutional
argument for cabining judicial leeway and making the interpretive process more
transparent and predictable”).
21 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 3–5 (2016) [hereinafter E SKRIDGE,
INTERPRETING LAW]; VICTORIA F. NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY
105–06 (2016) [hereinafter NOURSE, MISREADING LAW]; ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING
STATUTES 43, 48, 52 (2014); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 79–81 (2008);
Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1298, 1302–03
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the idea of “plain meaning,”22 they have also argued that textualist
opinions manipulate canons23 and dictionaries24 to create an arbitrary
façade of plain meaning. Such manipulations too often, they urge,
allow judges to trump congressional policy with their own frameworks
and preferences.25 Bostock not only confirmed the idea that textualism does not lead to one plain meaning but also presented skeptics
with a new point of attack. How is it possible to find the “original
public meaning” of a statute as applied to a social group (“gay men
and lesbians”) or a concept (like “sexual orientation” or “gender identity” discrimination) that did not exist in common parlance or the popular imagination in 1964?26
Justice Scalia believed that he would win the fight for textualism
because interpreters were lazy: Finding and processing information
about a statute’s “intended” meaning can be time-consuming and
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(2018) (finding empirically that even “very text-centric judges” often feel compelled to
look to “many different kinds of material . . . to confirm [their] interpretation”).
22 See NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 40–45 (arguing that there are
almost always two meanings of any particular term: the prototypical meaning, which is the
best example of the term, and the extensivist or legalist meaning, which includes any
logical understanding of the term).
23 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (arguing
that shifts in which canons the Court has emphasized over time suggest that Justices
employ the canons to achieve their ideological preferences); Lisa Heinzerling, The Power
Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017) (arguing that the Court has created new
canons which reflect some Justices’ desire to curb the administrative state).
24 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage:
The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483, 483 (2013) (“We demonstrate how the Court’s patterns of dictionary
usage reflect a casual form of opportunistic conduct.”); John Calhoun, Note, Measuring the
Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE
L.J. 484, 513 (2014) (arguing that judges rely on dictionaries to provide a “veneer of
objectivity” even when their definitions may not provide determinate answers).
25 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 79 (2005) (“[T]he canons are being used
by the Rehnquist Court to help produce a judicially desired set of policies, ignoring or
sacrificing legislatively expressed preferences in the process.”).
26 Eskridge et al., supra note 5, at 1562–64. Such criticisms of originalist struggles to
properly historicize terms and meanings abound. See, e.g., Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism
and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 936 (2015)
(questioning the “faulty premise that the Founding generation and we today occupy more
or less the same linguistic world” and arguing that some originalists incorrectly focus “on
individual words and statements when they must first grasp the broader idioms from which
those component parts issued”); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the
Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575,
583 (2011) (“[T]he now-dominant form of originalism—public meaning or semantic
originalism— . . . eschew[s] the value of reconstructing the historical context(s) in which
the Constitution was adopted in favor of a primarily linguistic exercise . . . .”).
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costly.27 To be sure, jettisoning inquiry into congressional materials
can reduce information costs, but Bostock shows that inquiry into the
historical meaning of words (like “sex,” as it was understood in 1964)
poses its own difficulties.28 Because new textualists such as Justices
Gorsuch and Thomas have increasingly focused on small bits of text,
such as “sex” in Bostock,29 and have demanded plain meanings from
those language morsels, they are pressed to find helpful new context.
With legislative materials off-limits, they have turned to other context:
related provisions in the United States Code, dictionaries, corpus linguistics, and canons of construction.30 But these materials, too, can be
costly to research and are certainly malleable in the hands of normatively motivated judges deciding cases that present divisive issues.31
Textualism’s original defenders claimed they were faithful to
democratic values because legislators understand text along the same
lines as new textualist judges, but empirical studies have falsified that
claim.32 The new textualist orthodoxy of the Bostock era, borrowing
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27 See Scalia, supra note 12, at 36–37 (“When I was head of the Office of Legal Counsel
. . . I estimated that 60 percent of the time of the lawyers on my staff was expended finding,
and poring over, the incunabula of legislative history.”).
28 The lengthy appendices and detailed historical analysis included by Justice Alito in
his dissenting opinion, see Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1784–1822 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting), illustrate the hard work required to argue for the original public
meaning of an older statute—yet his account remained incomplete. For example, his
discussion of “gay men and lesbians” was anachronistic: “gay” in 1964 meant “merry,” and
the social class recognized in 1964 for men who have sex with men was “homosexuals and
other sex perverts,” a far cry from today’s “gay men and lesbians.” Eskridge et al., supra
note 5, at 1562–63.
29 This extremely narrow focus is not limited to the Bostock decision, but a defining
feature of the Court’s method. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480–82 (2021)
(focusing on the word “a”); Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1654–56 (2021)
(focusing on the word “so”); Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1824–27 (2021)
(plurality opinion) (focusing on the phrase “against the person”).
30 See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88–92 (1991) (interpreting
“attorney’s fee” by reference to other sections of the U.S. Code); Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing corpus linguistics);
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788
(2018) (advocating the use of corpus linguistics); see also ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW,
supra note 21, at 411–16, 425–45 (identifying more than 100 whole act and substantive
canons); Brudney & Baum, supra note 24, at 483 (finding that one-third of the Court’s
statutory decisions invoke dictionaries); Heinzerling, supra note 23 (identifying new
substantive canons); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory History, 108 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Krishnakumar, Statutory History] (analyzing new
textualists’ frequent reliance on statutory history).
31 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
32 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 949 (2013) (finding that there are judicial canons of which
congressional counsels “were unaware and whose underlying presumptions do not seem
consistent with the realities of the drafting process”); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
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from constitutional originalism, claims to be democracy-enhancing by
emphasizing public meaning: how “We the People” would have
received the statutory language. What the new textualists say and
what they do are two different matters, however. The late Justice
Scalia, for example, invoked “ordinary meaning” when defending the
legitimacy of his method, but interpretations discussed in his treatise
and judicial opinions overwhelmingly turned on legal terms of art,
precedents, and judicial canons inaccessible to ordinary folks.33 To be
sure, Justice Scalia punctuated his opinions with homey examples
designed to demonstrate his populist bona fides, a practice other
Justices have mimicked.34 But there is no evidence that ordinary citizens read statutory texts the way judges do. When Justices—elite lawyers35—debate how “ordinary people” talk, there is a serious risk that
their renderings will speak with an upper-class, judicially-inflected
accent.36 When the ordinary people lived fifty or seventy-five years
ago, the reconstructive task is even more difficult.
At stake is the constitutional allocation of power in our representative democracy. Traditionally, courts defer to Congress on policy.
But if we are right, then textualism is at war with that traditional
power division. If you blind yourself to the production economy—to
Congress—and impose judge-created canons and judicial precedents
on top of judge-inflected ordinary meaning, then you create a system
in which the judiciary dominates the legislature.37 Marginalizing the
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Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575 (2002) (finding that even when lawmakers are aware of judicial rules of
construction, they do not consistently apply or consider those rules in their drafting).
33 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 41 (arguing that ordinary meaning is not
relevant when a precedent controls); id. at 73–77 (arguing that ordinary meaning gives way
when text uses a “term of art”); id. at 140–45 (revealing that technical grammar canons,
like the rule of the last antecedent, determine meaning that is far from ordinary); id. at
167–69, 217–20 (discussing non-ordinary meaning determined by judicial whole act and
preamble canons); id. at 252–55 (discussing non-ordinary meaning determined by judicial
whole code canons); id. at 261–340 (providing a partial list of judicially created substantive
canons that put a thumb on the scale of statutory meaning).
34 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994)
(offering a witty analysis by Justice Scalia of the term “modify”); infra notes 344–45 and
accompanying text (discussing Justices Kagan’s and Sotomayor’s use of homey examples).
35 See NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 25 (2019) (examining the elite backgrounds of
Supreme Court Justices and the biases, incentives, and blind spots those backgrounds
might create).
36 See Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria F. Nourse, Statutory Interpretation
from the Outside, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (demonstrating via an empirical
study of 4,500 people that “ordinary readers” frequently interpret rules non-literally).
37 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (constituting the Congress and granting it lawmaking
power), with U.S. CONST. art. III (constituting the federal judiciary and the limits on its
jurisdiction). See also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
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legislative process invites judges to adopt self-interested interpretations, or interpretations Congress has rejected. Hyper-focusing on text
poses costs for republican governance. By ignoring or marginalizing
legislative goals and context, the new textualism tends to increase legislative production costs by requiring Congress to draft with utmost
precision to correct the Court’s off-key interpretations and revise statutes which the Court has misinterpreted.38 It has already generated
costly and repetitive legal challenges to major policies—recall the textual challenges to the Affordable Care Act based on staffer’s errors.39
At stake, too, is the legitimacy of our rule of law.40 The new textualists rely on a transactional understanding of Article I, Section 7,
which requires bicameral approval and presidential presentment for a
bill to become a law.41 From their perspective, statutes are deals, and
strategic dealmakers will naturally manipulate legislative documents,
leaving the voted-on text as the only evidence of the deal.42 But that is
a thin understanding of Article I, Section 7, at odds with the republican aspirations of the Founding Era, which emphasized deliberation
by elected legislators who were attentive to the public interest as well
as to the particular views of the citizenry.43 Dismissing the republican
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78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989) (exploring the extent to which legislative supremacy constrains
judges, and the ways judges might respond to those constraints); Amy Coney Barrett,
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010) (arguing that a court
that applies something other than legislative will is not acting as a faithful agent); Manning,
supra note 19, at 91–99 (arguing that both textualists and purposivists justify their
preferences according to their understanding of the relationship between process and
legislative supremacy); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2127–29 (2004) (arguing
that “legislative supremacy” does not capture the extent of Congress’s powers under
Article I, Section 1, in that Congress actually holds a “legislative monopoly”).
38 See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014).
39 See Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. LEGIS. 83, 117–21
(2019) (analyzing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015), as an example of judicial correction
of a staff drafting error made as the ACA barreled toward enactment); Ryan D. Doerfler,
The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 815 n.20 (2016) (listing cases in which
scrivener’s errors have resulted in challenges to major pieces of legislation, such as the
Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act).
40 The rule of law requires that the law be objective, predictable, and performable—
that citizens know what is expected of them. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW (1964).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
42 See OLP, MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 64–65; John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 687–88 (1997)
(“Actual statutory language is the dearest legislative commodity, and so once legislators
become aware that legislative history influences courts, they and their agents (the staff)
will try to achieve desired outcomes through the lower-cost mechanism of legislative
history.”).
43 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–51 (1983)
(interpreting Article I, Section 7 as a legislative structure that encourages deliberation
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among lawmakers with different electoral connections). On the importance of the
republican tradition of deliberative representation to the Founding Era, see GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1998). See also James H.
Hutson, Country, Court, and Constitution: Antifederalism and the Historians, 38 WM. &
MARY Q. 337, 356–68 (1981) (applying English political norms to frame the American
“Country” ideology during the Founding Era as a derivative of classical republicanism).
We use ‘republicanism’ as a broad term, in distinction from direct ‘popular’ democracy. For
the complicated historiography of philosophical ‘republicanism,’ see Daniel T. Rodgers,
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992).
44 See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, 50 NOMOS
3, 12 (2011) (remarking that the rule of law requires “impartial” courts).
45 See Victoria F. Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons for Statutory
Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409 (2017) [hereinafter
Nourse, Picking and Choosing].
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deliberations of the production economy and focusing only on the
consumer or citizen viewpoint disrespects our constitutional roots and
distorts our representative democracy. The new textualism’s legitimacy costs are significant even under a liberal, transactional view,
because its tools and sources invite judges to read statutes through
their own perspectives, and thus lures them from the impartiality
demanded by the liberal as well as republican rule of law.44 This is
where the idea of textual gerrymandering comes into play.
Orthodox textualist rhetoric obscures the discretionary choices an
interpreter must make when resolving a hard case. Just as conflicting
state laws once led to the creation of the field of choice of law, we
believe that the kind of conflict we see in Bostock should invite a similar development in the field of statutory interpretation. The textattentive judge must engage in a process we call choice of text.45 What
statutory text is relevant to the issue raised by the case? By choosing
or prioritizing one text over others, the judge makes a choice that
must be defended as a matter of law and language. Theorists often
forget the essential next step: choice of context. Once one has homed
in on putatively controlling text(s), one must ask whether there is context that clarifies the meaning of vague or ambiguous text or confirms
one’s immediate apprehension of a plain meaning. There might be
more than one relevant text and a variety of contexts. We contend
that the new textualism is most problematic when the choice of text or
statutory context is announced by judicial fiat, ignoring obviously relevant text or context and failing to provide a reasonable justification or
even acknowledgment of the choices. When applying a method that
excludes a great deal of (production) context, new textualist judging
often picks and chooses text and (con)text in ways that are hard to
defend. Consistent with the emphasis on consumption, our neologism
(con)text refers to text-based context.
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Accordingly, textualism suffers from similar problems as purposivism. Just as the motivated or unmindful judge can find multiple purposes and set them at various levels of generality, as we demonstrated
in Table 1 above, so too the motivated or unmindful judge can pick
and choose texts and (con)texts and then read those texts at various
levels of generality, as we demonstrate in Table 2 below. From the
beginning, new textualists have engaged in what we call textual gerrymandering, which has become more pervasive over time, as their
method has become more influential. In an era of orthodox textualism, when everyone claims to be a textualist at least some of the
time,46 everyone gerrymanders text and (con)text at least some of the
time. This helps explain why the rise of textualism could lead to
Bostock’s three different textualist opinions. Ironically, we shall maintain that all three opinions were gerrymandered, and that therefore
none resolved the legal issue satisfactorily, even under the standards
announced by the new textualism.
Techniques of political gerrymandering inspire our analysis and
our critical edge. When a partisan legislature revises electoral districts,
it can minimize the other party’s power by packing opposing voters
into just a few districts, creating a few lopsided districts for the opposition, but many districts leaning the party’s way, or by cracking the
other party’s voting strength so that their voters are broken into many
districts where they lack sufficient voting power as a bloc.47 If a legislature wants to minimize representation of minorities, it can stack or
enlarge the district through creative mergers of several districts or
electing representatives at-large.48 And minority voters can be purged
43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 12 Side A
12/23/2021 09:17:08

46 See Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 8:28 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPEtszFT0Tg (“I think we’re all textualists now, in a way that
just was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”); see also Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 304 (2017) (celebrating Justice Kagan’s quip).
47 See GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 33 (2002); Richard
L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to
Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1837,
1852–53 (2018) (describing “[p]acking and cracking”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 551–52 (2004); Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan
Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHIC Q. 5, 5–6 (1988); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos &
Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
831, 834 (2015); Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J.F. 761, 768 (2018).
48 See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment
(describing cracking, packing, and stacking in Mississippi and Alabama congressional
redistricting), in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, 92–96 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984);
Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority-Group
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Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL.
982 (1981) (providing empirical evidence linking the creation of at-large systems with racial
gerrymandering); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671,
681 (2013) (discussing stacking and at-large elections); Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395, 441 (2012) (discussing at-large voting as disadvantaging
minority voters).
49 See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION (2006) (identifying contemporary voter suppression techniques including
gerrymandering, underfunded elections infrastructure, ballot inequities, and photo
identification requirements); JONATHAN BRATER, KEVIN MORRIS, MYRNA PÉREZ &
CHRISTOPHER DELUZIO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., PURGES: A GROWING THREAT TO THE
RIGHT TO VOTE (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/purgesgrowing-threat-right-vote (detailing voter purges as a tactic of voter suppression); see also
Rave, supra note 48, at 681 (discussing stacking and at-large elections); Daniel P. Tokaji,
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV.
689 (2006) (describing vote denial in the form of voting equipment, felon
disenfranchisement, and voter ID requirements); Tolson, supra note 48, at 441.
50 See supra notes 29, 45 and accompanying text.
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from participation altogether through what is called voter
suppression.49
Like a legislator who achieves partisan results by manipulating
electoral boundaries, an interpreter can sustain a preferred interpretation by (unconsciously or consciously) manipulating statutory boundaries. Interpretive packing hyper-focuses on only one of several
relevant statutory terms or even on only one or a few words. Interpretive cracking breaks up those items of text, defines each broadly or
narrowly according to taste, and then reassembles them into a
meaning not apparent from the text as a whole. Interpretive stacking
or suppression selectively enlarges or shrinks the (con)textual materials available, respectively. By spreading the (con)textual net widely
enough, stacking can narrow or expand the meaning of text that is
otherwise clear. Suppression reverses the process. In all cases of legislative redistricting, lines must always be drawn, just as lines in interpretive efforts must be drawn. Textual gerrymandering, as we define
it, is the unjustified drawing of lines: the insistence that a word like
“a” or “so” resolves a case, even when the textualist Justices themselves disagree about the proper text.50
Our concern is not with particular applications; it is that orthodox
textualism’s theoretical premises invite gerrymandering. In cases
reaching court, statutory text may not cleanly address novel fact situations because (1) those facts were not anticipated, usually because the
world changed in the years after the statute was passed; (2) legislators
ignored the issue; or (3) drafting issues were eclipsed by the need to
get legislation passed. Clumsy texts create hard cases, and judges face
tough choices in these cases because the new textualist culture bars
them from admitting that they are adjusting, fine-tuning, or even har-
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monizing text—even to correct obvious drafting errors.51 New textualist judges tend to deny ambiguity: To admit doubt seems to confess
that one is not clever enough to solve the drafting puzzle or discern
the will of the people.52 Hence, opinions often have a procrustean feature. Because the new textualist is loath to rely on legislative materials, they rely on interpretive resources that judges create—namely,
semantic and holistic canons, statutory precedents, and constitutionally inspired clear statement rules. This Article maintains that, in hard
cases, gerrymandering is a pervasive risk, rendering textualism less
able to satisfy the rule of law values to which it aspires. The result:
judicial opinions whose cleverness exceeds their soundness, as judges
engage in word games to the detriment of elaborating on seriously
deliberated statutory schemes.
We view the populist tendency underwriting the new textualists’
interpretive techniques as a form of judicial politics that weaponizes
“ordinary” meaning. Today’s orthodox textualism insists that it is
democratic because it searches for how an ordinary person would read
a statute.53 This is its basic, and purportedly simple, populist methodological premise. By definition, “political populism” invites a search
for authentic popular will antagonistic to the dominant political elite
or establishment.54 This form of discourse presupposes that the duly
elected representatives have failed the interests of ordinary people in
society.55 When the political demands of the voters go unmet, they
open the door for partisan actors who purport to solve them and act in
the ‘true interest’ of the whole population with purportedly simple
solutions.56
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51 See Cross, supra note 39, at 126–27 (discussing the view held by many that the
statutory text at issue in the landmark Affordable Care Act case, King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.
473 (2015), resulted from a drafting error); King, 576 U.S. at 514 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of assuming a “free-floating power ‘to rescue Congress from its
drafting errors’” (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004))).
52 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994) (arguing that textualism tends to devolve into a cleverness
game, where the winner is the judge who can solve the puzzle most elegantly).
53 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
54 See Kenneth M. Roberts, Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay: A Comparative
Perspective on Political Polarization in the United States (naming, for example, President
Trump as “a populist ‘empty signifier’ who is able to weld together, and provide expression
for, disparate ideological currents and strands of anti-establishment politics” (citing
ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON (2005))), in WHEN DEMOCRACY TRUMPS
POPULISM: EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 132, 147
(Kurt Weyland & Raul L. Madrid eds., 2019).
55 See id. at 148 (discussing populists’ incentives to politicize new issue areas in order to
win constituencies that feel neglected or unrepresented by the establishment).
56 See CATHERINE FIESCHI, POPULOCRACY: THE TYRANNY OF AUTHENTICITY AND
THE RISE OF POPULISM 14 (2019) (stating that a number of approaches toward populism
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describe it as a “corrective” to failed democracy). On simplistic solutions, see BENJAMIN
MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND
REPRESENTATION 9 (2016) (explaining how populists “present their own strong leadership
and simple solutions as a method for stemming or avoiding . . . crisis”).
57 See MOFFITT, supra note 56, at 7–10 (discussing, for example, the populist tactic of
representing oneself as the champion of “‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’”).
58 JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 20 (2016); see id. at 101 (“When in
opposition, populists will necessarily insist that elites are immoral, whereas the people are
a moral, homogeneous entity whose will cannot err.”); id. at 102 (noting that the populist
presents “a symbolic representation of the ‘real people’ from which the correct policy is
then deduced,” rendering “the political position of a populist immune to empirical
refutation”).
59 Cf. Roberts, supra note 54, at 133 (describing “democratic backsliding” in which
elected rulers leverage governmental control to “loosen institutional constraints on
executive authority”).
60 See Bernstein & Staszewski, supra note 8, at 309–18 (drawing a similar analogy
between textualism and political populism).
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An imagined unity, however, gives populists the cushion they
need to degrade debate by drawing false, authoritative moral lines
(“my people are the only good people”), articulating answers to questions that are intentionally limiting (“what do my people want?”), and
resisting empirical refutation of such claims (“my people know the
truth”).57 In his classic study, Jan-Werner Müller maintains that populism rejects democratic institutions that attempt to mediate inevitably
plural views on difficult, complicated political questions.58 Populists
claim that they, and they alone, can represent the will of the people.
But this can be a dangerous deception: Populists often seek to authoritatively assert their own interests and, as history and contemporary
events show, populists from Tom Watson to Benito Mussolini to Hugo
Chávez to Donald Trump end up pursuing demagogic and authoritarian strategies.59 If given enough power, they can create a state that
excludes those not considered to be part of the proper people. In this
way, populism is a form of exclusionary politics. Over time, this serves
to obviate the need for republican, meaning representative, institutions. If there is only one common good and only one way to
represent the people faithfully, those ideas become the symbolically
correct representation of the real people, and rejection of those ideas
become morally wrong and impermissible.
There are some parallels between the strategies of the new textualists and political populists.60 Just as populists believe that they are
the true interpreters of a singular and pure popular will, dogmatic textualists believe that they are the true interpreters of law seeking a
singular and pure “ordinary” meaning. Just as populists reject pluralist
sources of popular will and claim existing democratic institutions have
failed, so too do new textualists resist pluralists’ sources of law,
rejecting deference to executive meaning or legislative evidence. Just
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61 See Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
2193 (2017) [hereinafter Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders] (rejecting views
purporting to rely upon those who understand congressional processes).
62 See, e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1654 (2021) (“[Petitioners]
raise a host of policy arguments . . . . But we start where we always do: with the text of the
statute.”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2021) (“[N]o amount of policytalk can overcome a plain statutory command.”); id. at 1498 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(“As a matter of policy, one may reasonably debate the circumstances . . . [for removing
immigrants, but] those policy choices are for the political branches. Our job is to follow the
law . . . .”); Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1824 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[J]udges may not rewrite the law simply because of their own policy views.”);
id. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Many will applaud today’s decision because they agree
on policy grounds . . . . But the question in these cases is not whether discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity should be outlawed. The question is
whether Congress did that in 1964. It indisputably did not.”).
63 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
64 491 U.S. 440, 467–89 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 501 U.S. 380, 404–17 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
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as populists in the political sphere are anti-elitist, so too are textualists’ acolytes: They openly deride as “insiders” those who revert to the
meaning of republican (representative) institutions.61 Finally, just as
populists claim that they embody a single, virtuous people, strict textualists purport to further a pure form of democracy by relying on
meaning known to people on the street. Although some claim textualism should be empirical, the process itself—the search for ordinary
meaning—is seen at a meta-level as moral and often righteous, even
essential to preserve the rule of law and courts. Just look at the rhetoric deployed in the name of “ordinary meaning,” which denigrates
those who disagree as corrupt anti-rule-of-law judges reading their
own policy biases into statutes. There is no more common saying in
judicial opinions today than: You follow policy, I follow the text.62
Our Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we illustrate our analytical framework by considering new textualist classics written in its
foundational period. We interrogate both choice of text and choice of
(con)text. We find, surprisingly, that key text was omitted or overlooked in landmark opinions in the new textualist canon: Judge
Easterbrook’s opinion in a family farm bankruptcy case, In re
Sinclair;63 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Public Citizen v.
U.S. Department of Justice,64 interpreting a federal sunshine law;
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Chisom v. Roemer,65 involving
racially gerrymandered judicial elections; and Justice Markman’s
opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court in National Pride at Work,
Inc. v. Governor of Michigan,66 involving employment contract benefits for lesbian and gay households. These interpretations have been
criticized as countermajoritarian and ideologically driven, where con-
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servative judges seemed to bend statutes to support the interests of
banks over family farms,67 expand the President’s constitutional prerogatives,68 tolerate a voting system that entrenched a system of
white-only judges in Louisiana,69 and eliminate contract rights negotiated for and owed to lesbian and gay families.70 The opinions’ authors
did not argue in favor of those values, and claimed, rather, that the
text demanded their results. But some texts were chosen rather than
others, and in each case, text or (con)text was dramatically gerrymandered without justification. In short, textualism offered the judges
the power to look out over a crowd of texts and pick their ideological
friends.71 And once obvious textual ambiguities and errors are
exposed, these decisions appear lawless.
Part II and the Article’s Appendix of recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate the current operation of our theoretical critique—how
the move from a production to a consumer economy in statutory
interpretation has generated textual gerrymandering as a major phenomenon in statutory cases. Analyzing important Roberts Court decisions, including Bostock and many other decisions in the last three
Terms, we demonstrate that gerrymandering remains a characteristic
feature of new textualist opinions. In other words, we do not think
that judicial populism (an attitude that is anti-pluralist, anti-
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67 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 757–58 (2d ed. 1995).
68 See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in
Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1355 (2000) (critiquing Justice Kennedy’s “new
textualist approach” in Public Citizen for “inappropriately discount[ing] the importance of
public justification”); Frank J. Colucci, When Structure Fails: Justice Kennedy, Liberty, and
Trump v. Hawaii, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1141, 1155 (2019) (describing Justice Kennedy’s Public
Citizen opinion as “a vehicle for justifying judicial enforcement of separation of powers
and judicial policing of Congress” and noting consequent concerns about the President’s
power to appoint federal judges).
69 See Jonathan C. Augustine & Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Forty Years Later:
Chronicling the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Its Impact on Louisiana’s Judiciary, 66 LA.
L. REV. 453, 454 & n.7 (2006) (arguing that “African-Americans’ power to elect judicial
representatives of their own choosing . . . came through litigious victories in the courts”
like the majority opinion in Chisom); Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An
Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory
Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 182 (2008) (pointing out how Justice Scalia’s Chisom
dissent employs the same kind of “common law lawmaking” that he derides by
“constru[ing] a statute against the backdrop of lower court glosses”).
70 See Kristofer A. Scarpa, State Constitutional Law—Marriage—Michigan Marriage
Amendment Bars Public Employers from Providing Health Benefits to Same-Sex Partners
of Employees, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 995, 1013 (2009) (arguing that “the text of the Marriage
Amendment is not quite as clear and unambiguous as the National Pride majority claims”);
Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 20
(criticizing the court’s opinion in National Pride for allowing the amendment’s proponents
to pull a “bait-and-switch” con on Michiganders).
71 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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institutional, and Manichean) alone drives textual gerrymandering.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer, who are personally pluralist,
institutionalist, and not prone to good-versus-evil lines, are making
choices about text and context right along with strict original public
meaning populists, namely Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. They might
reach different results, but they do so by gerrymandering the text
(and, in the process, sometimes securing the votes of the true
believers).
In Part III, we illustrate how these same problems afflict liberal
judges: Our critique is not against textualism because it yields results
some find “conservative.” It is against the textualist method whether
applied by liberal, conservative, or moderate judges. Here is why: The
method’s emphasis on the ordinary consumer creates a hermeneutical
pinch, where there is less information to resolve difficult cases. Hyperfocusing on tiny bits of text, judges turn to more forms of (con)text to
secure interpretive closure—closure needed lest they be considered
faint-hearted or insufficiently rigorous textualists. This has generated
an expanding cottage industry of allegedly objective sources—dictionaries, corpuses, style books, the United States Code, and hundreds of
canons—that combine elasticity and opportunities for sourceshopping with normative vacuity. This strange combination of rigid
limits (refusal to use legislative materials or to admit that language
provides more than one answer) and interpretive innovation (more
aggressive deployment of canons and corpuses) propels anyone operating within the new textualist method toward textual and
(con)textual gerrymandering. Contrary to the theory’s claims, this
methodology also drags statutory meaning even further from anything
accessible to ordinary citizens, which undermines the approach’s rule
of law and democratic justifications. Worse, with judges controlling
statutory meaning and legislators marginalized, the new textualism
threatens to impose the values of judges upon statutes, undermining
textualists’ claims to leave policy to legislators.
In Part IV, we suggest a way to ameliorate the hermeneutical
pinch and restore some connection to representative democracy:
Open up the information economy to actual republican and legislative
evidence of a text’s meaning. Our government is a republic, not a
democracy; representatives filter policy in our constitutional system. If
one is to honor that constitutional principle, then one must consider
republican meaning—the meaning of representatives—as a check
against judicial rewriting of statutes. No judge denies that their role is
to defer to the policy choices of the First Branch, but textualism
strangely blinds them to evidence of those choices. Considering republican evidence of meaning helps the neutral, responsible judge to
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72 See infra note 397 and accompanying text; Gluck & Posner, supra note 21, at
1302–03.
73 See generally John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113.
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This Part examines canonical decisions penned by the Founding
Fathers of the new textualism. We start with Justice Antonin Scalia’s
famous critique of the Supreme Court’s 1892 decision in Church of the

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 15 Side B

figure out what text and (con)text are potentially relevant, to confirm
or call into question their understanding of ordinary meaning, and to
integrate a mature understanding of the full text and the statutory
plan as articulated by legislators to the public. Considering legislative
evidence allows judges to consider the perspectives of the actors who
authored the statute, much as The Federalist Papers help judges
understand the Constitution of 1789 from the perspectives of the
actors who created and lobbied for its ratification. Textualists already
admit the relevance of some legislative evidence.72 They do not admit
wholesale searches for subjective intent or purpose, but our approach
depends upon objective evidence—namely, how words were used,
how different parts of the statute fit together, the problem the statute
was addressing, and the solutions considered. In the spirit of Dean
Manning’s suggestion that purposivists have improved their approach
by imposing text-based discipline on their examination of legislative
expectations,73 we suggest that textualists (and all judges) can improve
their approach by imposing the discipline of republican evidence on
their choice of text, choice of (con)text, and inferences that might be
drawn from these sources.
In our conclusion, we explore the dangers of statutory populism.
Members of the Supreme Court acting as if they were ordinary people
(in a prior original time) invite a strange other-worldly speculation. In
the age of orthodox purposivism, judges used to imagine what a legislature would seek to do, called “imaginative reconstruction.” Curiously, statutory populism is no different: Instead of imagining what
Congress would do, judges imagine what the “ordinary reader” would
do. For some Justices, this permits a properly “populist” result, one
that they believe counters the results favored by elites. But our claim
is not about results, it is about the dangers of rejecting normal democratic institutions in statutory interpretation. Preferring an imaginary
public to the actual results or process reached by public institutions is
precisely the dark side of populism.
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Holy Trinity. We then move on to opinions by another intellectual
giant of the movement, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit, then to opinions by Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia, before
concluding with Justice Steven Markman, a state judge who authored
a leading textualist policy statement from the Reagan Justice
Department.74 We focus on two key questions: choice of text and
choice of (con)text. Remarkably, we find that canonical analyses overlooked the most relevant text. Because choices of text and (con)text
were left unjustified (and in our view could not be persuasively justified), we find considerable textual gerrymandering.
Our inquiry should trouble the most avid textualist, as leading
exemplars of their method violate its very tenets. At the very least,
our findings demonstrate that the new textualism cannot claim the
rule of law superiority that is its hallmark, as its method is subject to
the same (or worse) selection biases as pragmatic and purposivist
methods. Our hypothesis, however, cuts more deeply. Even if more
scrupulously deployed, the new textualism or original public meaning
sacrifices both republican and democratic legitimacy in statutory interpretation, without any demonstrated advantage. Not least important,
textual dogmatism entrenches in statutory cases the bitter polarization
that has afflicted the political process. In short, a lot is at stake in our
critique.
A.

Church of the Holy Trinity: Cracking and Packing Text While
Stacking and Suppressing (Con)text

74

12/23/2021 09:17:08

See OLP, MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12.
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
76 Scalia, supra note 12, at 18–23; cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 89–102 (2006)
(supporting Justice Scalia’s skepticism); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment (commenting
on the Tanner Lectures and offering thoughts on Holy Trinity), in SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 12, at 115, 115–18; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2403–04 (2003) (summarizing the Court’s holding in Holy
Trinity).
77 Alien Contract Labor Act, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (1885).
75
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Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 75 anchors the textualist anti-canon. Justice Scalia’s Tanner Lectures took Justice Brewer’s
opinion to task for its flawed reasoning.76 Section 1 of an 1885 statute
barred employers from prepaying transportation to bring noncitizens
to the United States to perform “labor or service of any kind.”77 The
question was whether the statute covered a British rector who had
contracted to work at the Church of the Holy Trinity in New York
City. Although he conceded that the prepayment of the minister’s
transportation may have fallen within the “letter of this section,”
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Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458–59, 465.
See Scalia, supra note 12, at 19–21.
80 Alien Contract Labor Act § 1, 23 Stat. at 332.
81 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465–68.
82 Id. at 471–72.
83 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.
84 See id. § 12 (providing that the amendment did not apply to pending actions).
85 See Scalia, supra note 12, at 18–23.
86 See id. at 19–20 (emphasis added). Nor does “of any kind” solve the problem. See
BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 153–56 (2015) (arguing that “any” has no meaning
until one identifies the domain of the category to which it is appended). Here, the question
is what “kind” refers to—manual labor, or all labor.
87 See Scalia, supra note 12, at 19–20.
79
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Justice Brewer read the statute as a whole to exempt the pastor.78
Justice Scalia critiqued this position, insisting that there was only one
meaning of the text “labor or service of any kind,” which had to
include the rector—end of story.79
Focus on choice of text and then on choice of (con)text. The
statute applied to “labor or service of any kind.”80 Justice Brewer
stacked his opinion with large foundational texts—Ferdinand and
Isabella’s commission to Columbus, the Crown’s charters to the
English colonies, early state constitutions, and the Religion Clauses.81
He concluded from these texts that in a “Christian nation” no one
would think that a church could not pay for its minister to travel from
abroad.82 This move enlarged the (con)text, overshadowing the text
that was most on point. Also, Justice Brewer’s stacking was selective,
ignoring relevant (con)text: Congress had specifically resolved the
question in 1891, amending the law to allow churches to import ministers.83 Justice Brewer ignored this deliberative resolution because the
law was not retroactive.84
Justice Scalia’s critique of Holy Trinity also made contestable
choices, though different from Justice Brewer’s. Justice Scalia’s
Tanner Lectures packed the entire statute’s meaning into six words:
“labor or service of any kind.”85 Then, these six words were cracked
apart, each interpreted broadly, and reassembled into a plain
meaning. Whether the preacher performed “labor or service of any
kind” was analyzed as a question about itty bitty bits of text: What is
“labor”? “Service”? Surely, Justice Scalia insisted, the pastor was at
least engaged in “service” and even mental “labor,” and without a
doubt “labor or service of any kind.”86 Justice Scalia also relied on
section 5’s exclusion of artists, singers, lecturers, and domestic servants from the prohibitions in the statute, for the exceptions list did
not say anything about ministers.87 But Justice Scalia failed to explain
why a pastor might not have been considered a “lecturer” in 1885, or
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at least analogous to the others on the list. Neither he nor Justice
Brewer explained why section 1 should not have been read in pari
materia with section 4. Section 4 barred ship masters from knowingly
transporting any “laborer, mechanic, or artisan” pursuant to contract
labor arrangements like those barred in section 1.88 Justice Scalia’s
bottom line was an interpretation that the statute covered all noncitizens brought over for employment—surely an ambitious reading for a
one-page law targeting manual workers in section 4 and exempting a
variety of lecturers and other workers of the mind in section 5.
Although Justice Scalia demanded that judges follow the original
public meaning of texts, his Tanner Lectures ignored the public
meaning that “labor or service of any kind” might have had in 1885.
Such research might start with the Fugitive Slave Clause of the
Constitution of 1789: Article IV requires the return to his home state
of any “Person held to Service or Labour” (i.e., slavery or servitude)
who had escaped to another state.89 By the post-slavery 1880s, this
term (“labor or service” or vice-versa) had acquired a broader
meaning, including wage labor or physical toil but not intellectual
work.90 All of this was obvious, accessible (con)text, all ignored by the
Scalia critique.
B.

In re Sinclair: Suppressing Text

88

12/23/2021 09:17:08

Alien Contract Labor Act, ch. 164, § 4, 23 Stat. 332, 333 (1885).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (Fugitive Slave Clause); Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch.
60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64 (statutory version).
90 Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory
Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer?, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 504 (2020) (“[W]hen
[people] used the word ‘labor,’ they generally did so to describe manual labor, not
something typically performed by clergy. . . . Furthermore[,] . . . the compound phrase
‘labor or service’ was used as an expression to mean the work of slaves—not the tasks of
the clergy.”). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, for example, used the term “laborers” to
mean both “skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.” Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 15, 22 Stat. 58, 61.
91 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1983) (providing a foundation for textualist approaches to statutory interpretation); Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
92 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
93 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).
89
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No one is more important to the conceptual foundations of the
new textualism than Judge Frank Easterbrook,91 but his classic applications have sometimes failed to engage deeply with relevant statutory texts. Judge Easterbrook’s most famous statutory opinion is
Marshall v. United States.92 Writing for the en banc Seventh Circuit,
Judge Easterbrook interpreted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198693 to
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94 See Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1317–18 (holding that blotter paper treated with LSD
constitutes a “mixture” under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, triggering the mandatory
minimum). For a sharp critique of this linguistic conclusion, see Lawrence Solan, When
Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 54 (1993) (“Calling the blotter paper
impregnated with LSD a mixture seems odd for the same reason that it seems odd to call a
pancake soaked with syrup a pancake-syrup mixture . . . .”).
95 In re Sinclair, No. BK 85-50136 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1987).
96 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99–554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105–14 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201–1208, 1211–1231).
97 11 U.S.C. § 1112(d)(3).
98 In re Sinclair, No. BK 85-50136, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1987), aff’d,
Civil No. 87-5196, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1988), aff’d sub nom. In re Sinclair, 870
F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
99 Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302(c)(1), 100 Stat. at 3119.
100 See Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1341.
101 H.R. REP. NO. 99-958, at 48–49 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5249–50.
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apply a mandatory minimum penalty for LSD sales based on a highly
debatable interpretation of the word “mixture.”94
More conceptually important, but less well known, is Judge
Easterbrook’s earlier treatment of Marguerite and Russell Sinclair,
owners of a family farm. In April 1985, they filed a petition under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.95 The next year, Congress
revised the Bankruptcy Code to add a new Chapter 12, providing a
more flexible regime for handling family farms in distress.96 The
Sinclairs asked the bankruptcy court to “convert” their case from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 12, as permitted under equity-based criteria
found in the newly created section 1112(d)(3) of the Code.97 The
bankruptcy judge declined, and the district court affirmed.98
The lower court judges had a good reason to decline the petition.
Section 302(c)(1) of the 1986 Act contained a transition rule: “The
amendments made by subtitle B of title II [the new Chapter 12] shall
not apply with respect to cases commenced under title 11 of the
United States Code before the effective date of this Act.”99 The
Sinclairs responded that Congress allowed for conversion to Chapter
12 under equitable circumstances.100 They relied on the Joint
Explanation of the Conferees who presented the Conference
Committee Report (i.e., the text of the conference bill) to the House
and Senate: “It is not intended that there be routine conversion of
Chapter 11 and 13 cases, pending at the time of enactment, to Chapter
12. Instead, it is expected that courts will exercise their sound discretion in each case, in allowing conversions only where it is equitable to
do so.”101
Judge Easterbrook framed the case this way: “The statute says
conversion is impossible, the report says that conversion is possible
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Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1341.
Id. at 1341–44. Legislative history might help a judge figure out the meaning of
words and phrases, sort of like a super-dictionary, but nothing more. Id. at 1342 (“Clarity
depends on context, which legislative history may illuminate. The process is objective; the
search is not for the contents of the authors’ heads but for the rules of language they
used.”).
104 Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 256(4), 100 Stat. at 3114.
105 11 U.S.C. § 1112(d)(3).
106 In re Sinclair, Civil No. 87-5196, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1988). The court issued
a show cause order to their counsel, requesting a brief, but vacated the order several days
later, and Judge Easterbrook issued his opinion within a week. Order to Show Cause, In
re Sinclair, No. 89–1093 (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 1989); Vacating Order, In re Sinclair, No.
89–1093 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 1989); Order Affirming Judgment, In re Sinclair, No. 89–1093
(7th Cir. Mar. 28, 1989). On Judge Easterbrook’s tendency to ignore or override facts
found in records on appeal, see Emily Hoerner & Rick Tulsky, Pattern of Misstated Facts
Found in Opinions of Renowned U.S. Judge Easterbrook, INJUSTICE WATCH (Apr. 4,
2017), https://www.injusticewatch.org/projects/2017/pattern-of-misstated-facts-found-inprobe-of-renowned-federal-judges-opinions.
103
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and describes the circumstances under which it should occur.”102 He
solved the conflict with an early statement of the new textualism: discern the objective meaning of the text, and do not guess at the subjective expectations of the legislators voting on the text.103 Only the text,
and nothing but the text, is law under Article I, and so only the text
binds judges. The Sinclairs lost their case and, perhaps, their farm.
This textualist analysis missed key text. The conferees’ explanation, quoted above, was not referring to section 302 of the bankruptcy
bill—the transition rule—as Easterbrook thought. Instead, the conferees were discussing the conversion rule in section 256 of the bill.104
That provision was inserted in conference to add new section
1112(d)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 11 cases could be converted to Chapter 12 if “equitable,” that is, fair under the circumstances to the various interests, including creditors’ interests.105 Judge
Easterbrook did not mention section 256—the conversion provision—
of the 1986 Act. He later told one of us that he was unaware of section
256 and did not explore the relevance of section 1112(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code, even though it was cited in the district court’s
opinion.106
Judge Easterbrook bungled the choice of text. The real conflict in
this case was not between statutory text and legislative history but
between two statutory provisions. On the one hand, you have the
transition rule suggesting that the Sinclairs lose; on the other hand,
you have the equitable conversion rule suggesting that the Sinclairs
win. How do the different texts relate to one another? Judge
Easterbrook told us he would stick with his original answer: The transition rule applies to conversion. Hence, equitable conversion applied
only after the 1986 “effective date” of the statute. But there is another
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approach that allows a court to reconcile the two provisions, without
negating either of them, thus harmonizing the texts.107 The Sinclairs
had requested leave to dismiss their Chapter 11 proceeding, without
prejudice to their refiling under Chapter 12.108 The judges rejected
that request because it would have been an end-run around the transition rule, section 302.109 But because the judges did not link the conferees’ remarks to the proper statutory text, they were unaware of the
clash between sections 256 and 302. Allowing dismissal without
prejudice in appropriate cases would have allowed the court to follow
both sections 256 and 302. Judge Easterbrook’s approach, in fact, read
the transition rule more liberally than the full text demanded—and
needlessly restricted the conversion provision.110 This is a very odd
“textualism.”
C.

Public Citizen: Ignoring the Whole Text

12/23/2021 09:17:08

107 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (holding that judges must reconcile
clashing statutory provisions, if possible); accord Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 266–76
(2003) (plurality opinion) (attempting to reconcile conflicting statutory provisions rather
than find an implied repeal).
108 Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1345.
109 Id. at 1344–45.
110 See 133 CONG. REC. 3768–69 (1987) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley) (expressing
dismay that judges were ignoring § 256 and not allowing conversions).
111 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Other examples
of leading textualist opinions by Justice Kennedy include Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001);
and Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
112 5 U.S.C. app. § 1.
113 Sunshine laws impose transparency requirements, such as disclosure mandates and
public access rights, on government entities. See Open-Meeting Law, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (identifying the term “sunshine law” as a colloquial
equivalent).
114 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2).
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The practice of ignoring or suppressing text recurs when we apply
our analytic questions—choice of text and (con)text—to another new
textualist classic, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Public
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice.111 The issue was whether the
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA)112 required the
American Bar Association (ABA) to follow sunshine requirements113
when it provided advice to the President regarding potential judicial
nominees. Watchdog groups argued that the ABA’s Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary was an “advisory committee” as
defined by section 3(2)(B) of the 1972 Act to include “any committee,
board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other
similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof . . .
which is . . . established or utilized by the President.”114 Because the
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President often considered its evaluations, he “utilized” the Standing
Committee, making it subject to FACA’s sunshine requirements.
Writing for a 5–3 Court, Justice Brennan declined to interpret the
statute so broadly, relying on a rambling account of the legislative history and on the absurdity rule, for which he invoked Holy Trinity, the
last time it has been cited by a Supreme Court majority opinion.115
Justice Kennedy made sport of the Court’s invocation of Holy
Trinity and rejected any suggestion that text must yield to the “spirit”
of the statute:
Where it is clear that the unambiguous language of a statute
embraces certain conduct, and it would not be patently absurd to
apply the statute to such conduct, it does not foster a democratic
exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an
alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is
more comfortable.116

12/23/2021 09:17:08

115 Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 453–54; cf. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of
Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 93–95 (2012)
[hereinafter Nourse, By the Rules] (critiquing the majority opinion for its FACA legislative
history).
116 Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
117 See id. at 486–69.
118 See id. at 469–82.
119 See Brief for Federal Appellee at 19–28, Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. 440 (No. 88-429, 88494), 1989 WL 1127662, at *16–20, *23–29.
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To Justice Kennedy, FACA clearly applied to the Standing Committee
and, as applied, was unconstitutional because it invaded the
President’s freedom to consult with outside experts and others when
he made judicial appointments. Hence, Justice Kennedy agreed with
the Court’s result that the Standing Committee did not have to follow
the sunshine requirements of FACA.117
Justice Kennedy boiled the case down to one word: “utilized.”118
This seemed to answer the question, as the President was obviously
utilizing (i.e., using) the ABA for advice. But this framing of the case
turns out to be wrong. As the Department of Justice argued, advisory
committees might be limited to groups created or formally recognized
by the federal government; Congress, for example, might “establish”
an advisory committee, whose counsel would be “utilized” by the
President.119 Justice Kennedy provided no reason the text could not
have been read this way.
At the very least, FACA was ambiguous—but not when you read
the entire statute, which supported the Public Citizen majority. The
majority and concurring opinions focused their attention on the section 3(2)(B) definition and ignored a different text, section 9(a): “No
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advisory committee shall be established unless such establishment is—
(1) specifically authorized by statute or by the President; or (2) . . . by
the head of an agency” involved as a matter of formal record and in
consultation with designated officials.120 What this language demonstrates is that private bodies are not “advisory committees” under the
Act. To “establish” a committee under section 9(a), the committee
had to be authorized by statute, presidential order, or formal agency
action, thus excluding the ABA’s Standing Committee.121 For those
following the statute’s text as the legislative process evolved, that
should not be surprising: Neither the House nor the Senate wrote or
passed bills that differed on this score—they covered only committees
“established” by the government.122
Returning to the text provides a solution to the case’s riddle—the
role played by “utilize.” Section 9(b) provides: “Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute or Presidential directive, advisory committees shall be utilized solely for advisory functions.”123 It was
possible, for example, for advisory groups to be created by one governmental entity but used by another. Congress could “establish” an
official advisory committee, whose advice the President might
“utilize.”124 Groups whose advice was “utilized” by the President were
advisory committees only if they were “established” by statute, presidential order, or formal agency action. This makes sense of the language in section 3(2)(B), “established or utilized.”125 Conversely,
section 14(a) provided that all advisory committees existing on
FACA’s effective date should terminate within two years unless they
were specifically renewed by presidential order or by appropriate

12/23/2021 09:17:08

5 U.S.C. app. § 9(a) (emphasis added).
Indeed, reports from a “Presidential advisory committee” were required to cite the
“authority for its creation.” Id. § 6(a)–(c).
122 See Nourse, By the Rules, supra note 115, at 94; H.R. 4383, 92d Cong. § 3(b) (1972);
S. 3529, 92d Cong. § 3(1), (2) (1972). One of us inferred from this that “utilize” was not
meant to change the statute in significant ways. Conference committees are not supposed
to make major changes to bills in conference. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, rule XXII, cl. 9, at 916 (2011) (“The introduction of any language
presenting specific additional matter not committed to the conference committee by either
House does not constitute a germane modification of the matter in disagreement.”);
SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, rule XXVIII, subsec. 2(a), at 52 (2011) (“Conferees
shall not insert in their report matter not committed to them by either House, nor shall
they strike from the bill matter agreed to by both Houses.”). Adding section 9 into the
calculus explains why the addition of the word “utilize” did not in fact make a major
change in the bill’s coverage.
123 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(b) (emphasis added).
124 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 4 (1972) (discussing how advisory committees may be
used by the President); S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 3–5, 7 (1972) (same).
125 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121
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agency action or by statute.126 FACA’s text established that the
ABA’s judicial evaluation committee was not a federal “advisory committee,” because it was neither established by the government nor
subject to a sunset provision. Justice Kennedy’s adventure into constitutional law thus becomes unnecessary if one simply bothers to read
the whole text.
D.

Chisom: A Representative Textual Gerrymander

Justice Scalia wrote many textualist landmarks. Some of these
opinions strike us as cogent applications of legal terms of art,127 while
many of his ordinary meaning opinions reveal an unfounded confidence in text-only analysis.128 Consider questions about choice of text
and (con)text as applied to one of Justice Scalia’s most theoretically
lucid and colorful opinions—namely, his dissenting opinion in Chisom
v. Roemer.129 As we saw with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Public
Citizen, Justice Scalia deployed one of the classic moves of textual
gerrymandering: reducing a statute to a single word.
Chisom’s question was whether section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, as amended, applied to judicial elections. The original
section 2 was simple: “No voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”130 No
one disputed that this 1965 statute applied to judicial elections.131 But
in 1982, Congress amended the statute, in part as a response to

12/23/2021 09:17:08

5 U.S.C. app. § 14(a).
E.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 119–20 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating that “falsely made” was a legal term of art and did not entail the ordinary
meaning, i.e., containing inaccurate information); cf. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
241–42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s view that a drug defendant
was “using a firearm” when he traded his gun for drugs).
128 E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (dismissing legislative debates as “not helpful” and
“declin[ing] to join [the majority’s] discussion” of those issues at all, even while admitting
the relevant text, “if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps
unconstitutional, result”); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 365, 376–78 (1990) (demonstrating that Justice Scalia’s revision of the text in
Bock Laundry rendered the rule incoherent).
129 501 U.S. 380, 404–17 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
131 See Brief for the United States, Chisom, 501 U.S. 380 (Nos. 90-757, 90-1032), 1991
WL 521250, at *13–14 (“The text of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 therefore clearly applies
to the election of state judges . . . .”).
127
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Supreme Court decisions.132 In City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme
Court had narrowed section 2, limiting it to intentional discrimination.133 Bolden left Black citizens without redress if legislatures gerrymandered to preserve a segregated status quo but did not overtly
admit to racial motivation. That was precisely the problem in
Louisiana’s judicial elections. The all-white legislature had diluted
Black voting strength by combining New Orleans’ Black-majority precincts with a larger number of suburban white-majority precincts to
elect two reliably white justices through an at-large electoral process.134 The Louisiana Supreme Court remained 100% white through
the 1980s,135 in a state whose population was almost one-third
Black.136
In 1982, Congress overrode Bolden and rewrote section 2 to bar
electoral gerrymanders with a demonstrable racial effect. The
amended section 2 read as follows:

Ronald Chisom and other voters of color successfully challenged
Louisiana’s judicial districtbing law under the new statute.

12/23/2021 09:17:08

132 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
133 446 U.S. 55, 69–70 (1980).
134 See Act of June 23, 1975, No. 51, 1975 La. Acts 282, 283 (codified at LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:101); Augustine & Thibodeaux, supra note 69, at 456–60 (analyzing the legislative
background for the judicial district gerrymander).
135 See John B. Wefing, State Supreme Court Justices: Who Are They?, 32 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 47, 52 n.19 (1997).
136 Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by
Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions,
Divisions, and States 51 tbl.33 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 56, 2002).
137 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 2, 96 Stat. at 134.
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(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees
set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. . . .137
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Writing for a 6–3 majority, Justice Stevens ruled that section 2
continued to apply to judicial elections after 1982.138 Justice Stevens
argued that the burden was on the State to demonstrate that Congress
meant to narrow section 2 or exclude judicial elections in the 1982
Amendments.139 Because congressional deliberations revealed no evidence that Congress limited the reach of section 2, and there was
every reason to think that Congress was expanding the ambit of the
statute, Chisom’s claim prevailed.140 In the wake of Chisom,
Louisiana reconfigured its supreme court districts, and in 1994
Bernette Joshua Johnson, the first Black woman, was selected to the
court, where she recently retired as Chief Justice.141
Justice Scalia’s dissent would have produced a different result—
but only because it edited out most of the statutory language and
reduced the law to a single word: “representatives.” That word, Justice
Scalia claimed, meant that section 2’s disparate impact test could not
apply to judicial elections.142 He maintained that no ordinary speaker
would have applied the word “representatives” to judges, and as evidence he cherry-picked a 1950 dictionary.143 The logic: Judges were
not like members of a legislature who act on behalf of their constituents. But the statute focused on “election[s],”144 and no one doubted
that Louisiana’s judges were “elected,” nor that the dominant dictionary and popular view tied representatives to elections.145 Justice
Scalia riposted: “On that hypothesis, the fan-elected members of the
baseball all-star teams are ‘representatives’—hardly a common, if
even a permissible, usage.”146 But Google “All-Star Game” and “rep138

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 21 Side A
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Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403–04 (1991).
Id. at 396 & n.23 (invoking the “dog that did not bark” canon); see also Zuni Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2007) (arguing that, in amending a
statute providing for federal school aid, Congress’s silence on a well-established calculation
method indicated that Congress did not intend to change that method).
140 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404.
141 Press Release, La. Sup. Ct., Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Bernette Joshua
Johnson Retires (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.lasc.org/Press_Release?p=2020-41.
142 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s approach was in
tension with his statement of textualist method, which emphasized context: “[F]irst, find
the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using established
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible
meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If not . . . we apply that ordinary meaning.”
Id. at 404.
143 Id. at 410–11.
144 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
145 See, e.g., Representative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/representative (last visited July 29, 2021) (defining “representative” as “of,
based on, or constituting a government in which the many are represented by persons
chosen from among them usually by election”).
146 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139
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147 See, e.g., Joel Reuter, Which Team Will Have the Most Representatives at 2020 MLB
All-Star Game?, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2880156-which-team-will-have-the-most-representatives-at-2020-mlb-all-star-game.
148 See, e.g., HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 53–54
(1967) (“We speak of representation . . . where the action is to be ascribed to someone
other than the one who acts.”); see also David Plotke, Representation Is Democracy, 4
CONSTELLATIONS 19, 24 (1997) (arguing that representation plays a “central positive role
in democratic politics”); Michael Saward, The Representative Claim, 5 CONTEMP. POL.
THEORY 297, 301–02 (2006) (underscoring representation as “claim-making,” in addition
to acting on behalf of others).
149 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61, 69–70 (1980).
150 See Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 655 (1991) (applying section 5 to Louisiana’s
judicial gerrymander).
151 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 407–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 21 Side B

resentative.” It turns out that All-Stars are ordinarily said to be “representatives” of their cities or their teams.147 In the end, Justice
Scalia’s view of “representatives” reflected his personal view of governance, where political legislators churned out statutes in an
unknowable black box and judges mechanically applied them to new
facts. His transactional view of legislators is in stark contrast to that of
leading political theorists, who view representatives as acting for and
on behalf of the public.148
The Scalia interpretation also ignored a good bit of relevant
(con)text. No one doubted that under the primary statutory text and
the Fifteenth Amendment, Chisom could have brought a claim that
judicial elections were covered, as long as the claim involved intentional discrimination.149 And judicial elections were covered under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which at that time required Justice
Department preclearance of some states’ new voting laws.150 The 1982
Amendments added a different method to establish a violation via disparate impact, but nowhere were judicial elections expressly excluded.
As we can see from the Scalia opinion, the aim of textual method in
practice was not to harmonize the most text, but to disaggregate it—to
reduce it to smaller morsels that could be expanded or narrowed to
taste.
One of the problems with packing a statute into a single word is
that the move can lead to further gerrymanders. Justice Scalia was not
ready to say that judicial elections were completely excluded from
coverage, only that disparate impact claims were excluded. To accomplish that, he had to slice up the statute in an unusual way. He split
section 2(b), quoted above, into two segments, and then read “and” as
“or.”151 For the Scalia dissent, section 2(b) created two separate
voting rights. One right was for individuals to challenge elections in
which “members have less opportunity than other members of the
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electorate to participate in the political process.”152 The other right was
“to elect representatives of their choice.”153 For Justice Scalia, the right
to participate allowed some claims in judicial elections—e.g., shorter
polling hours in Black voting districts.154 But the separate right to
elect “representatives” did not apply to judicial elections.155 The
statute itself did not, however, bifurcate these rights. Instead, the section 2(b) right to “participate in the political process” was immediately followed by “and” to elect representatives.156 Justice Scalia’s
forced segregation arbitrarily broke up the statutory protection but
was needed so that he could make the case turn on the word “representatives,” and his interpretive theory, even though his real beef was
with disparate impact claims.
E.

Pride at Work: Cracking-and-Packing a Constitutional Initiative

152

12/23/2021 09:17:08

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
Id. at 408–10, 417 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
154 See id. at 417.
155 Id. at 416–17.
156 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).
157 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
158 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
159 Justice Markman was criticized for disrespecting precedent. See, e.g., Robert A.
Sedler, The Michigan Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and Overruling the Overrulings, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1911, 1939 (2009) (“[I]n the period from 1999 to 2008, the Michigan
Supreme Court overruled thirty-four decisions on ideological grounds. . . . I believe this
record of overrulings on ideological grounds by one state court in a limited time frame is
truly extraordinary, and likely unmatched by any other state court.”).
160 Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 533–39.
161 Id. at 531–32.
153
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Serving in the Reagan Department of Justice, Steve Markman
was a Founding Father of the new textualism a decade before he was
named to the Michigan Supreme Court.157 His best-known opinion
was National Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan,158 another
example of cracking-and-packing a legal text.159 As Justice Kennedy
did in Public Citizen, Justice Markman broke up the statute into its
individual words, read each word as broadly as possible, and then
reassembled the words into a very broad prohibition at odds with the
legislative and popular plans.160
The Markman opinion arose in a challenge to whether
Kalamazoo, Michigan could grant health insurance benefits to samesex partners. Kalamazoo permitted every municipal employee to
include another person in their health insurance coverage that came
with the employment package.161 Married employees could include
their legal spouses. Nonmarried employees could include “domestic
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Id.
Id. at 532.
164 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
165 Id. In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized samesex marriages. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
Earlier, California and Vermont had adopted statutes granting almost all the legal rights
and benefits of marriage to same-sex partners and persons joined in civil unions. California
Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Stat. 3081
(providing comprehensive domestic partnership rights in California); Act of Apr. 26, 2000,
No. 91, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72 (providing comprehensive civil union rights in
Vermont).
166 Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 529–30.
167 Id. at 530.
168 Id. at 543.
169 Id. at 533–39.
163
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partners,” so long as they could certify that the partners were of the
same sex; at least eighteen years old and mentally competent; shared a
common residence; were not domestic partners or married to anyone
else and not related by blood; and shared financial arrangements and
daily living expenses.162 The Michigan Attorney General claimed that
the Kalamazoo plan was preempted by a state constitutional provision
defining marriage as a “union of one man and one woman.”163
In 2004, Michigan voters amended the Michigan constitution as a
response to other states’ early recognition of same-sex marriage and
civil unions.164 Aiming to forestall the outcomes of Vermont and
California, which bestowed almost all the legal rights and duties of
civil marriage upon same-sex couples in statewide civil unions and
domestic partnerships (respectively), Michigan voters adopted an
amendment which read: “To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union
of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”165
National Pride at Work and a cohort of various individual plaintiffs
brought suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the amendment did
not bar public employers from providing health-insurance benefits to
their employees’ qualified same-sex domestic partners.166 The
Attorney General intervened in the suit on behalf of the defendants,
arguing that Kalamazoo could not provide partnership benefits to its
employees, as its union contract provided.167 Justice Markman’s
opinion for the Court agreed with the Attorney General and voided
the contract benefits.168
Justice Markman separately analyzed each of the words of the
Amendment. Was there (1) an “agreement” (2) that was being “recognized” (3) as a “marriage or similar union”?169 Disaggregating the
sentence into individual words cracked the statute open, allowing
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Justice Markman to choose the broadest possible meaning of each
term. When packed back together, the text appeared to have only one
plain meaning—but Justice Markman’s interpretation left out relevant
text and (con)text. By 2004, for example, many municipalities had created registries where same-sex couples could file domestic partnership
agreements with the government, some triggering public benefits.170
California’s domestic partnership law vested registered partners with
hundreds of marriage-based legal benefits.171 But Kalamazoo had
nothing like this regime for its employees: The city only asked
employees to identify their domestic partners and to certify the truth
of the factual requirements.172 Upon certification, the partners would
be added as health insurance beneficiaries.173 Hence, there was no
“agreement” similar to a marriage contract, a civil union agreement,
or even a registered domestic partnership.174
Justice Markman focused most of his attention on “marriage or
similar union.” The natural reading of that language likely would
target legal statuses amounting to a marriage or something close to it,
in light of the preamble’s goal of securing “the benefits of marriage
for our society and future generations of children.”175 As background
(con)text, the laws of other states at the time did recognize such a
similar legal status, namely, Vermont’s civil unions and California’s
statewide domestic partnerships.176 But Kalamazoo’s domestic partnership requirements differed. Although the city intended to give the
partners of lesbian and gay employees the same contractual benefits
as those provided to the spouses (or partners) of straight employees,
43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 23 Side A
12/23/2021 09:17:08

170 See David L. Chambers, Tales of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of
Domestic Partnerships in San Francisco and New York, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 181, 182
(1992).
171 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
172 Attorney General’s Brief on Appeal at 5–7, Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d 524
(Nos. 133429, 133554) (describing the domestic partnership requirements of Kalamazoo,
the University of Michigan, and Michigan State University).
173 Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 531.
174 Justice Markman defined “agreement” as any kind of “mutual arrangement.” Nat’l
Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 538 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 28 (1991)).
175 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
176 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court
directed the state legislature to create a legal form that would afford same-sex couples a
status similar to that of married couples. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). The
next year, the Vermont Legislature enacted a law creating “civil unions,” with all the legal
rights and duties of marriage, for same-sex couples. Act of Apr. 26, 2000, No. 91, 2000 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 72. California enacted a similar law in 2003. California Domestic Partner
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Stat. 3081, 3081–82.

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 23 Side B

12/23/2021 09:17:08

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-6\NYU603.txt

1754

unknown

Seq: 37

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

17-DEC-21

12:19

[Vol. 96:1718

the municipal policy created no legal status other than that of an
employment contract.177
To include Kalamazoo’s contract, Justice Markman split up “similar” and “union.” The opinion defined a “union” as “something
formed by uniting two or more things; combination,” and “similar”
meant “having qualities in common.”178 So anything that put two or
more people together and had “qualities in common” with marriage
was covered by the amendment—potentially including grandchildren,
best friends, and even casebook co-authors. Or imagine this: A man
asks a woman to slow dance with him; she consents because he is an
appropriate partner given his age, his unmarried status, and his not
being a relative. Is their “agreement” a “similar union” to a marriage?
An impertinent young man in Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey
thought so, but his dancing partner was appalled.179
Cracking the amendment into itty bits of text, Justice Markman
created an implausibly broad construction, rendered the preamble
irrelevant, and failed to consider relevant (con)text—namely, state
civil union and domestic partnership laws. This should not be a surprise, given what we have already seen: Packing the text’s meaning into
small pieces tends to increase, rather than decrease, discretion. Once
the text is pulled from context, each word is set in its own null context,180 and the interpreter may give it either a broad or a narrow
meaning, without regard to the remainder of text.
F. The Costs of Gerrymandering

177
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See Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 531–32.
Id. at 533–34 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra
note 174, at 1248, 1456).
179 JANE AUSTEN, NORTHANGER ABBEY 74–75 (Barbara M. Benedict & Deirdre Le
Faye eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1817) (giving an amusing fictional account of a
young man who suggested that a woman’s acceptance of an invitation to dance was
“similar” to her acceptance of an offer to marry).
180 For an analysis of this move from text to null context, see Nourse, Picking and
Choosing, supra note 45, at 1414–23 (relying upon PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF
WORDS 23–31 (1989) (highlighting how an interpreter can change the contextual
implication of a phrase by isolating it from surrounding text)).
181 See, e.g., LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE
REGULATORY STATE 147–53, 303–04 (3d ed. 2020) (reviewing Holy Trinity with Justice
Scalia’s critique and Public Citizen); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH
178
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Given the textual mistakes identified above, one might wonder
whether we have gerrymandered our own examples. But the authors
of these opinions are the early new textualist leaders and chose to
make important theoretical statements in these cases; indeed, legislation casebooks have focused attention on these very cases as exemplary of the new textualist methodology.181 Textualists rely upon them
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as sources of methodological guidance.182 Our Appendix of recent
cases demonstrates that the slicing and dicing techniques generating
imaginary plain meanings have now become standard practice within
the Supreme Court.183 To the extent textual gerrymandering is occurring, the rule of law takes a hit because statutory applications become
less objective and predictable.184 If you actually read the statutes in
question—they are not very complicated—would you have predicted
the results in Bostock and the cases analyzed above? The new textualists claim their method is the only one that can be applied objectively
to reach consistent results across different interpreters, yet textualists
themselves no longer agree upon the proper text and have disagreed
in high-profile cases. One might claim that as long as both of the
results were “reasonable” in some way, the interpreters’ discretion has
been restrained relative to a universe of additional possible interpretations. But can textualism survive the discovery that, despite its theoretical foundations, these divergent interpretations depend upon
picking and choosing text? And that their rush to exclude legislative
evidence often yields results that are indefensible as a matter of text?
The fact that textualist interpretation allows judges wide discretion to define textual meaning brings to mind a cognitive bias: The less
information you use in interpretation, the more likely the interpreter
will engage in motivated reasoning.185 No leading linguist believes that
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CHAFETZ, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 366,
377–78, 411–18, 476–81, 511–13, 517–25, 528–38, 760–65 (6th ed. 2020) (reviewing National
Pride at Work, Holy Trinity and Justice Scalia’s critique, Public Citizen, Chisom, Marshall,
and Sinclair); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE,
STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN
THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 304–12, 386–97, 410–23, 686–98 (2014) (reviewing Holy
Trinity and Justice Scalia’s critique, Chisom, Marshall, Public Citizen, and Pride at Work);
JANE C. GINSBURG & DAVID S. LOUK, LEGAL METHODS: CASE ANALYSIS AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 274–86 (5th ed. 2020) (providing textualist lower court and
purposivist Supreme Court opinions in Holy Trinity and Marshall); Manning &
Stephenson, supra note 12, at 44–45, 121–36, 246–49, 253–69 (reviewing Holy Trinity and
Justice Scalia’s critique, Public Citizen, Sinclair, and Marshall); ABNER J. MIKVA, ERIC
LANE & MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 818–23, 843–54, 908–18 (4th ed.
2015) (reviewing Holy Trinity, Marshall, and Chisom).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1319 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(relying on Sinclair).
183 See infra Appendix.
184 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of
Law (identifying the elements of a legal system that satisfy “the requirements of the rule of
law” as “generality,” “knowability,” and “performability”), in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS
XXXVI 265, 265 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
185 See Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean
More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (2017) (answering the question posed in the title
as: not at all, based on empirical evidence).
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one can discern the meaning of a sentence by pulling words from it,
for words cannot be understood without context.186 Language
depends upon condensed, shorthand expressions that communicate
based on shared but unarticulated assumptions. As the philosopher
John Searle has explained: If I order a hamburger, I do not expect that
I will receive a hamburger in a lucite cube, and I certainly do not have
to communicate “no lucite cube” in my order.187 If, after more than a
decade during which the Voting Rights Act applied to judicial elections, Congress imposes new anti-discrimination rules onto state elections, a judicial opinion saying that judicial elections are no longer
covered by the Voting Rights Act is like the waiter who brings the
burger in a lucite cube.188 But the judge is more willful than the
waiter: She trumps background context with her own theory of
judging and representation, and the injury is to our democracy and
individual voting rights, not only to a disappointed diner.
Judges who boast about the determinacy of their method often
secure it by adding meaning using implicit, but unacknowledged, modifiers.189 And, often, these modifiers are sufficiently hard-edged and
quantitative to appear to resolve the case. In Public Citizen, Justice
Kennedy expanded FACA to require that all committees utilized in
any way by the President were advisory committees, including family
members and political advisers—an absurd result.190 In Pride at Work,
Justice Markman read the statute to include all relationships similar in

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 24 Side B
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186 See, e.g., SLOCUM, supra note 86, at 106 (“With philosophy of language and
linguistics, the typical focus is on sentences as the relevant units of meaning. Part of the
problem with the current judicial approach to interpretation, though, is that courts often
frame the ordinary meaning inquiry as involving an individual word instead of the relevant
sentence.”).
187 John R. Searle, Literal Meaning, 13 ERKENNTNIS 207, 216 (1978). See generally KENT
BACH & ROBERT M. HARNISH, LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION AND SPEECH ACTS (1979)
(observing that the determination of locutionary meaning involves inferences from
contextual information about the speaker’s intentions); GRICE, supra note 180, at 1–144;
FRANÇOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING (2004) (defending semantic contextualism);
ROBERT C. STALNAKER, CONTEXT AND CONTENT: ESSAYS ON INTENTIONALITY IN SPEECH
AND THOUGHT (1999) (offering a subjective conception of context as the common ground
of shared presuppositions in a conversation). On applying these ideas, see Nourse, Picking
and Choosing, supra note 45, at 1414–20.
188 See supra Section I.D.
189 See Nourse, Picking and Choosing, supra note 45, at 1420–23 (showing how
analyzing phrases taken out of context leads judges to imply exclusivity or inclusivity not
present when the phrases are considered in context of their full statutes); Victoria Nourse,
Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive Power, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2018) [hereinafter Nourse, Reclaiming] (explaining how Justice
Scalia implied the word “all” before “the Executive Power” in Article II of the
Constitution in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). For a
discussion of quantifiers, see SLOCUM, supra note 86, at 148–212.
190 See supra Section I.C.
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any way imaginable to marriage (ironically, a unique institution).191 In
Chisom, Justice Scalia modified representatives to mean only political
officials.192 And lest you think that these implicatures are always inexplicit, do not forget Justice Scalia’s opinion in Morrison v. Olson,193
much celebrated by textualists, that the President has all possible and
not just “the” executive power, something the Constitution does not
say.194
Textualists are not alone in failing to address the picking-andchoosing problem. Purposivism has its own gerrymandering problem,
given the malleability of statutory purpose, as we demonstrated in
Table 1 above.195 So in Chisom, one might describe the purpose
broadly as protecting minority voting rights, or more narrowly as protecting only voting rights in elections for representatives. In Public
Citizen, the statute identified six purposes, any of which could have
been read broadly or narrowly.196 But the new textualism claims as its
comparative advantage that its method uniquely constrains decisionmaking. That claim has never been supported empirically and is
inconsistent with evidence from the leading empirical studies of
Supreme Court decisionmaking.197 Table 2 maps this dialectic. One
axis is choice of relevant text and (con)text, the other is how broadly
to read words and phrases.

12/23/2021 09:17:08

See supra Section I.E.
See supra Section I.D.
193 487 U.S. at 705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Nourse, Reclaiming, supra note
189, at 1.
194 See Nourse, Reclaiming, supra note 189, at 23.
195 See supra Table 1. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (published version of the 1958 tent. ed.); cf. Frank
H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 693
(1987).
196 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b).
197 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,
96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (analyzing statutory interpretation in Supreme Court cases
empirically and concluding that ad hoc judicial decisionmaking occurs in textualist and
purposivist decisions alike); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 25, at 79–80, 83 (identifying
cases in which same textualist canons are used to reach opposing outcomes).
192
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AND

Limit Words and Phrases to
Their Core Meanings

Ignore and/or Minimize
Inconvenient Text

Enlarging (Con)text
Whole Act or Whole Code
or Constitution

[Vol. 96:1718

(CON)TEXT CAN BE MANIPULATED

Narrow Reading of Words

Shrinking (Con)text

12:19

Broad Reading of Words
Divvy Up Text, Provide
Broad Meaning for Each
Word, Then Reassemble
Scalia’s Tanner Lectures
(Anti-Holy Trinity)

Sinclair (Easterbrook)
Chisom (Scalia’s dissent)

Public Citizen (Kennedy’s
concurring opinion)
National Pride at Work
(Markman)

Holy Trinity Church
(Brewer)

Chisom (Stevens)

Public Citizen (Brennan)

12/23/2021 09:17:08

198 For a discussion of how neoliberal economic ideals associated with the Chicago
School have systematically influenced legal decisionmaking, see Jedediah Britton-Purdy,
David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-andPolitical-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J.
1784, 1799, 1815–18 (2020).
199 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Absence of Method, supra note 16, at 95 (demonstrating that
judges are not omniscient and apply canons in ways that fit with their partisan
understandings when issues present no clear or easy answer).
200 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Particularly troubling is new textualism’s scorn for frank normative evaluation, while freeing judges to make normative choices under
the veil of word games. In the foregoing cases, judges took an active
role in creating, not just discovering, text. And the created text coincided with ideological positions associated with the judges writing
those opinions. Judge Easterbrook’s interpretation of the 1986
Bankruptcy Act was consistent with his Chicago School premise that
burdening bankers would dry up farmers’ credit, and so such burdens
should be minimized.198 Justice Scalia’s Chisom dissent coincided with
a rigid understanding of the separation of powers, aggressively differentiating judges as officers of the law from politician-representatives.
Justice Markman’s Pride at Work decision echoed the views of those
nostalgic for the 1950s marriage regime or insistent that same-sex
unions ought to be denigrated. If textualism does not produce “one
right answer,” then it follows that hard cases are likely to be decided
by reading partisan values into gerrymandered texts.199 This reverses
the critique of purposivism: In practice, the new textualists’ choice of
text and choice of (con)text is like looking out over the crowd and
picking out their friends.200
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Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, HARPER’S MAG., Nov.

202

Id. at 79–81.
GEORGE PACKER, LAST BEST HOPE: AMERICA IN CRISIS AND RENEWAL 103 (2021)
(discussing Hofstadter’s thesis as reflecting anti-intellectualism and anti-elitism).
203
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201

1964.

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 26 Side A

New textualism’s partisan supporters may believe that ideological
tilt is a positive feature if textualism correlates with dismantling or
enfeebling the modern regulatory state or with an anti-statist populism. But textualism as a method is not inherently libertarian, unless
the partisan judge makes it so. New textualist analysis would have
expanded government regulation of religion in the Tanner Lectures,
assumed congressional meddling with presidential nominations in
Public Citizen’s concurring opinion, terminated contract rights in
Pride at Work, and denied voting rights in the Chisom dissent. Nor is
textualism as applied by Ivy League and Chicago School jurists populist in a generic sense associated with a pro-agrarian or anti-regulatory
stance. If anything, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Sinclair is probank elitist (ask the family farmers, the classic audience for populism
but disrespected in the judge’s opinion), and Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion in Public Citizen aggrandizes the President’s authority
and protects the ABA, a bastion of elite power, against FACA’s openprocess directives. The method’s manipulability makes Procrustes—
the ancient bandit and smith who either stretched or amputated
people’s legs to fit them into an iron bed—the new textualism’s
mythic symbol.
On the other hand, some of our examples here (and elsewhere in
this Article) do echo the ideology or spirit of classic populism—but
the echo is to the most questionable features of that political impulse,
what Richard Hofstadter called the “paranoid style” in American
politics.201 The paranoid style of many historical claims that sounded
in populist rhetoric—from the anti-Catholic paranoia of the early
nineteenth century to the racist hysteria of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries—rested upon Americans’ feeling that they
were being dispossessed and their cherished traditions diminished by a
conspiracy of government officials and private elites.202 According to
the populists, “[s]elf-government didn’t require any special learning,
just the native wisdom of the people,” as opposed to “educated
sophisticates.”203 There is a whiff of that style in Justice Markman’s
fearful resistance to lesbian and gay relationships in Pride at Work
and in Justice Scalia’s textual gymnastics arrayed against racial
remediation in Chisom. There is even a populist edge to his critique of
Holy Trinity, where an elite Court protected a tony well-heeled
Episcopal church against a statute aiming to discourage a flood of for-

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 26 Side B

12/23/2021 09:17:08

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-6\NYU603.txt

1760

unknown

Seq: 43

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

17-DEC-21

12:19

[Vol. 96:1718

eign manual workers. Some populist complaints—and some of its suspicion of elite decisions—are well-grounded. If the Justices seek what
they consider to be populist results (whether it be for farmers or
against elites and minorities), those aims should be transparent, not
hidden in an assertedly neutral empirical method. Our critique is not
focused on the results of any particular case, but on a method that
justifies itself at a meta-level as normatively superior because it speaks
on behalf of the “ordinary man,” whether that method yields purportedly liberal or conservative, popular or unpopular, results.
The Constitution established our government as a republic of
representatives, not as a populist democracy. As Madison expressed it
in Federalist No. 10, the goal of a representative, deliberative democracy is
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and
love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,
will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by
the people themselves, convened for the purpose.204

204
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
See generally PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY (2012); DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK (2008); Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and
Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 475, 478 (2000); Thomas M. Guterbock & Bruce
London, Race, Political Orientation, and Participation: An Empirical Test of Four
Competing Theories, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 439 (1983); Stephen C. Craig, Richard G. Niemi &
Glenn E. Silver, Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items, 12
POL. BEHAV. 289 (1990); Donald E. Stokes, Popular Evaluations of Government: An
Empirical Assessment, in ETHICS AND BIGNESS: SCIENTIFIC, ACADEMIC, RELIGIOUS,
POLITICAL, AND MILITARY 61 (Harlan Cleveland & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1962).
206 Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 66–76 (1994).
205
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The legitimacy of a democratic government is complicated and cannot
be reduced to a single variable—but leading political theorists maintain that a key building block for legitimate government is the
people’s perception that their elected representatives are deliberating
with their overall interests in mind and are accountable for the products of their deliberations.205 No political scientist doubts that, in the
United States, voters base their views on low information; they delegate policy choices to elected representatives who, as a relative
matter, have greater information about the means by which actual
policies can be implemented in a complex legal system.206

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 27 Side A

12/23/2021 09:17:08

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-6\NYU603.txt

December 2021]

unknown

Seq: 44

17-DEC-21

TEXTUAL GERRYMANDERING

12:19

1761

This process has served the country well, and the judiciary has
usually been a cooperative partner or a faithful relational agent in that
process.207 The new textualism’s effort to exclude or marginalize representatives’ views in the name of a consumer economy of the “ordinary person” is, at bottom, a faux-populism—ostensibly democracyenhancing but in practice judge-empowering. Rhetorically, it builds on
cynicism about legislators and is fueled and empowered by congressional gridlock, a phenomenon that Samuel Issacharoff warns is creating a “democracy deficit” and enfeebling our national
government.208 Nadia Urbinati has shown that populists claim to
represent an immediate “ordinary” popular will, but that these claims
are routinely deployed by authoritarian leaders to bypass the republican political process and to advance their own interests.209 The
democracy deficit and suspicion of public officials have gotten worse
in the last two decades, at the same time statutory populism and suspicion of any kind of official discretion have come to dominate discourse about courts and judging.210 Today, as we shall see, Justices of
all persuasions hew to the rhetoric and embrace the methods of the
new textualism, with legislative materials ignored or closeted. As the
reach of the new textualism has expanded, we have entered the
golden age of textual gerrymandering in search of “ordinary”
meaning.
II
THE ROBERTS COURT

NEW JUDICIAL ECONOMY
INFORMATION

AND THE

OF

12/23/2021 09:17:08

207 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)
(offering examples of dynamic but text-based statutory interpretation by judges operating
as faithful agents of congressional plans); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989) (demonstrating that a “faithful agent” for a long-term
contract or statute is a judge who acts as a “relational agent” dynamically applying its rules
to new circumstances).
208 Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficit, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 485, 497–99 (2018).
209 See Nadia Urbinati, Liquid Parties, Dense Populism, 45 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM
1069, 1070 (2019) (“[P]opulism’s factional nature . . . resonates with . . . the priority given
to their ‘here’ and ‘now’ majority . . . .”). This immediacy helps to explain populism’s
“‘impatience’ with constitutional rules and the division of powers . . . .” Id.
210 Issacharoff, supra note 208, at 485–88 (surveying causes of populist anti-institutional
sensibilities throughout the West).
211 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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In this Part, supplemented by the Appendix of recent cases, we
explore how the Roberts Court—including Justices of liberal as well
as conservative persuasion—has shifted the interpretive inquiry away
from the authors of statutes, Congress (the “production economy”), to
the readers of statutes (the “consumer economy”).211 Building on the
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original impulse to focus on particular words, the Justices now joust
about the meaning to the ordinary person of a textual morsel, trading
homey examples, even in cases where the methodology yields no
interpretive closure even among true textualist believers, like Bostock
v. Clayton County.212 Borrowing original public meaning from constitutional theory, the homey example now looks backward in time: For
example, what did “sex” mean to the average American in 1964?213
Here, we illustrate the method and oddity of orthodox textualism.
Elite judges try to imagine themselves as ordinary people reading
technical statutes as if they lived decades in the past. They refuse to
rely on legislative evidence for anything but perfunctory confirmation
of the judge’s imaginary ordinary meaning.214 Meanwhile, the judge’s
duty to interpret the law is offloaded onto dictionaries, corpus
searches, grammar-based inferences, and judicially created textual
canons of statutory construction.215 Moreover, when dictionaries and
the like do not yield interpretive closure, judges deploy judge-made
substantive canons to supplant actual evidence of meaning from the
production economy, even when the statutory authors’ views are
undisputed.216
The foundational cases for the new textualism saw judges cherrypicking texts and (con)text. In today’s age of orthodox textualism,
substantive canons are being aggressively deployed by judges to create
new context. By creating and adjusting substantive canons, judges can
engage in “stealth constitutionalism,” bending—or rewriting—pre-

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 27 Side B
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212 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); see infra Section II.C (discussing the various opinions in
Bostock).
213 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
214 On the use of legislative history to confirm “plain” meaning, see, for example,
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1072 (2020) (Breyer, J.); Milner v. Dep’t of
Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011) (Kagan, J.); Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 514 n.3
(2012) (Sotomayor, J.); see also James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 901, 901–02 (2011) (discussing judges’ use of legislative history to confirm
their plain meaning analysis).
215 See supra note 30 and accompanying text; ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra
note 21, at 407–45 (appendix of canon references for the Roberts Court, 2006–15); Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 236 (2010); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling
Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 914 (2016); Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and
Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s
First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 74–75 (2018).
216 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275,
1350–51 (2020) (arguing that the Roberts Court textualists use canons to smuggle in
“purpose” through the back door). For a more democracy-respecting theory of the canons,
see generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008).
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selected texts to reflect their preferred constitutional values.217 This
exacerbates new textualism’s costs to representative democracy as
well as to the rule of law. Textualists claim to be empirical, not normative, and yet the choice of canons often depends upon normative commitments that may be entirely at odds with the commitments of the
people who voted for the statute in Congress.218
A.

Bond v. United States: Choosing Text and Context

12/23/2021 09:17:08

217 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81–87 (1994).
218 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 32, at 930–40, 954–56 (finding most “textual
canons” deployed by the Roberts Court are unknown to and unused by congressional
drafters); id. at 940–49, 956–61 (finding a large majority of “substantive canons” deployed
by the Roberts Court are unknown to congressional drafters, and some are the opposite of
what drafters assume).
219 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 123–25, 153–56 and accompanying text.
221 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
222 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–856 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6701–6771).
223 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1).
224 Id. § 229F(1)(A).
225 Id. § 229F(8)(A).
226 Id. § 229F(7)(A).
227 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014).
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Recall that Judge Easterbrook treated Sinclair as an easy case
because he did not notice a relevant textual provision.219 Justice
Kennedy in Public Citizen and Justice Scalia in Chisom made easy
cases harder by ignoring relevant statutory text.220 Cracking-andpacking, accompanied by suppression of text, has become, if anything,
more common during the Roberts Court—and it is not limited to the
most dogmatic textualists. We start with the Chief Justice’s opinion for
the Court in Bond v. United States.221
In 1998, Congress enacted the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act.222 The Act forbids any person knowingly to use
“any chemical weapon.”223 It defines “chemical weapon” as “[a] toxic
chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not
prohibited under this chapter.”224 “Toxic chemical” is defined as “any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”225 Permissible purposes of such chemicals include “[a]ny
peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity.”226
Microbiologist Carol Anne Bond stole a quantity of 10-chloro10H-phenoxarsine (an arsenic-based compound).227 Orally ingesting
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Brief for United States at 4, Bond, 572 U.S. 844 (No. 12-158).
Id.
230 Bond, 572 U.S. at 852.
231 Id. at 857 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350
(1971)); see also id. at 848, 856–59.
232 Id. at 860–61 (emphasis added).
233 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A).
234 Bond, 572 U.S. at 861; see also Brief for Petitioner at 47–48, Bond, 572 U.S. 844 (No.
12-158) (“Congress clearly intended section 229 to reach acts of terrorism, not every
malicious use of chemicals.”).
229
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one-half of a teaspoon of this chemical may be lethal to an adult, and
“a few ingested crystals could kill a child”; a teaspoon may be “lethal
to the touch.”228 Bond also ordered a vial of potassium dichromate on
Amazon.com. Even in small quantities, this chemical can cause permanent scarring, organ damage, or death.229 Bond used these toxic
chemicals to exact revenge on Myrlinda Haynes, a neighbor who was
pregnant with the child of Bond’s husband. Bond went to Haynes’s
home on at least twenty-four occasions and spread the chemicals on
her neighbor’s car door, mailbox, and front doorknob. Because she
detected the chemicals, Haynes suffered only minor injuries, but she
complained to local authorities of the ongoing danger to her and her
family.230 The state authorities did nothing, but Bond was prosecuted
federally.
Writing for a 6–3 Court, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that Bond’s
conduct did not fall within the statute. The problem with the government’s interpretation, he began, was that it would “‘dramatically
intrude[] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction,’ and we avoid
reading statutes to have such reach in the absence of a clear indication
that they do.”231 Rather than asking whether the statute provided
such a clear statement, Chief Justice Roberts pivoted toward the statutory audience. “[A]s a matter of natural meaning, an educated user of
English would not describe Bond’s crime as involving a ‘chemical
weapon.’ Saying that a person ‘used a chemical weapon’ conveys a
very different idea than saying the person ‘used a chemical in a way
that caused some harm.’”232 The Chief Justice provided no evidence
that his supposition reflected the views of most Americans.
Notice that the turn to the hypothetical educated consumer displaced the actual text of the statute. The statute explicitly defines
“chemical weapon” and specifies permissible and impermissible uses:
“Toxic chemicals” triggering the statute are those that “can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”233 Chief Justice Roberts read into the text the idea that the
toxic chemical had to be used as a weapon of war or terrorism.234 As
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235 Bond, 572 U.S. at 867–73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagreeing sharply with Chief
Justice Roberts’s argument on the statutory issue).
236 Id. at 871 (emphasis added) (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000));
accord Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 490 (2020); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
237 See Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 409–11 (2015); cf.
Heather K. Gerken, Comment, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85,
89–90 (2014) (arguing the statute was “crystalline” but “[t]he Court . . . couldn’t bring itself
to believe that Congress had, in fact, passed a statute broad enough to reach Bond’s
conduct”); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2152 (2015) (arguing that
Bond is only defensible from a purposivist or avoidance perspective); Skilling v. United
States, 561 U.S. 358, 403–11 (2010) (openly rewriting a statute to avoid due process notice
problems).
238 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
239 Bond, 572 U.S. at 857 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)).
240 See Stephen F. Smith, Federalization’s Folly, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 35 (2019); cf.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress’s ability to regulate home-grown
marijuana, even though state law traditionally regulated illegal drugs).
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Justice Scalia’s separate opinion observed on this issue,235 Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion, by supplanting the statute’s definition with
“natural meaning,” violated one of the most basic rules of statutory
interpretation: “When a statute includes an explicit definition, we
must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary
meaning.”236 As Richard Re has argued, the Chief Justice’s problem
was that he did not want to admit he was carrying out a Holy Trinity
move, namely, narrowing the statute.237
Moreover, the majority’s understanding of the “educated user of
English” was both ungrounded and questionable.238 Is it not likely
that Myrlinda Haynes and her daughter viewed the two dozen
attempts to poison them as “weaponizing” toxic chemicals and as a
terror campaign against them? Even if an ordinary citizen could work
her way through a chemical weapons statute, would she not pay attention to the statutory definition? The Chief Justice violated the textualist rule that definitions trump ordinary meaning, because other
normative considerations loomed larger.
Recall that Chief Justice Roberts began his interpretation with a
canon disfavoring interpretations that would “dramatically intrude[]
upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction.”239 This put a heavy finger
on the scale favoring a narrow interpretation that rendered choice of
text less important and the Court’s holding easier to justify. Why was
that particular canon preferred? A vast array of federal criminal law
overlaps with state criminal law but has not consistently given rise to
application of the federalism canon or to limiting constructions.240
Why invoke federalism concerns in this case but not in other criminal
cases? Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts never explained why this
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canon provided better information than other available (con)text—
such as the international chemical weapons convention requiring that
Congress pass the legislation. The convention ratified by the Senate
commits the United States to protect an international market for safe
and useful chemicals.241 Article VI of the treaty requires the United
States to adopt measures ensuring that toxic chemicals are only
“developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or
used within its territory” for “peaceful purposes.”242 Such an effort
requires national regulation that, by definition, marginalizes or may
even supersede state law. The Chief Justice’s federalism opinion suppressed this competing (con)text without justification or even
recognition.
Was Chief Justice Roberts basically rejecting an international law
preference for a national regulatory regime, a preference that had
been ratified by an overwhelming Senate majority?243 In our view, it is
more likely that he was trying to avoid the bigger constitutional issue
raised by the concurring Justices, who would have embraced a gamechanging limit on Congress’s power to enforce treaties. They maintained that the Treaty Clause gave Congress no authority to enact a
chemical weapons law, in effect overruling Missouri v. Holland.244
Notwithstanding his statesmanship, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
was a multifaceted textual gerrymander: picking some text (“chemical
weapon”) but ignoring other text (the statutory definition), picking
one canon among several, and suppressing the international
convention.
King v. Burwell: Harmonizing v. Dissecting Text

The Roberts Court’s gerrymandering appeared in full force again
the year after Bond. If there were a preview of Bostock’s fracturing
textualism, it was the Roberts-Scalia debate in King v. Burwell.245 The
Chief Justice purported to find a textual resolution to what was essen-

12/23/2021 09:17:08

241 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974
U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. The convention was ratified by
the Senate by a 74–26 vote. Convention on Chemical Weapons, Apr. 24, 1997, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 103-21.
242 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 241, art. VI(2) & art. II(9)(a).
243 See Bond, 572 U.S. at 848.
244 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (announcing a broad authorization for Congress to pass laws
implementing valid treaties). In Bond, Justice Scalia advocated that Holland be overruled.
Bond, 572 U.S. at 873–82 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
245 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
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tially a drafting error in the Affordable Care Act of 2010.246 That law
sought to encourage citizens to buy health insurance by providing
public exchanges on which to buy policies and subsidies to help pay
for them.247 States were required to create “Exchanges” on which
their citizens could purchase insurance—but, if they did not, then the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would create
“such Exchange” for the State.248 Section 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) of the tax
code informed taxpayers how to calculate tax credits. That section
defines a “coverage month”—when the taxpayer is eligible for subsidies—as one in which the taxpayer is covered by a plan purchased
through an “Exchange established by the State under section 1311.”249
Nine months after the ACA was adopted, an ACA critic opined
that persons who purchased insurance on HHS-established Exchanges
were entitled to no tax subsidies; the tax credits were only applicable
to taxpayers purchasing insurance on exchanges created “by the
states,” a tax provision that critics argued excluded exchanges created
by the federal government for the states.250 Stated differently, the
critic’s challenge would have gone away if one had changed “by” to
“for” in the tax provisions. In his majority opinion, the Chief Justice
rejected the critic’s tax credit interpretation by characterizing
Exchanges established by the federal government as “such
Exchanges” as those established by the states and by reading the tax
provision, section 36B(c)(2)(A)(i), in light of the entire statute.251 To
read it any other way would have eliminated the many statutory provisions that viewed HHS as standing in for the states and creating
exchanges “for” the states.252 Said differently, the Chief Justice har43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 30 Side A
12/23/2021 09:17:08

246 The dissenters focused on key language describing exchanges created “by” the states.
Id. at 498–518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 479.
248 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (requiring each State to establish an Exchange); id.
§ 18041(c)(1) (providing if a State does not establish a § 18031(b)(1) Exchange, HHS will
“establish and operate such Exchange”).
249 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a), (b)(1) (providing for a tax credit “equal to the established
premium assistance credit amount,” which is the sum of monthly assistance amounts for
“all coverage months of the taxpayer” during the year). A “coverage month,” in turn, is
one in which the taxpayer is covered by a plan purchased through an “Exchange
established by the State under section 1311.” Id. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i).
250 See Adam Liptak, Lawyer Put Health Act in Peril by Pointing Out 4 Little Words,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/in-four-wordphrase-challenger-spied-health-care-laws-vulnerability.html.
251 King, 576 U.S. at 497–98.
252 Id. at 487–92; see also Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr., John A. Ferejohn, Charles
Fried, Lisa Marshall Manheim, and David A. Strauss as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 16–18, King, 576 U.S. 473 (No. 14-114) (listing provisions of the Act that
would have been so eliminated).
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monized the text, rather than chopping it up into bits and blowing up
the statutory plan.
Justice Scalia scolded the Chief Justice for rewriting the statute:
“Words no longer have meaning” if the majority can get away with
what Justice Scalia considered linguistic homicide.253 Whereas the
Roberts opinion tried to make sense of more rather than less text, the
Scalia opinion hyper-focused on four words—“established by the
State.” That could only mean that an exchange had to be established
“by the State,” not by the federal government “for” the State. Justice
Scalia read “established by the State” in light of a frequently ignored
canon that interpreters should “give effect, if possible, to every clause
and word of a statute.”254 As Chief Justice Roberts responded, however, giving Justice Scalia’s effect to those four words would have
wreaked havoc on dozens of other words and phrases in the statute
and might have nullified thousands of words if his anti-ACA policy
had been adopted.255
Comparing Bond and King, one sees the emergence of two different, clashing textualisms. One textualism aims to harmonize text,
the other to disaggregate it. But the Justices do not appear to be consistent in these approaches. In Bond, the Chief Justice disaggregated,
but in King, he harmonized. In Bond, Justice Scalia harmonized, but
in King, he disaggregated. It would take Justice Scalia’s passing, and
two new textualist judges, to reach the textualist fracture in Bostock,
but the eventual bifurcation of textualism, such that it could reasonably produce two or more opposing results, was apparent before then.
Bostock v. Clayton County: Three Different Textualisms

Bostock v. Clayton County 256 was the statutory interpretation
blockbuster of the 2019 Term. Deploying a textualist method to
achieve a liberal result, Justice Gorsuch surprised some of his fans.
But if there is one thing we have been trying to show, it is that textu253

12/23/2021 09:17:08

King, 576 U.S. at 499–501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 502 (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
255 See Abbe R. Gluck, Comment, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015)
(defending the Roberts approach in King).
256 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). See generally Eskridge et al., supra note 5, at 1513 (describing
the “great debate” between three textualist opinions); Grove, supra note 5, at 266
(describing how “Bostock revealed . . . important tensions within textualism”); Andrew
Koppelman, Essay, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN.
L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 6–17 (2020) (describing the new textualism at play in all three
Bostock opinions); Marc Spindelman, Bostock’s Paradox: Textualism, Legal Justice, and
the Constitution, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 553, 632 (2021) (arguing that the Bostock majority
opinion is “part textualist, part anti-textualist”).
254
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alism has no predictable tilt because text and (con)text can be selectively chosen and rearranged; interpreters might have a predictable
tilt, but the method does not. Gerrymandering saturates all three of
the Court’s textual opinions in Bostock. What is most striking about
the textualist cross-fire is that the Justices gerrymandered history as
well. If new textualist judges look out over the crowd and pick out
their friends, original public meaning judges pack the crowd with their
friends and then pick them out.257
Title VII bars employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex,”258 even when sex is
one among several “motivating factor[s].”259 Gerald Bostock worked
for Clayton County, Georgia as a child welfare advocate, and his
employer fired him upon learning that Bostock played on a gay softball team.260 Two other plaintiffs, Donald Zarda and Aimee Stephens,
were allegedly fired because they were gay and transgender, respectively.261 The Court found that each plaintiff had been discriminated
against “because of such individual’s sex.”262 The Court’s opinion and
both dissents focused only on text and found unambiguous original
meanings. All three opinions made strategic choices about text and
(con)text. Each opinion gerrymandered in a distinctive manner. Each
blamed the others for false use of textualist or originalist methodology. The hypothesized consumer of statutes—the ordinary reader—
was deployed to justify diametrically opposed textual readings and to
accuse other Justices of bad faith.
1. Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion: Hyper-Textualism and Choice of Text

257
258
259
260
262
263
264
265

12/23/2021 09:17:08

261

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Id. § 2000e-2(m).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38.
Id.
Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1743; see also id. at 1739–41 (offering a word-by-word analysis).
Id. at 1740–41.
Id.
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Authoring the opinion for the 6–3 Court, Justice Gorsuch pulled
each word out of the statute and matched it with a broad dictionary
definition (applicable in 1964 as well as today), then reassembled the
words, and concluded that the reassembled text had a meaning that
was “plain and settled.”263 Justice Gorsuch methodically offered definitions of each and every term in the statute, including ones that ordinary persons would consider self-evident, like “otherwise,” and
“individual.”264 Firing Bostock, a man, because he dated men “discriminated” against him “because of” his male “sex.”265 If he had been
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a woman who dated men, he would not have been fired. Firing
Stephens because her gender identity did not match that assigned to
her at birth was sex discrimination for similar reasons. Although
Justice Gorsuch insisted that he was applying original public meaning,
Justice Alito denounced Justice Gorsuch’s opinion as a “pirate
ship”—textualism under a false “flag”266—and Justice Kavanaugh
lamented the majority’s “literalist approach.”267 We agree with Justice
Kavanaugh that interpreters should “not simply split statutory phrases
into their component words, look up each in a dictionary, and then
mechanically put them together again.”268 What he is describing is a
cracking-and-packing gerrymander.
Ironically, it is unclear how much Justice Gorsuch’s cracking-andpacking analysis drove the result. The majority opinion would have
been just as persuasive if it had omitted the word-by-word analysis,
and started with Justice Gorsuch’s homey hypothetical:
So an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is insufficiently feminine and also fires a man, Bob, for being insufficiently
masculine may treat men and women as groups more or less
equally. But in both cases the employer fires an individual in part
because of sex. Instead of avoiding Title VII exposure, this
employer doubles it.269

266
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Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1824–25 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 1827.
269 Id. at 1741 (majority opinion).
270 Id.
271 490 U.S. 228, 241–43, 259, 263 (1989) (holding in the plurality and concurring
opinions that discriminating against a female employee because she did not match the
employer’s stereotype of women was discrimination “because of sex”).
272 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756–57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 1739 (majority opinion) (accepting the parties’ mutual agreement that “sex”
meant “biological distinctions between male and female”).
274 Id. at 1741.
267
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Justice Gorsuch’s hypothetical rests upon a sex-stereotyping theory of
discrimination (“insufficiently feminine” or “masculine”).270 This is a
social theory of “sex,” grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.271 Justice Alito insisted that it is “sex”
discrimination only when employers treat persons assigned female at
birth differently from those assigned male at birth,272 a theory Justice
Gorsuch accepted as his working assumption273—until he got to Bob
and Hannah.274 Discriminating against effeminate men and masculine
women treats men and women the same, so such discrimination does
not exactly rely on “sex as biology.” Instead, it distinguishes between
those individuals because of “sex as gender role,” a short analytical
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275 See Eskridge, Title VII, supra note 10, at 363–64 (distinguishing between
“descriptive” and “prescriptive” sex-based stereotypes).
276 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 350 (2013)); accord Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Andrew M. Koppelman as
Amici Curiae at 5–8, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (Nos. 17-1623, 18-107) [hereinafter EskridgeKoppelman Amicus Brief].
277 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
278 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208–12 (1994) (drawing an analogy between laws
discriminating against gay people and anti-miscegenation laws).
279 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743–44, 1745–46 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978) and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), as well as
sexual harassment precedents).
280 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); accord CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 4 (1979).
281 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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step from finding discrimination against them because they do not
date or marry different-sex partners.275
Ultimately, statutory precedents complemented and then overtook language analysis in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion. Its key textualist
move was to invoke the Court’s decisions holding that an employer
violated Title VII if the employee would not have suffered adverse
workplace treatment “but for” the employee’s sex.276 Whether “sex”
is understood as biology or as gender role, the majority ruled that “it
is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or
transgender without discriminating against that individual based on
sex.”277 The majority’s Bob and Hannah hypothetical implicitly relied
on Hopkins to support the textual claim. As Professor Koppelman has
long argued, penalizing a woman for dating women is discrimination
“because of sex” for the same reason penalizing a white man for marrying a Black woman is discrimination “because of race.”278
Precedent and stare decisis justified the majority opinion better
than cut-and-paste textual analysis.279 Had the Court followed Justice
Alito’s argument in dissent that discrimination “because of sex”
meant nothing more than that women are treated differently than
men, Hopkins and other statutory precedents would have been subject to challenge. Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court held that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination.280 But the 1964 Act
does not bar “sexual harassment”; it says only that employers cannot
“discriminate . . . because of . . . sex.”281 Might not a strict textualist
insist that Congress must pass a statute that uses the specific words
“sexual harassment” before courts may consider such claims under
Title VII? Likewise, accepting the dissenters’ perspective would have
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narrowed or overruled Hopkins, based on their claim that discrimination because of sex sounded only in biology and not social attitudes.282
By the end of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, the textual arguments
had been overtaken by normative ones, grounded on the ways that
unacceptable “discrimination” may evolve over time. Rejecting the
idea that the Court should follow the “expected application[]” of the
statute (as no one in 1964 would have protected “homosexual[s]” nor
talked about “transgender” persons), Justice Gorsuch warned that
“objections about unexpected applications will not be deployed neutrally,” presumably because majorities would throw minorities under
the bus; if statutory interpretation were reduced to a popularity contest, law’s neutrality would take a hit.283 For example, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires accommodation for persons
with disabilities by “public entit[ies],” which the Supreme Court has
applied to state prisons, even though legislators presumably would
neither have supported nor expected such an unpopular
application.284
2. Justice Alito’s Dissent: Time-Machine Textualism and Choice of
Original Meaning Date

12/23/2021 09:17:08

282 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 251, 266 (1989) (plurality and
concurring opinions) (holding that a woman allegedly denied a promotion because she was
not sufficiently “feminine” had stated a claim under Title VII), superseded by statute on
other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 29, 42 U.S.C.); cf. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82 (holding
that male-on-male harassment is actionable under Title VII and requiring courts to
consider social context when analyzing these claims).
283 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750–51.
284 Id. at 1750 (citing Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998)).
285 Id. at 1755, 1758, 1762 (Alito, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 1755.
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Echoing Justice Scalia’s indignant style, Justice Alito lambasted
the majority opinion as “pirat[ical],” “preposterous,” “arrogant,” and
“stubborn.”285 His dissent took a time-machine approach to public
meaning. “If every single living American had been surveyed in 1964,
it would have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination
because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation—
not to mention gender identity, a concept that was essentially
unknown at the time.”286 This form of argument mobilizes the Dred
Scott problem, namely, the use of original public meaning by Chief
Justice Taney to find that persons of African descent could never be
Article III “citizens,” because public opinion in 1789 considered even
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free Black persons unworthy of military service or marriage to white
persons.287
Another problem with Justice Alito’s time machine is that he gerrymandered the date. The 1964 Act did not even apply to a state
entity like Clayton County until the 1972 Amendments,288 when it was
hardly unthinkable that “homosexuals” would be protected by a sex
discrimination prohibition. The Congress that enacted the 1972
Amendments also passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA),
which barred state discrimination “on account of sex.”289 In 1970, Paul
Freund told Congress that, by analogy to race discrimination law, the
ERA would bar states from discriminating against same-sex marriage.290 This argument did not prevent Congress from passing the
ERA, but it was persuasive to many state legislators and voters, who
prevented ERA ratification.291
Moreover, as part of a comprehensive reform aimed at reversing
a series of restrictive Supreme Court decisions, the 1991 Congress
added section 703(m), broadening Title VII to include claims where
“sex” was a “motivating factor.”292 This expanded the statute in ways
that legislators and their allies described as barring “sex stereotyping.”293 In 1991, was it unthinkable that sex stereotyping could be
a “motivating factor” when an employer fired a man, but not a
woman, who was married to a man? In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme
Court ruled that sex discrimination was the primary factor in the
state’s denying two lesbians a marriage license.294 As the Seventh

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 33 Side A
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287 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407–11 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
288 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)).
289 Equal Rights Amendment to the Federal Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
290 See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 584 n.49 (1973)
(“Indeed, if the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is toward race, it
would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between members of the same sex would be as
invalid as laws forbidding miscegenation.” (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 9564 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Sam Ervin))); see also Eskridge, Title VII, supra note 10, at 349
(describing Professor Freund’s testimony before Congress).
291 See Eskridge, Title VII, supra note 10, at 350–52 (describing the key role the Freund
argument played in the ERA defeat).
292 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
293 See Eskridge, Title VII, supra note 10, at 368–76, 398 (describing how the 1991
Amendments confirmed and expanded Hopkins).
294 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60, 64 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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Circuit observed, “[i]t would require considerable calisthenics to
remove . . . ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’”295
Justice Alito paid no attention to this evidence because he
anchored “original public meaning” in 1964, before the statute actually applied to Gerald Bostock and before its relevant text assumed its
current form. “Sexual orientation” had nothing to do with “sex,” he
insisted, and the majority’s examples were “so much smoke.”296
Instead, Justice Alito hyper-focused on the keystone of the consumer
economy: how ordinary readers would distinguish “sex discrimination” from “sexual orientation discrimination.”297 But the distinction
made no sense in 1964, as “sexual orientation” was not a term people
used then.298 In his appendix of dictionary definitions, Justice Alito
did not include “sexual orientation”—because it was not in the popular dictionaries of that era.299 Justice Alito claimed that the 1964
Congress did not have “gay men and lesbians” in mind for protection
under Title VII—and no wonder, as there was no such class of
Americans in 1964. If they referred to sexual minorities at all, government documents classified them as “homosexuals and other sex perverts,” and not “gay men and lesbians.”300 “Gay” meant “merry,” not
“homosexual,” and terms like “perversion” and “perverts” populated
the dictionaries.301 Justice Alito’s time machine gerrymander assumed
that contemporary words and conceptions of identity could be
dropped into 1964, but that assumption turned his time machine into
an imaginary encounter with a sad and even paranoid past.

Justice Kavanaugh, an astute commentator on statutory interpretation,302 rejected Justice Gorsuch’s cracking-and-packing approach:
“Legislation cannot sensibly be interpreted by stringing together dic295

12/23/2021 09:17:08

Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 350 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1775 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 1767, 1772.
298 See Eskridge et al., supra note 5, at 1554.
299 See WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2291 (2d ed., unabr. 1961)
(defining “sexual” but having no entry for “sexual orientation”).
300 E.g., SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE
EXEC. DEP’T, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN
GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 81-241, at 1–3 (2d Sess. 1950); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 67–70, 79 (1999) (describing
various federal and state government policies referring to sexual minorities as
“homosexuals” or “sex perverts”).
301 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
302 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
296
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3. Justice Kavanaugh’s Dissent: Holistic Textualism and Choice of
(Con)text
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303 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1827 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100,
144 n.7 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting)).
304 Id. at 1828.
305 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
306 See Eskridge et al., supra note 5, at 1554 (detailing how uncommon the term “sexual
orientation” was in 1964).
307 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (m) (emphasis added).
308 Cf. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704, 711 (1978)
(holding that “because of sex” meant “but for the employee’s sex”).
309 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1829–32 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
310 Id. at 1830.
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tionary synonyms of each word and proclaiming that, if the right
example of the meaning of each is selected, the ‘plain meaning’ of the
statute leads to a particular result.”303 For Justice Kavanaugh, “the
question in this case boils down to the ordinary meaning of the phrase
‘discriminate because of sex.’ Does the ordinary meaning of that
phrase encompass discrimination because of sexual orientation? The
answer is plainly no.”304
Justice Kavanaugh cited no empirical evidence for this statement,
and it remains unclear to us what makes Ivy League-educated judges
experts on “ordinary meaning.”305 Indeed, the country’s leading linguists say that “sexual orientation”—the term he was applying—had
no meaning at all to most Americans in 1964.306 On top of those
problems, the learned textualist slighted relevant text. As amended,
the statute says an employer cannot “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex,” a rule violated even if
sex is just one “motivating factor.”307 The complete text shows why an
employer who fires an employee because she is married to someone of
a different race or religion has discriminated because of race or
religion, for it is undeniable that race or religion is at least one “motivating factor” in the job loss.308 For the same reason, sex is at least a
“motivating factor” if an employer fires an employee because of the
sex of their partner or spouse. Brainy textualists like Justice Gorsuch
and Judge Easterbrook consider “discrimination because of such individual’s sexual orientation” a subset of “discrimination because of
such individual’s sex.” You cannot say “gay” without saying “sex,” but
not vice-versa. Justice Kavanaugh had no response to this obvious
argument.
Instead, Justice Kavanaugh’s strongest argument was a
(con)textual one. He pointed to several federal statutes barring discrimination because of “sex” that were amended to include “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity.”309 He explained: “Congress knows
how to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.”310 Because one
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Id. at 1831 & n.7.
See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“The lesson from the redundancy in these sections and elsewhere in the Tax
Code is not to read provisions out of the statute or contrary to their plain meaning. . . .
Rather, we should read the provisions according to their terms, recognizing that Congress
often wants to make ‘double sure.’”).
313 Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997); see also Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S.
474, 486 (2008) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 330).
314 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56–57 (1963) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
315 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphasis added); cf. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 178–79 (1981) (addressing broader protections in Title VII).
316 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
317 Id. § 511(a), (b)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a), (b)(1)).
318 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2, 29, 42 U.S.C.)
312
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such federal law was passed in 1998, and the remainder after 2007
(more than a generation after Title VII), their relevance for “original
public meaning” was wobbly.311 Congress often adds duplicative terms
ex abundante cautela (“with an abundance of caution”), and Justice
Kavanaugh himself has cautioned against drawing conclusions from
terminological variety in the U.S. Code.312
Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh’s meaningful variation argument
was selective, leaving out (con)text that was more relevant than the
(con)text he cited. As the Court has repeatedly said, “negative implications raised by disparate provisions” might, at best, be weighed in
those instances in which the relevant statutory provisions were “considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was
inserted,” not decades later.313 Contemporary statutes, ignored by
Justice Kavanaugh, generate different inferences. The Congress that
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the same Congress that
enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).314 The EPA prohibited
employers from discriminating “on the basis of sex” by paying wages
to employees “at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex” for similar work.315 The sweeping language of Title VII (discrimination “because of sex,” in all its generality) is in striking contrast to the more particularistic language used in
the EPA. At the same time Congress was considering Title VII
amendments responding to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hopkins
and other cases, it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA).316 Section 511(b) excluded “homosexuality and bisexuality” as well as “transvestism” and “transsexualism” from the ADA’s
definition of “disability.”317 The next year, Congress enacted the 1991
Amendments, significantly revising Title VII.318 Under Justice
Kavanaugh’s meaningful variation argument, it is significant that
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Congress in 1991 failed to revise its definition of “sex” to specifically
exclude “homosexuality and bisexuality” or “transvestism” or
“transsexualism,” terms that it had just used in the ADA.
III
LIBERALS GERRYMANDER, TOO: IT’S
THE JUSTICE

THE

METHOD, NOT

No one should think that gerrymandering is a phenomenon limited to conservative judges expressing a populist attitude. In this Part,
we consider several textual battles between liberal Justices. Although
the Roberts Court presides over textualism’s golden age, the
Rehnquist Court laid its foundations. Surprisingly, liberal Justices
were often eager textual bricklayers. We consider four clashes in
which the Justices decided on different texts and (con)texts, choosing
text and (con)text without justifying those choices—in short, gerrymandering. In the first four cases, liberal Justices are pitted against
each other; in the last, Justice Gorsuch debates Justice Sotomayor.
A.

Muscarello v. United States: Breyer v. Ginsburg

12/23/2021 09:17:08

319 524 U.S. 125 (1998). For an equally unpersuasive textual analysis of Muscarello,
based on corpus linguistics, see Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 30, at 788, 803–04, 807–10.
320 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126–27 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
321 Id. at 127.
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Consider the duel between Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg in Muscarello v. United States. 319 Three defendants
were convicted of drug-related felonies, and their stiff sentences were
enhanced by section 924(c)(1) of the Criminal Code, which imposed a
five-year mandatory prison term upon a person who “‘uses or carries
a firearm’ ‘during and in relation to’ a ‘drug trafficking crime.’”320
Frank Muscarello had a gun in the locked glove compartment of the
truck he used to transport marijuana to his buyers.321 Muscarello’s
case offered the Court an opportunity to decide whether it satisfied
section 924(c)(1)’s “carries a firearm.” The Court divided 5–4 on that
issue, with Justice Breyer writing for the Court and Justice Ginsburg
writing for the dissenters. The authors were the Court’s junior
Justices, and its only Democratic appointees. But their opinions
reflected new textualism’s strong influence, with their homey examples, resort to dictionaries and corpuses, and reliance on canons and
other judge-made materials that brought closure to open-textured
statutory language.
Admitting that “carries a firearm” might have a variety of meanings, such as to bear arms on one’s person, Justice Breyer opened with
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Id. at 128.
Id. at 128–32.
324 Id. at 130.
325 Id. at 129.
326 Id. at 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
327 Id. at 147–48; cf. Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 607, 620 (2005) (criticizing both Justices’ “maximizing textualism”).
328 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138.
329 Id. at 148–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
330 Id. at 132, 138–39 (majority opinion).
323
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a linguistic analysis. “[O]ne can, as a matter of ordinary English, ‘carry
firearms’ in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies.”322 Over the next four pages, he illustrated that point by references to the King James Version of the Bible, Herman Melville, the
Arkansas Gazette, and The New York Times.323 In contrast, he minimized the “bearing arms” understanding as so rare that it was the
Oxford English Dictionary’s twenty-sixth definition.324 Justice
Breyer’s chambers applied a home-grown corpus linguistics search,
randomly surveying usage from The New York Times and U.S. News
databases and finding “that many, perhaps more than one-third [of
the thousands of sentences], are sentences used to convey the meaning
at issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car.”325
These references aimed to rebut the dissenters’ focus on the putative consumer of criminal law. Justice Ginsburg insisted that the “ordinary” reader would think that “carries a gun” means carrying on the
person, or “packing heat.”326 Responding to Justice Breyer, Justice
Ginsburg deployed an equally delightful array of sources, including
cognate statutes like section 926A, regulating the “transport” of firearms to states where one was allowed to “carry” them.327 But Justice
Breyer replied with the statute’s definition of “firearm” to include
bombs, missiles, and rocket launchers—hardly items that could easily
be packed into a person’s jacket or purse.328 Notice how the textualist
debate moved rapidly from ordinary meaning to technical meaning
constructed by lawyers.
As textual analysis, the opinions seemed evenly matched. Their
authors chose different kinds of context to reach interpretive closure.
Justice Ginsburg concluded her dissent with a canon, the rule of lenity:
When in doubt, construe criminal laws narrowly, against the government.329 Justice Breyer rejected lenity, based on the statute’s purpose
to take guns out of the hands of drug dealers.330 Meanwhile, both
opinions missed something big: whether the term “carry” was being
used as a term of art, given the proliferation of state gun laws. By
1968, states had laws regulating how people could possess and carry
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guns,331 and under those state laws, “carries a firearm” typically
entailed carriage in a vehicle as well as on the person.332 For example,
Arizona’s carry-gun law allowed carrying in a vehicle so long as the
firearm “is carried within a means of transportation or within a
storage compartment, trunk or glove compartment of a means of
transportation.”333 No state clearly excluded vehicular carrying. In
short, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg’s textual analyses sidetracked the
inquiry from questions any elected official would ask. Were legislators
aware that section 924(c)(1) of the Criminal Code was using “carry”
as a term of art deployed in state carry-gun laws? Were they aware of
gun laws that regulate traveling with a gun in your car?334 In Part IV,
we provide answers to those questions.
B.

Lockhart v. United States: Sotomayor v. Kagan

Roberts Court liberals have continued these textual debates. In
Lockhart v. United States,335 Justices Sotomayor and Kagan battled
about hypothesized ordinary meaning and deployed various canons,
with no clear triumph for either side.336 Avondale Lockhart possessed
child pornography in violation of section 2252 of the Criminal Code,
which increases penalties for prior offenses.337 Lockhart had been
convicted of sexually abusing his fifty-three-year-old partner.338 The
statute imposed a mandatory prison sentence of ten to twenty years if
the defendant:
[H]as a prior conviction under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter
109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of
43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 36 Side A
12/23/2021 09:17:08

331 See State Gun Laws, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-gunlaws (last visited Nov. 15, 2021) (identifying and summarizing each state’s carry-gun laws).
332 See Brief for the United States, Muscarello, 524 U.S. 125 (No. 96-1654), 1998 WL
84393, at *34–40; Memorandum from Ben Daus-Haberle to authors (June 19, 2020) (on file
with authors).
333 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(B)(3)(e) (1997).
334 See Memorandum from Ben Daus-Haberle to authors, supra note 332 (documenting
that the application of state carry-gun laws to vehicular carrying would have been hard to
miss in 1968).
335 577 U.S. 347 (2016).
336 See Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Judge
Gorsuch’s Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 187
(2017) (describing how then-Judge Gorsuch “t[ook] delight” in the dueling textualist
opinions in Lockhart); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure
of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They
Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 193 (2017) (critiquing the Lockhart
textualist opinions as “serv[ing] neither democracy reasons nor predictability reasons”);
Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where
Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2075–76 (2017) (similar).
337 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b).
338 Lockhart, 577 U.S. at 349.
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any
State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation
of child pornography . . . .339

You tell your scouts to find a defensive catcher, a quick-footed
shortstop, or a pitcher from last year’s World Champion Kansas
City Royals. It would be natural for your scouts to confine their
search for a pitcher to last year’s championship team, but to look
more broadly for catchers and shortstops.344

Justice Kagan recast that hypothetical (a “defensive catcher, quickfooted shortstop, or hard-throwing pitcher from the Kansas City
Royals”) and offered her own:
Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet ‘an actor, director,
or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie.’ You would
339
341
342
343
344

18 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (emphasis added).
See Lockhart, 577 U.S. at 349.
Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
Id. at 352 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)).
Id. at 363–65 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion).
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340
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The question was whether section 2252(b)’s mandatory minimum
kicked in only when the victim in a state conviction was a child, or
included Lockhart’s conviction of sexual abuse against an adult.340
Writing for a 6–2 majority, Justice Sotomayor nodded to the text,
but promptly invoked a canon. When the Court “has interpreted statutes that include a list of terms or phrases followed by a limiting
clause, [it has] typically applied an interpretive strategy called the
‘rule of the last antecedent.’”341 That rule holds that a modifier
applies only to its nearest neighbors, unless it is set off by a comma.
Applying this rule to the state crime predicate (“aggravated sexual
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or a
ward”), she ruled that “a minor or a ward” applies only to the last
phrase, “abusive sexual conduct.”342 Under this interpretation,
Lockhart could not escape the mandatory minimum sentence. In dissent, Justice Kagan deployed a different semantic canon: the series
qualifier rule.343 That canon says that the modifier “involving a minor
or ward” presumptively applies throughout the list of prior offenses,
meaning Lockhart’s offense against an adult would not count in penalty calculation.
Both Justices deployed homey examples based on hypothetical
ordinary readers. Invoking her favorite sport, Justice Sotomayor
wrote:
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know immediately that she wanted to meet an actor from the Star
Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the latest Zoolander.345

345
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Id. at 362, 364 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
347 Lockhart, 577 U.S. at 376–77 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
348 Id. at 358 (majority opinion).
349 Id. at 352–54, 358.
350 Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, §§ 320–323, 104 Stat. 4816, 4817–19.
351 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 160001(d), 108 Stat. 1796, 2037 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)).
352 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(5), 110 Stat.
3009–26, at 3009–30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2252(b)(1)–(2)).
353 Statutory history shows the statutory language as it evolves over time, while
legislative history shows the public legislative deliberations accompanying the path a bill
346
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Again, we see the Bostock battle of ordinary meaning foreshadowed,
with no apparent way to resolve the contending examples.
Like Muscarello’s Clinton-appointed Justices, Lockhart’s
Obama-appointed Justices had caught the new textualism bug. Justice
Scalia was famous for his own homey examples, for hyper-focusing,
and for relying on canons to end debate on his terms.346 Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan followed suit. Justice Kagan relied upon the
rule of lenity.347 Justice Sotomayor relied upon the whole text, aiming
to harmonize the text. The statute included many cross-references to
other crimes applying to adult victims, from obscenity offenses to sex
trafficking. From this, Justice Sotomayor argued that there was no
reason to limit the state law predicates to child victims.348 Moreover,
section 2252(b) repeated the unusual phrasing of the federal sexual
assault law in chapter 109A, which criminalized assault of adults as
well as children.349 Should one committing a sexual assault in
Manhattan’s federal courthouse receive a different penalty than one
committing a similar offense in a state court? This was a telling point,
whatever one’s methodology.
But if the Lockhart Justices followed the virtuous method of their
late colleague, Justice Scalia, they also picked up its vices, such as suppressing relevant (con)text. Both opinions neglected the statutory history, meaning how the statute’s text was constructed over time. When
enacted in 1990, the law’s penalty provisions were triggered only by
prior crimes committed against children.350 In 1994, as a technical
amendment to an omnibus crime bill, Congress added the federal
sexual assault crimes in chapter 109A.351 The 1994 amendment added
no language limiting the offense to child victims, however. Passed as
part of a large omnibus appropriations law, the 1996 amendments
added the state law predicates at issue in Lockhart.352 This statutory
history353 shows that several different Congresses assembled section
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2252(b)’s enhancements; there was no single coherent drafting effort.
The statutory history does not tell us whether Congress had decided
that the 1996 enhancements applied only to crimes against minors. To
answer that question, the Justices would have had to dig into the legislative record, but none did. In Part IV, we provide the answer to that
question.
C.

Yates v. United States: Ginsburg v. Kagan

Lockhart is not the only recent statutory debate within the
Supreme Court’s liberal wing to depend upon homey examples and
multiple canons. In Yates v. United States,354 the skipper of the Miss
Katie had gotten himself into trouble for overfishing the endangered
red grouper. After an inspector caught him red-handed with too many
small grouper, Captain Yates allegedly ordered a crew member to
throw the undersized fish overboard before he docked for final examination.355 As a result, federal authorities charged him with obstruction
of justice under section 1519 of the Criminal Code:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction
of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.356

12/23/2021 09:17:08

takes to becoming a law. See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 21, at 204–06;
Krishnakumar, Statutory History, supra note 30 (manuscript at 5) (differentiating between
legislative history and statutory history where the latter “focuses on textual comparisons
between different versions of a statute”).
354 574 U.S. 528 (2015). See generally David S. Louk, The Audiences of Statutes, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 137, 200 (2019) (describing Yates as an “instant classic of statutory
interpretation”); Anton Metlitsky, The Roberts Court and the New Textualism, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 673 (2016) (critiquing Yates for “fail[ing] to give effect to the
semantic meaning of the relevant statutory text”); Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing,
supra note 45, at 1412 (discussing Yates to illustrate how “isolationist textualism trades
upon enriched meanings that may be contrary to the meaning of the whole text”).
355 Yates, 574 U.S. at 528.
356 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis added).
357 Jeff Leeds, Andersen Auditor Details Shredding of Enron Papers, L.A. TIMES (May
14, 2002), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-may-14-fi-andersen14-story.html.

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 37 Side B

If Yates’s piscatorial facts were prosaic, the statute addressed
something much grander: a nation-gripping fraud that had brought
down a multi-billion-dollar corporation. When it came to light that
Enron Corporation was charging down bad investments, the Securities
and Exchange Commission investigated. Enron’s chief accountant
ordered the destruction of millions of documents, and a month later
the firm collapsed.357 The accountants’ involvement in this project
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358
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See Yates, 574 U.S. at 535–36 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 539–40.
360 See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the Statutes We Threw Away,
18 GREEN BAG 2D 377, 379–81, 386–89 (2015) (discussing Congress’s instructions against
relying on chapter, title, and heading for purposes of interpretation, and Yates’s disregard
of those instructions); Daniel B. Listwa, Comment, Uncovering the Codifier’s Canon: How
Codification Informs Interpretation, 127 YALE L.J. 464, 473–74, 486–88 (2017) (similar).
361 Yates, 574 U.S. at 543–44 (plurality opinion).
362 Id. at 544 (emphasis omitted).
363 Id. at 544–45 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519).
364 See id. at 553 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (interpreting “tangible object” to mean “any
object capable of being touched”).
359
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caused a sensation, worrying markets about the basic soundness of
major accounting firms’ practices, and major legislation known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, or SOX, followed.358
Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion setting aside Captain Yates’s
conviction was quite textual. She almost entirely ignored legislative
history, picking and choosing various pieces of (con)text. For example,
she began with section 1519’s caption, the statute’s title, and surrounding U.S. Code provisions—all of which described the law’s focus
as documents and records, full stop.359 Those elements of (con)text
were emphasized as key evidence despite the fact that Congress itself
has warned that titles, captions, and placement are unreliable interpretive devices for interpreting the Criminal Code in particular.360
The plurality then hyper-focused on three words in the statute—
“record, document or tangible object”—which they interpreted
through the lens of the linguistic canon noscitur a sociis, namely,
“words are known by their associates.”361 Because “tangible object”
was associated with record and document, that broader term should
be limited to “the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects used to record or preserve information.”362 Justice
Ginsburg confirmed this reading by matching it to the verbs in the
statute—“alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry”—arguing that the last two verbs are typically
associated with things like records, logbooks or hard drives.363
In dissent, Justice Kagan admonished the plurality for its
(con)textual gerrymander: Titles and captions are not supposed to
narrow the statutory text, which was as broad as Congress could have
written it.364 Justice Kagan then engaged in her own textual gerrymander, cracking the text, reducing it to two words, and reading those
two words broadly. She deployed the statute’s reference to “any,” the
use of a similar term—“thing”—in the now-controversial Model Penal
Code, and the accepted interpretation of “tangible object” in other
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365 Id. at 555–57. The Model Penal Code has never been a “model” for the federal
Criminal Code in Title 18. See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second
(Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 299–300, 299 nn.
6–11, 348 (1998) (citing federal criminal statutes “undreamed of by the drafters of the
Model Penal Code”); Yates, 574 U.S. at 546–47 (plurality opinion) (discussing the
differences between the Model Penal Code’s provision prohibiting tampering with physical
evidence and 18 U.S.C. § 1519); see also Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The
American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326–27 (2007)
(describing Congress’s failure to reform the federal Criminal Code following the Model
Penal Code).
366 Yates, 574 U.S. at 553 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
367 Id. at 553 (citing DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH TWO FISH RED FISH BLUE FISH (1960)).
368 Easterbrook, Absence of Method, supra note 16, at 83.
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federal rules and laws, including obstruction of justice statutes.365
There was only one “ordinary meaning” of “tangible object,” namely,
“a discrete thing that possesses physical form.”366 According to no less
an authority than Dr. Seuss, “a fish is, of course, a discrete thing that
possesses physical form.”367
Yates’s central debate was whether the statute should be read as a
specialized obstruction statute, relating to financial records, or a general obstruction statute, relating to anything that might be covered up.
Justice Ginsburg wanted to make “record, document, and tangible
object” the lodestar; Justice Kagan wanted to emphasize the breadth
of “tangible object.” Justice Kagan cracked the text into smaller pieces
and gave them a broad reading; Justice Ginsburg considered the
words in a larger whole act context. But the canons did not determine
the choice either Justice was making; the canons followed the choice
of text. Noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis both call for generalizations based on common traits. Justice Ginsburg offered one generalization, a narrow one about document-like things preserving
information; Justice Kagan had a different one, a broad one about
anything providing information. It is no coincidence that these generalizations followed their views about the proper textual meaning of
the statute. Unlike Lockhart’s canceling canons, in Yates, a single
canon yielded canceling interpretations.
Yates shows how the linguistic canons may do less to reveal genuine meaning than to provide ammunition for a judge to create a supposed plain meaning. As Judge Easterbrook has explained, “every
canon implicitly begins or ends with the statement ‘unless the context
indicates otherwise,’ which potentially leaves so much room for
maneuver that the canon isn’t doing much work. Indeed, a reference
to ‘the context’ does not even pin down what context.”368 Indeed,
“what context” is precisely our question. Why limit one’s view to
judge-made canons as a form of context? Why not look at the actual
legislative context—Congress’s official reports? Instead, both Justices
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selected other context that was less relevant, like the Model Penal
Code or the title. Justice Ginsburg contextualized the case by
describing the massive Enron fraud prompting the law’s enactment,
but only cited a bit of the legislative evidence, while Justice Kagan
invoked a Senate committee report as “extra icing on a cake already
frosted.”369 Both Justices relied on a Senate committee report that discussed a bill that came before the SOX legislation.370 That report
focused on financial fraud; it did not contemplate a general “obstruction of justice” reform, although it mentioned “evidence” in discussing
the obstruction provisions.371 As we will see in Part IV, in their hyperfocus on what they considered textualist smoking guns, both opinions
ignored more probative legislative evidence: the Senate floor debate
adding section 1519 to SOX, and the conference report—the legislative process’s final stage, where precise text is finalized and then
debated again.372
Justice Kagan was right to ask whether Congress meant to enact a
general obstruction statute. General obstruction statutes, common in
state law, use terminology like “thing” or “tangible object” to cover
everything from dead bodies to murder weapons.373 This issue is complicated by the fact that there is a general evidence tampering statute,
section 1512, that pre-existed SOX.374 That creates a puzzle: Why did
Congress not just fix the old general-evidence-tampering section 1512,
rather than add a new obstruction section 1519? Surely, a reasonable
interpreter would want to know the answer to these questions.
369

Yates, 574 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion); id. at 557–58 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
The SOX bill came to the Senate with no provisions on obstruction of justice.
Senator Leahy added them to SOX on the Senate floor as part of a larger amendment. See
148 CONG. REC. 6436–37 (2002) (recording the introduction of the Leahy Amendment); id.
at 6551 (enacted). That amendment originated in S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002). See also S.
REP. NO. 107-146 (2002) (accompanying the Leahy Amendment). The new section 1519,
which was part of S. 2010, was nearly identical to the provision ultimately passed as part of
the Conference Report. See id.; infra note 372.
371 The Senate Report never uses the term “general obstruction of justice” statute; it
focuses on financial fraud and various penalties and reporting requirements involving
financial fraud. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2, 27 (2002). But the report does refer to “acts
to destroy or fabricate physical evidence,” id. at 14, and mentions difficulties courts had
created by narrow constructions of section 1512, the general evidence tampering statute.
Id. at 6–7, 12.
372 See H.R. REP. NO. 107-610 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
373 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(a)(1) (West 2021) (stating a person
commits an offense if, knowingly during an investigation, he “alters, destroys, or conceals
any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as
evidence in the investigation or official proceeding”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2921.12(A)(1) (West 2021) (prohibiting, for example, “[a]lter[ing], destroy[ing],
conceal[ing], or remov[ing] any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its
value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation”).
374 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
370
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Without an answer to these questions, one is left worrying that the
opinions reflected different normative impulses or sub silentio constitutional principles. Justice Ginsburg, for example, read both the statutory text and the committee report through the constitutional lens of
lenity, a concern she had displayed in prior decisions such as
Muscarello.375
D.

Murphy v. Smith: Gorsuch v. Sotomayor

The issue in Murphy v. Smith was how to pay prisoners’ attorneys
who bring successful lawsuits. Charles Murphy lost his sight as a result
of prison officials’ racist abuse and physical assaults.376 The jury
awarded him $307,733.82, a rare sum in prisoner cases, and the
District Court assessed fees of $108,446.54 to be paid to prevailing
counsel, with ten percent of Murphy’s award applied to the fees and
the remainder to be paid by the state.377 On appeal, the state successfully objected that Murphy should fork over twenty-five percent of his
award to pay most of the counsel fees.378
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1978 requires States to
pay counsel fees for plaintiffs, often prisoners, who successfully sue
the State for civil rights violations.379 The Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 imposed a number of new rules on the award of counsel
fees for successful prisoner suits.380 Section 803 established the rule at
issue in Murphy:
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375 See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 140 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating the court should have continued to adhere to the principle of lenity as it has long
followed by confining “carries a firearm” to mean bearing a firearm in a manner as to be
ready for use as a weapon).
376 Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784 (2018); id. at 791 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(describing the facts of Murphy); see also Nourse, supra note 4, at 675 (arguing that
Murphy presents a “problem of which text to choose”).
377 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 791. The jury itself awarded Mr. Murphy $409,750, which the
District Court reduced to $307,733.82. Id.
378 Id. at 792.
379 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
380 Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 to -72 (1995) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B)) (limiting attorney’s fees).
381 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (emphasis added).
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Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in [a section 1983 civil
rights action brought by a prisoner], a portion of the judgment (not
to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of
attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of
attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the
excess shall be paid by the defendant.381
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Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 787.
Id. at 787–88.
384 Id. at 795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The rest of the statutory text confirms that
district courts have discretion to choose the amount of the judgment that must be applied
toward the attorney’s fee award.”).
385 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–7, 10–12, 29–31, 35–36, 49, 51–53, Murphy, 138
S. Ct. 784 (No. 16-1067).
386 See id. at 22–23 (detailing an exchange between Chief Justice Roberts and plaintiff’s
counsel).
383
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The trial judge assumed he had discretion under the first sentence to
order Murphy to pay less than twenty-five percent: After all, the
statute says, “not to exceed 25 percent.”382
Writing for the 5–4 Court, Justice Gorsuch disagreed. Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion cracked the first sentence into particular words that
could be edited and reassembled; he then sealed his gerrymander by
packing everything into one word, “satisfy.” Thus, Justice Gorsuch
started with the mandatory (“shall”) nature of the statute, which he
read to bar district court discretion, and then concluded with “to satisfy,” which he read as “to discharge the obligation in full.”383 After he
was done, Justice Gorsuch had effectively revised the first sentence to
mean “25% of the judgment shall be applied to satisfy the amount of
attorney’s fees.” “[A] portion . . . not to exceed” had literally been
struck from the statute.
The suppressed text, as Justice Sotomayor argued for the dissenters, vested the district court with discretion to apportion less than
twenty-five percent of the judgment to pay counsel fees.384 At oral
argument, the majority Justices were fixated on the idea that “satisfy”
could only mean pay the entire fees award.385 That focus edited out
the word “applied.” Everyone recognized that even twenty-five percent of usually meager prisoner judgments would usually not fully pay
an award of counsel fees. Even under the State’s theory, Murphy’s
payment of $76,933.46 (twenty-five percent of the judgment) would
not “satisfy” the fee award, but it could be “applied to satisfy” the
award, with the State kicking in the rest. The same could be said of the
$30,773 (ten percent of the judgment) that the district court said
should be “applied to satisfy” the fee award.
In Murphy, the Justices’ different choices of text were driven by
two different models of attorney compensation. The majority Justices
viewed the statute as instantiating a private law model of standard tort
suits. Successful counsel was assured at least twenty-five percent of
the judgment, a low but not unusual contingency fee, and the law
allowed counsel to negotiate a higher percentage to take the case.386
The dissenting Justices saw a public law baseline: Civil rights statutes
like section 1988 follow a private attorney general approach, prizing
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Id. at 27–28 (detailing an exchange between Justice Breyer and plaintiff’s counsel).
Examples from the last several terms of the Supreme Court are collected and briefly
analyzed in the Appendix.
389 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
390 See MOFFITT, supra note 56, at 9 (arguing that populists perform “crisis” to
“radically simplify the political terrain, and to present their own strong leadership and
simple solutions as a method for stemming or avoiding the crisis”).
391 MÜLLER, supra note 58, at 101 (“Populism is neither the authentic part of modern
democratic politics nor a kind of pathology caused by irrational citizens. It is the
permanent shadow of representative politics.”).
392 Id. (“Populists are not against the principle of political representation; they just insist
that only they themselves are legitimate representatives.”).
388
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generosity in cases in which the litigant has ferreted out public
abuse.387 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion essentially privatized a claim for
relief and fee structure. To do so, he had to edit the text quite a bit.
Did his editing needlessly undermine Congress’s statutory scheme?
We will try to answer that question in Part IV.
Notice what we have demonstrated in this Part. Our earlier claim
was that Roberts Court Justices will strain to answer interpretive
questions based on text and nothing but the text. That might be a
predictable claim from those who have criticized textualism in the
past. But in this Part, we apply the same critique to liberal Justices.
And we show, unexpectedly for many gentle readers, that liberal
Justices helped lay the groundwork for this new orthodoxy. As Table 3
summarizes, these cases illustrate judges failing to grapple openly with
their choices of text or choices of context.388 Contrary to its proponents’ much-publicized claims, the new textualist method is not more
constraining than traditional methodology. In our view, it is less constraining. This should be alarming to any judge dedicated to the rule
of law in our constitutional democracy. And it calls into question the
seeming banality of Justice Kagan’s famous statement that “we are all
textualists now.”389 There is a dark side to this statement, as these
cases show, if by textualism one means picking and choosing text. One
of the essential strategies of dangerous populist political leaders—
from Hugo Chávez to Huey Long—is to offer highly simplistic solutions to difficult problems.390 As we have seen, there is nothing particularly simple about textualism in difficult cases. As students of
political populism know, it is a “permanent shadow of representative
politics.”391 None of the liberal Justices would say they are against
representation. The danger is that they have adopted a theory at war
with that principle, one which allows judges to insist that “only they
themselves are the legitimate representatives”392 of an imagined
“ordinary” people.
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The new textualism has proven to be a methodology at odds with
its own aspirations for predictability, neutrality, and the rule of law.
As in Bostock, new textualist judges cherry-pick text and (con)text
and read current terms and social identities back into history, while
bitterly accusing other judges of legislating from the bench. There is
something deeply disturbing about this: Interpretation should be more
than word play in the name of a hypothetical ordinary reader in an
imaginary populist information economy grounded in a past that
judges view through their own presentist lenses. In our view, the new
economy of statutory interpretation denigrates what ought to be central: the production of statutes by elected and accountable representatives. In hard cases, the new economy entrenches a judicial monopoly
on the sources of meaning, namely, precedents and canons. Congress,
and the idea of a republican government, have been eclipsed by
dictionary- and canon-wielding judges. The fact is, we have a republican government, one which filters democracy through representation. To honor that government, we propose that statutory
interpreters consider republican evidence of meaning in hard cases. As
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393 See Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative
Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014) (rejecting the relevance of “mental
intent”).
394 See OLP, MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 74–77 (endorsing a
limited utility of legislative materials as “evidence” of “actual [textual] meaning”).
395 See Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, supra note 61 (rejecting views
purporting to rely upon those who understand congressional processes).
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we will show in this Part, the results of this effort are not always what
we would prefer or even expect.
Our project is critical but not nostalgic. We do not advocate for a
return to New Deal purposivism, nor do we abandon the methodological advances we owe to Judge Easterbrook’s and Justice Scalia’s close
focus on text and their healthy skepticism about the value of legislative history as evidence of a subjective “legislative intent.”393 At its
worst, however, the new textualism risks turning statutory interpretation into a shell game, where clever but shallow manipulation of dictionaries (and now corpuses), canons, and Control-F searches of the
U.S. Code dominate efforts to understand the problem prompting the
statute, the drafting history of the act, and—ironically—the very thing
textualists care most about: relevant text.
Our thesis is that in hard cases, evidence from the production
economy of statutes has powerful value for textualist as well as pluralist
judges, for it can serve as a partial check against judicial bias and gerrymandering. “Legislative evidence” is not legislative history. It is a
term first used by textualists in describing the role that legislative
materials might play—not as authoritative, but, in cases of doubt, as
evidentiary.394 Nor, as we explain later, is it mere elite knowledge of
insiders;395 it is the public, non-subjective, record of republican deliberation. Moreover, such evidence is probative in a very specific way: It
elevates the views of deliberative bodies whose role in our republican
system refine and shape the policy demands generated by popular
majorities. Hence, we call it republican evidence. Accordingly, it must
be evaluated as evidence. Not all legislative materials are of the same
caliber or relevance or probative effect, and in some cases, they do
nothing to resolve the matter. Conventional theories of legislative history have invited all sorts of deviations from a proper understanding
of legislative evidence. Our theory of republican evidence creates no
roving commission searching for something in an individual legislator’s mind or vague statements of purpose; it follows the making of
text. In hard cases, where the text supports serious claims for two
“ordinary meanings,” courts should check those meanings against evidence in the production economy. In fact, the refusal to look at such
texts, when ordinary meaning is inconclusive or open to reasonable
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See supra notes 331–34 and accompanying text.
Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1616 (2012); accord In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus
Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1656.
398 Dan Listwa, The Congressional Record as a Dictionary: The Case of Labor or
Service (2018) (unpublished Yale Law School seminar paper) (on file with authors); see
also Gales & Solan, supra note 90.
399 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892); e.g., 16 CONG.
REC. 1779–95 (1885) (showcasing numerous Senators using the terms “labor or service” or
“labor” in connection with the alien contract labor bill); see also NOURSE, MISREADING
LAW, supra note 21, at 77–78.
400 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
402 Alien Contract Labor Act, ch. 164, § 4, 23 Stat. 332, 332–33 (1885); see also supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
397
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debate, means that statutory interpretation has given up all pretense
to respecting the republic.
Republican evidence from the deliberative production economy
serves three values. First, republican evidence has a potential rule of
law value that can aid interpreters in finding and considering all the
relevant text. As in Muscarello, legislative evidence can help us see
when Congress uses legal terms of art, a common practice.396 Surely,
as Justice Scalia conceded, legislative evidence is admissible to show
legislative usage or “that a word could bear a particular meaning.”397
Our student Dan Listwa searched 1880s legislative discussions to
determine how members of Congress used the Holy Trinity statute’s
phrase “labor or service” and found it was limited to wage labor.398
Our own examination of the legislative record of the 1885 Act found
that both sides of the debate used the term “labor” (or “labor or service”) to refer to skilled as well as unskilled manual work, not what
Justice Brewer referred to as “toil . . . of the brain.”399
In addition to word meaning, legislative evidence can be an invaluable resource for locating relevant text and explaining how different
provisions in a statute relate to one another. We saw this on dramatic
display in the Sinclair bankruptcy case, where legislative evidence
pointed the interpreter to a conflicting provision,400 and in Public
Citizen, where legislative evidence motivated us to consider the statutory structure and led us to the conclusion that FACA only regulated
advisory committees established by a federal official or institution.401
But it is also true of Holy Trinity. Neither Justice Brewer nor Justice
Scalia appreciated the significance of section 4 of the contract labor
law, which barred the master of a ship from knowingly transporting
any immigrant who was a “laborer, mechanic, or artisan” under contract to do “labor or service” in the United States.402 We read the
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403 16 CONG. REC. 1630 (1885) (statement of Sen. Henry W. Blair, sponsor); accord id.
at 1629 (statement of Sen. John R. McPherson); id. at 1785 (statement of Sen. Henry W.
Blair); id. at 1779 (statement of Sen. John Franklin Miller). Professor Vermeule’s contrary
reading, emphasizing the breadth of section 1, ignored this evidence, and relied on the
statements of an opponent of the legislation. See NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note
21, at 76–78.
404 See ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 21.
405 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
406 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 195; Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109
GEO. L.J. 967 (2021); Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 616, 643 (1949) (“I must confess that as I grow older I become more and more
perplexed at men’s refusal to apply their common sense to problems of law and
government.”); see also Gluck & Posner, supra note 21, at 1303 (noting that even “very
text-centric judges” voice support for “a cabined approach that seeks to implement what
Congress was trying to do, using all available tools to confirm the judge’s interpretation”).
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statute and caught the section 4 point but did not know what to make
of it: Was section 4 in pari materia with section 1, and therefore supporting Justice Brewer’s opinion? Or was it an example of meaningful
variation, and thus supporting Justice Scalia’s critique? Legislative evidence gave us a clear, objective, and verifiable answer: The sponsor
and supportive legislators assured their colleagues and the public that
section 4 was “aimed . . . against the man who knowingly brings an
immigrant from foreign shores to our own, who comes here under and
by virtue of a contract such as is prohibited by [section 1 of] the
bill.”403
Second, republican evidence checks interpretive bias by providing judges with information that might disconfirm their assumptions and reject some problems as outside the statute’s anticipated
application.404 We all suffer from cognitive biases. Because of their
elite backgrounds and lived experiences, judges arguably suffer from
more of these biases, making it harder to consistently categorize the
full scope of everyday problems.405 For generations, theorists have
maintained that legislative materials are valuable not as evidence of
legislators’ specific intent on an interpretive issue, but instead as evidence of how the statute sought to ameliorate a real-world mischief or
problem.406 We use the word “problem” as opposed to “purpose”
because the latter term suggests a vague mental state and our focus is
on concrete facts about the world. From Chisom to Muscarello to
Yates to Lockhart, the best way to figure out the problem—or “mischief,” to use an old term—Congress was addressing and the level of
generality with which it was addressing it, is to examine the public
debate. At worst, examining those materials involves effort and
research that merely confirm the obvious, but at best, those materials
can lead the judge to see the statute from the perspective of those who
produced it. As we saw for Holy Trinity, Justice Scalia’s modern per-
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See supra notes 89–90, 398–99 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. NO. 48-444 (1884), as reprinted in 15 CONG. REC. 6059 (1884); see also
Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in
Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 923–38 (2000) (providing a
comprehensive account of the legislative evidence on the statutory problem).
409 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
410 See Issacharoff, supra note 208, at 486.
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spective was wrong: Legislative deliberations were better evidence of
original public meaning, because the words used in the legislative process were not only contemporary with the statute’s enactment, but
they were used in the normative context of the statute itself. “Labor
or service” were normative words, embodying a policy choice made by
Congress addressing a particular problem, easily misunderstood by
modern readers ignorant of the legislative context.407
Shifting the interpretive focus from purposes to problems does
not magically vitiate the generality critique: It is possible to describe
problems (such as the danger of guns during crimes) as well as words
and phrases (such as “carries a firearm”) at various levels of generality. Textualism aggravates the generality problem and the judicial
discretion problem by ignoring both issues. In our view, the best way
to ameliorate the level-of-generality issue in practice is to look to concrete evidence about Congress’s republican deliberations, including
the level of generality at which legislators described the problem they
were trying to solve. Legislative evidence demonstrates that the Alien
Contract Labor Act was a specific response to employers financing a
flood of foreign workers; Congress considered that a problem because
“bought” foreign workers were driving down wage rates for “free”
American workers.408 Notice how the legislative focus on the
“bought” (as opposed to “free”) workers linked the statutory language in the 1885 Act (“labor or service”) with the language of the
Fugitive Slave Clause (“Service or Labor”).409 There was no evidence
that ministers or so-called brain-toilers were being imported en masse
to the United States.
Third, republican evidence often has value for any neutral judge
wishing to be true to the idea that the Congress and its elected representatives, not the appointed Court, makes and changes the law, as
well as takes the lead in declaring national policies. If populism is, as
Professor Issacharoff argues, all popular and no republican,410 then
courts employing such a method are undermining the elected body
representing the multifarious views of those very people. The
Constitution grants Congress the legislative power not because its
members are individually wise, but because collectively they are
accountable to We the People, and deliberate in the interest of the

408
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411 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (2d ed. 1986)
(“[N]o democracy operates by taking continuous nose counts on the broad range of daily
governmental activities. Representative democracies—that is to say, all working
democracies—function by electing . . . [representatives] for certain periods . . . and then
passing judgment periodically on their conduct.”).
412 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
413 See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
345, 347.
414 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085; see also 21 CONG. REC. 9439
(1890).
415 21 CONG. REC. 10,466–67 (1890) (containing a colloquy justifying a broad exemption
for any faith tradition).
416 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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polity by considering a wide variety of perspectives.411 Conservatives
are fond of insisting that we have a republic,412 rather than a democracy, because we have representatives who filter popular views.
Surely, an interpreter faced with two plausible ordinary meanings
would want to know how legislators—our elected representatives,
accountable for the statutory policy—understood those meanings. No
disinterested judge ought to apply a statute in ways that Congress has
rejected, or in ways that intrude upon the legislative authority. Nor
should judges want to apply a statute to aggrandize their own
authority. For example, the rule of lenity tells us that courts should
not create common law crimes through dynamic interpretations of
open-textured criminal laws.413 Republican evidence in criminal prosecutions such as Muscarello, Yates, Bond, and Lockhart may help the
cautious judge be more certain that an expansive reading of the
Criminal Code does not reach beyond the conduct legislators, after
investigation and deliberation, considered culpable.
Legislative materials can be valuable evidence of consensus positions undergirding statutory responses to social and economic
problems. Judicial respect for legislatively settled issues is essential to
maintaining the separation of powers, including judicial deference to
the supremacy of Congress as the democratically legitimate driver of
the republic. After the circuit court ruled in 1890 that Holy Trinity
Church had violated the 1885 Act, surprised legislators immediately
amended the statute to exempt “ministers of any religious denomination.”414 The legislative debates revealed a consensus that statutory
law should reflect the norm that “this is a free country, free in religion
as in everything else.”415 Although the 1891 Amendment did not
apply to pending cases (i.e., Holy Trinity),416 the legislative evidence
supports the Supreme Court’s view that penalizing a church’s choice
of minister was not appropriate under the 1885 language. Today, we
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A. Finding and Understanding Relevant Text
Republican evidence can help the interpreter locate relevant text
and (con)text and resist the tendency to cherry-pick. When a first look
at the application of a text seems irrational or unthinkable, interpreters should, as Justice Scalia once suggested, check their intuition
against legislative materials.419 In Public Citizen, a broad reading of

12/23/2021 09:17:08

417 Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
184, 202 (2012) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause bars statutory interference with a
church’s selection of ministerial officials).
418 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7, 12 (2010) (arguing that legislative and administrative
deliberations over time can create entrenched institutional norms).
419 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the
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should be reluctant to interpret a generally worded criminal law to
deny a church the freedom to choose its ministers,417 and the legislative evidence in Holy Trinity demonstrates that this longstanding
norm was appreciated by Congress before it was apprehended by the
Supreme Court. In our republic of statutes, judges can learn something about norms from legislative deliberations.418
Using decisions we analyzed in Parts I and II, we show how
republican evidence might help the politically neutral textualist
resolve issues that the text, standing alone, did not. Specifically, the
evidence decisively refutes the views advanced by dissenters in King
and Muscarello, suggests more persuasive reasoning for majority
opinions in Yates, Murphy, and Bostock, and supports different textbased results in cases like Sinclair, Bond, Lockhart, and Pride at
Work. Our detective work led us in surprising directions—often
upending our own biases and disfavoring positions taken by our
favorite Justices. For example, in Muscarello, the legislative evidence
shows that Congress wanted judges to enforce what we consider a
harsh minimum mandatory penalty. For years, we taught Bond as a
case neatly wedding federalism and the rule of lenity—but the legislative and treaty materials drove us into Justice Scalia’s camp on the
statutory issue. In Lockhart, we originally leaned toward Justice
Sotomayor’s view, but republican evidence taught us that the statutory focus was child sex abuse. Justice Kagan’s witty arguments persuaded us in Yates, until we looked at the actual record which focused
on “shredding.” Legislative evidence flipped us from Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent to favor Justice Gorsuch’s ruling in Murphy.
Additional examples can be found in our Appendix of recent Roberts
Court decisions.
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background of Rule 609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what
seems to us an unthinkable disposition.”).
420 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 459–62 (1989). That “utilize”
was added in conference supports the inference that it did not really “change” the
underlying bill, as major changes at that stage are disfavored and against congressional
rules. Nourse, By the Rules, supra note 115, at 93–97.
421 See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
422 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
423 See supra notes 329–32 and accompanying text.
424 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–928).
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“utilized” gave the FACA a constitutionally questionable breadth.
The Justices should have taken a harder look in light of republican
evidence revealing that the broadening term—utilize—was not found
in either the House or Senate bills and was added in conference.420
That led us to a more careful review of the statutory scheme, including
FACA’s rules for creating and terminating advisory committees.421
Thanks to legislative materials, a hard case became quite easy, as a
textual matter.
Sinclair is the flip side of Public Citizen: an easy case that is made
hard once republican evidence reveals that the conflict was not
between the statute and its legislative history, but between two statutory provisions—the conversion provision favoring the farmers and
the nonretroactivity provision favoring the creditor. The statutory
conflict could have been avoided by allowing the Sinclairs to dismiss
their Chapter 11 claim and refile under Chapter 12.422 An approach
that reconciles more rather than less text ought to be preferred by
textualists. This precept also justifies Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion in King, though not his opinion in Bond, where Justice Scalia
had the better arguments.
Muscarello was a hard case because “carries a firearm” is susceptible to both broad and narrow readings, and in such cases we usually
follow the rule of lenity. Our inclination was unsettled when we
learned that most state “carry-gun” laws apply to “carrying” firearms
in vehicles, but we still wondered: Did Members of Congress consider
these laws? Was it fair to view them as prominent features of the legal
landscape? Decisive for us was the statutory history of section 924(c).
Almost all of the Supreme Court’s debate about words in the Bible
and popular culture was irrelevant in light of the actual evidence
showing that members were using “carries a firearm” as a phrase with
legally established meaning, which is entirely plausible given the
importance of gun laws in the states.423
The House and Senate enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968424
against the background of state carry-gun laws. When the House
added “unlawfully carries a firearm” as a sentencing enhancement,
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most states had laws regulating “carrying firearms,” and some states
explicitly regulated carrying guns in vehicles.425 For example,
Massachusetts prohibited carrying firearms in vehicles unless “under
the direct control” of the carrier, as in a glove compartment—which
was Muscarello’s enhancement.426 Hawaii, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
and other states prohibited gun-carrying within any vehicle.427 General carry-gun prohibitions had been interpreted to apply to carrying
guns in automobiles.428 During Senate deliberations, Senator Strom
Thurmond introduced into the Congressional Record a list of state
carry-gun laws, and senators were informed that without the “unlawfully” language, the proposed legislation might penalize law-abiding
citizens for carrying weapons “in their automobiles.”429 Both supporters430 and opponents431 of the gun control bill discussed state
carry-gun laws.
In 1968, Congress was using “unlawfully carries a firearm” as a
term of art based on state law. As a matter of public meaning in 1968
or 1984 (when section 924(c) was expanded to drop the “unlawfully”
modifier),432 “carrying a firearm” typically included carriage within a
vehicle. A similar consensus was reflected in legislative deliberations
425

See supra notes 329–33 and accompanying text.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131C (West 1958), amended by Act of Feb. 16,
1965, ch. 44, 1965 Mass. Acts 18; see also Act of May 11, 1959, ch. 296, § 6, 1959 Mass. Acts
207 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131 (West Supp. 1972)) (earlier
regulation touching on carrying a gun in an automobile); Act effective Sept. 9, 1953, ch. 36,
§ 12025, 1953 Cal. Stat. 653, 654–55 (prohibiting unlicensed carrying of firearms in any
vehicle in California).
427 HAW. REV. STAT. § 727-25 (1968); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227 (West
1968) (making it a felony for individuals to carry any pistol “in any vehicle operated or
occupied” by them); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4416 (West 1963), amended by
Act of July 30, 1968, 1968 Pa. Laws 690, sec. 1, § 4416(a).
428 See, e.g., Stephens v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1957) (holding that
storing a pistol in the glove compartment of a car constituted “carrying a pistol in ‘any
manner’” (quoting Ark. Acts § 41-4501 (1985))).
429 114 CONG. REC. 27,412–19 (1968) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, an
opponent). Because state courts had applied carry-gun laws to vehicles, Senator Cooper, a
supporter, worried that the Senate bill would “deprive law abiding citizens of the right to
. . . carry these weapons in their automobiles as many people do today.” 114 CONG. REC.
27,419 (1968).
430 See 114 CONG. REC. 22,267–68 (1968) (statement of Rep. Benjamin B. Blackburn)
(discussing gun control provisions in Georgia); id. at 22,241–42 (statement of Rep.
Catherine D. May) (discussing state-level enforcement in Washington).
431 Opponents worried that the federal legislation would go beyond the regulations in
their own state carry-gun laws, which specifically allowed carrying guns in certain vehicles
or (for one state) in a “saddlebag” when traveling. 114 CONG. REC. 26,827 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings) (referencing a Texas law); see id. at 27,125 (statement
of Sen. Ernest Gruening) (referencing an Alaska law requiring some individuals to carry
guns in planes).
432 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 314 n.819 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3492.
426
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surrounding section 926A, added in 1986 and invoked by the
Muscarello dissenters.433 Legislative evidence establishes that the 1986
law strongly supported the majority’s argument. The sponsor
explained that “a hunter from South Carolina has no way of getting
through the State of New York to go moose hunting in Maine,”
because New York’s carry-gun law did not permit carrying such
weapons in vehicles.434 The proposed legislation would allow “transport” of a gun through New York to another state where the owner
could lawfully “carry” the gun.435 Contrary to the dissenting opinion,
the 1986 law confirms that “carries a firearm” applied to carrying a
gun in your car.
As a matter of law, Justice Breyer reached the right answer. For a
judge worried about expanding the reach of the criminal law, or
aggrandizing judicial authority to create crimes, the republican evidence provides reassurance. Our qualms about harsh punishment
were satisfied by targeted legislative deliberation—as legislators we
might have voted the other way, but as judges we would follow the
congressional consensus. A great lesson of this case is that Congress
legislates, often carefully, based on law, particularly state law. This
should not be surprising given the republican nature of representation: Representatives are elected by voters from their states and localities. Judges who care about federalism should take an important
lesson from this case—but it is a lesson easily missed by judges who
close their eyes to republican evidence.
B. Disconfirming Judicial Assumptions: Curbing Judicial Activism

12/23/2021 09:17:08

433 Act of July 8, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-360, § 1(a), 100 Stat. 766 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 926A); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 146–48 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
434 132 CONG. REC. 9603 (1986) (statement of Sen. James A. McClure, Senate sponsor).
435 Id. at 15,227–28 (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum, House sponsor).
436 Brudney, supra note 214, at 901.
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Today, legislative materials are usually invoked to “confirm”
ordinary meaning,436 but we think republican evidence should also be
used to disconfirm interpreters’ assumptions or tentative conclusions.
The new textualism pressures judges to find a plain meaning, but a
clear-eyed view of the text often does not cooperate. Textualists ought
to test their assumptions against republican evidence. In the following
cases, the evidence negated some judicial claims about Congress’s
plans and converted hard cases into easier ones.
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Yates v. United States: How Broadly Did Congress Define the
Problem Addressed in Sarbanes-Oxley?

Yates, the fish case, presented us with a mystery: Was section
1519437 (added by SOX) a new general obstruction statute, or just a
specialized statute focusing on document destruction? In 2002, the
Criminal Code had an existing general evidence tampering statute,
section 1512.438 Why did Congress not amend section 1512, rather
than create a new section 1519 (and section 1520,439 requiring preservation of records)? Looking at the legislative debate helps us see the
problem Congress addressed: financial fraud, markets crashing, and
high-flying corporate executives destroying citizens’ pensions.
Congress was aware of the old section 1512 and chose to treat it differently. This disconfirms the dissenters’ view that the purpose of the
statute was to create a general obstruction measure.
When the Oxley bill came to the Senate, it had no obstruction of
justice provisions.440 Senator Leahy, a former prosecutor and sponsor
of the bill, added the obstruction provision that would become section
1519 as a floor amendment.441 During conference, the House receded
to the Senate provisions.442 During the Senate’s debate on the conference report, Senator Leahy explained:

The Senate debate was focused on documents and records, not fish
and assorted things:
Section 802 creates two new felonies [sections 1519 and 1520] to
clarify and close loopholes in the existing criminal laws relating to
the destruction or fabrication of evidence and the preservation of
437

12/23/2021 09:17:08

18 U.S.C. § 1519.
Id. § 1512.
439 Id. § 1520.
440 See Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6, Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (No. 13-7451) [hereinafter
Oxley Amicus Brief].
441 148 CONG. REC. 12,315–17 (2002); id. at 12,490, 12,505.
442 H.R. REP. NO. 107-610, at 1 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
443 148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (referencing then-pending Arthur Andersen LLP v. United
States, 544 U.S. 696, 706, 708 (2005) (overturning conviction of an accounting firm for
obstruction of justice due to lack of scienter)).
438
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[W]e include new anti-shredding crimes and the requirement that
corporate audit documents be preserved for 5 years with a 10 year
maximum penalty for willful violations. . . . As the Andersen case
showed, instead of just incorporating the loopholes from existing
crimes and raising the penalties, we need tough new provisions that
will make sure key documents do not get shredded in the first
place.443
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financial and audit records. [Specifically], it creates a new general
anti shredding provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, with a 10-year maximum
prison sentence.444

12/23/2021 09:17:08

444 Id. at 14,448 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The conference report’s
explanation speaks not of a “general spoliation statute” as Justice Ginsburg wrote, Yates,
574 U.S. at 546 (plurality opinion), but of a “general anti shredding” provision, 148 CONG.
REC. 14,448 (2002) (reprinting and discussing the conference report).
445 See Oxley Amicus Brief, supra note 440, at 3, 7–8 (showing that “frustration” with
the limitations placed on prosecutors in prosecuting the Enron case motivated proposals to
amend section 1512).
446 Id. at 18–19, 23–24.
447 See id. at 3 (discussing how section 1512 only made it a crime to persuade another
person to destroy evidence, not to destroy evidence oneself).
448 148 CONG. REC. 12,509, 12,512 (2002) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott) (“[T]his section
would allow the Government to charge obstruction against individuals who acted alone,
even if the tampering took place prior to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena.”).
449 See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539–41 (2015) (plurality opinion); Oxley
Amicus Brief, supra note 440, at 7, 9, 10–11, 16 (arguing that the caption, title, and
placement points all support reading “tangible object” to refer primarily to documents and
records).
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The Department of Justice had been pushing Congress to amend
the general obstruction statute, section 1512, which started as a statute
focusing on evidence tampering.445 Congress rejected that approach,
preferring to create subject-matter fraud and obstruction statutes with
a narrower reach, such as obstruction in health care fraud or, in this
case, financial fraud.446 Enron highlighted the need for some fixes:
One of the problems in prosecuting the Enron accountants was that
section 1512 seemed to require a third party to dispose of the evidence.447 Senator Leahy’s bill never amended section 1512—it added
new provisions, sections 1519 and 1520. Neither Senator Leahy nor
the bill’s bipartisan supporters (it passed 96–3) mentioned the existing
general evidence-tampering statute—until the end of the Senate
debate, when Senator Lott offered an amendment (probably on
behalf of the Justice Department) that updated the old evidencetampering statute, section 1512.448
Given this sequence of events, Justice Kagan was wrong to say
that section 1519 was a general obstruction statute: As the drafting
and debating history of SOX demonstrates, there was congressional
consensus that it was not. Even if one does not want to import this
evidence into an opinion, as Justice Ginsburg did when she derived
her caption, title, and other textual arguments from former
Representative Oxley’s amicus brief in Yates,449 at the very least it
disconfirms Justice Kagan’s assumptions. Her effort to “clean up” the
otherwise messy law of obstructing justice is attractive—but that was
not what Congress was doing in 2002.
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Lockhart v. United States: Was Congress Focused on Crimes
Against Children?

450
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See supra notes 348–49 and accompanying text.
Brief for Petitioner at 25, Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016) (No. 148358).
452 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 121(4)–(5), 110
Stat. 3009–26, at 3009–30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(d), 2252(b)).
453 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-863, at 802 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the conference
bill “includes new language, not included in the House or Senate-reported bills, to address
the growing problem of child pornographic materials produced using new computer
imaging and ‘morphing’ technologies”). Conference reports occur at the end of a long
process and there may be a rush to finish; they also present opportunities for drafters to
win points lost elsewhere. See Nourse, By the Rules, supra note 115, at 98.
454 See S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 18–37 (1995).
455 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755–56, 758 (1982) (upholding New
York’s regulation of child pornography that was not “obscene” under the Court’s
precedents, based, in part, on the notion that the “use of children as subjects of
451
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After all the canons had been fired—last antecedent, series modifier, whole act, whole code—Lockhart seems a tie. Although it is
doubtful any ordinary citizen would have tried to untangle the statute,
there were two plausible legal meanings. Assuming that Congress had
created a coherent scheme, the majority read the state law predicates
to echo the federal predicates.450 But the statutory record belies that
assumption and disconfirms the notion that focusing on child crimes
was a mere accident. The dissenters’ narrower meaning emerges as the
more plausible one, whose cogency should have been sealed by the
rule of lenity.
Between 1978 and 1996, section 2252’s enhancements were only
triggered by prior convictions under federal law, assembled from a
variety of unrelated pieces of legislation.451 State law crimes were first
added by a child pornography bill introduced by Senator Hatch, the
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 104th
Congress.452 The Hatch bill was a rider to an appropriations bill,
emerging only in conference, a process ripe with risks for bad
drafting.453 The history of the Hatch bill disconfirms assumptions,
made by the majority opinion, that Congress was aiming for penalty
coherence; the statutory scheme was instead assembled piecemeal.
The Hatch bill expanded regulation of child pornography to
computer-morphed child pornography, and much of the debate in the
Senate Judiciary Committee was about whether this violated the First
Amendment.454 As background, it is important to note that while
Congress generally cannot regulate adult pornography other than
obscenity, it can regulate child pornography but only if its laws meet
certain standards, including a showing of harm to children.455 Senators
concerned about First Amendment implications warned that some
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pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the
child”).
456 S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 28–30, 36–38 (1995).
457 Id. at 17, 19.
458 142 CONG. REC. 26,638 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (emphasis added).
459 S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 9–10 (emphasis added).
460 H.R. REP. NO. 104-863, at 802–03 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
461 Id. at 32 (emphasis added); 142 CONG. REC. 26,638–39 (1996) (printing a section-bysection analysis of the Child Pornography Prevention Act).
462 The Justice Department read the 1996 amendment in precisely this way. See
Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 368–71 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting the
Justice Department’s interpretation in a formal bill comment).
463 Justice Kagan invoked only the Senate committee report, see id. at 369–70 (quoting
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 9 (1996)), but the conference report is better evidence because it
was the text of the law actually enacted.
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morphed porn did not involve an actual child, so the harm was not as
great as that which had been one of the “compelling reasons” for the
Supreme Court to support earlier child pornography legislation.456
Senator Hatch replied that there was harm to children because
pedophiles would view child pornography and then commit sex
crimes457: “[C]hild pornography aggravates child sexual molestation.”458
Thus, the original committee report described the penalty provision as limited to offenses against children: “[A]ny State child abuse
law or law relating to the production, receipt or distribution of child
pornography.”459 More importantly, the conferees adopted that
meaning—focusing on children—by explaining that the bill “would
increase the penalties for child sexual exploitation, child sexual abuse
and child pornography offenses”460 and including a ten-year enhancement if the defendant had a prior conviction “under the laws of any
State relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”461 In neither the
committee report nor the conference report’s joint explanation did
anyone pay attention to how these new offenses related to the list of
adult offenses covered in then-existing section 2252(b). At the same
time, this evidence shows that the drafters462 and the conferees463
were very much focused on children and offenses against children and
that there was a reason for that focus: the debate about the law’s constitutionality. A measure regulating child pornography was less
encumbered by constitutional difficulties than one involving just
adults.
None of this evidence played a significant role in Lockhart’s
majority or dissenting opinions. Legislators were paying attention to
crimes against children, and not to how the penalties matched up in
section 2252. At the very least, this disconfirms the majority’s notion
of penalty coherence and responds to its lament that no one could
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come up with a reason why crimes against minors were the focus of all
three sentence enhancements added in 1996. There were good reasons
that Congress focused on abuse of children: Legislators considered
previous sexual exploitation of children particularly reprehensible
(and hence deserving of longer sentences) and were aware that the
Supreme Court gave them greater authority to regulate child, but not
adult, pornography. Even if one did not think that this evidence established the provision’s meaning beyond all argument, it should at least
have tilted the balance toward the rule of lenity, which encourages
Congress to clarify the criminal law’s reach.
3.

Murphy v. Smith: How Much Was Congress Retreating from the
Civil Rights Fee-Shifting Model for Prisoner Civil Rights
Lawsuits?

464

12/23/2021 09:17:08

See supra notes 386–87 and accompanying text.
See Brief for Respondents at 21–25, Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784 (2018) (No. 161067) (reviewing statements by congressional sponsors that the legislation was intended to
align prisoners’ incentives with non-incarcerated individuals).
466 S. 1279, 104th Cong. § 7(d)(2) (1995). There was an earlier version of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, but it lacked the distinctive attorney’s fee-shifting provisions
relevant to this statutory scheme. See S. 866, 104th Cong. (1995).
467 See NEWT GINGRICH, DICK ARMEY & HOUSE REPUBLICANS, CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA 53 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (discussing reforms applicable to
prison lawsuits in the PLRA’s predecessor bill, the Taking Back Our Streets Act, H.R. 3,
104th Cong. (1995)).
465
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In Murphy, the critical consideration for reading that oddly
drafted statute was whether Congress was substantially abandoning,
for prisoner lawsuits, the liberal fee-shifting civil rights approach of
the 1978 statute in favor of something closer to the American Rule,
under which each party bears its own fees.464 Because we believe civil
rights lawsuits can deter egregious public conduct and therefore
should be encouraged through fee-shifting, we were with Justice
Sotomayor—until we read the legislative evidence. It suggests that
Congress was indeed demoting prisoners from favored civil rights litigation status to a litigation status only a little better than a normal tort
plaintiff. The enacting coalition specifically pitched the legislation to
colleagues and the public as treating counsel fees in prisoner cases
more like American Rule contingency fees, consistent with Justice
Gorsuch’s majority opinion.465
The proposed Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)466 was originally introduced in connection with the GOP’s Contract with
America.467 The initial 1995 bill contained the following counsel fee
provision:
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Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described
in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees
awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is
greater than 25 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by
the defendant. 468

468
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S. 1279 § 7(d)(2).
See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat.
1321, 1321–72 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2)). Though the Act’s official title is
“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,” it was not enacted until April 26, 1996.
470 141 CONG. REC. 14,572 (1995) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); accord id. at 26,548
(statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
471 H.R. 2076, 104th Cong. §§ 801–802 (1995).
472 H.R. REP. NO. 104-378, at 71 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); see also H.R. Res. 289, 104th
Cong. (1995) (resolution ordering appropriations); BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. & WILLIAM
H. MANZ, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996
(1997) (outlining reports pertaining to the PLRA).
473 See 141 CONG. REC. 35,797 (1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
469
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The first sentence is identical to the first sentence of section 803 as
enacted469 and, read in conjunction with the second sentence, it shows
that the sponsors were treating the prisoner plaintiff like a contingency fee plaintiff, up to twenty-five percent of the judgment (which
would usually be a modest figure). After twenty-five percent, the prisoner plaintiff was being treated like a civil rights plaintiff, and the
state defendant had to pay. The analogy to contingency fees was
repeatedly suggested by the PLRA’s sponsors. They reasoned that
prisoners with modest claims would be deterred from filing marginal
lawsuits if they were to face the same considerations other citizens
face when deciding whether to file suit: “Is the lawsuit worth the
price?”470 Performing this familiar calculus would likely make prisoners with marginal and even valid claims think twice about filing a
lawsuit, and naturally lawyers performing the same calculus would
think more than twice before taking even a valid claim to court. Later
that year, the PLRA, including this language, was attached to an
omnibus appropriations measure.471
When the omnibus bill emerged from conference, the second sentence of the PLRA fee-shifting provisions had been changed to cap
counsel fees paid by the state at 150% of the judgment.472 Although
Senator Hatch reported that the conference report achieved the same
goal as the earlier bill,473 the revised PLRA actually discouraged more
prisoner civil rights lawsuits—both frivolous and meritorious—by setting a 150% cap on counsel fees. Congress was on notice that the
overwhelming majority of prisoner awards were very low. The imposition of a cap further weakened the analogy between prisoner civil
rights cases and regular civil rights cases and strengthened the analogy

43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 49 Side A

12/23/2021 09:17:08

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-6\NYU603.txt

December 2021]

unknown

Seq: 88

TEXTUAL GERRYMANDERING

17-DEC-21

12:19

1805

with normal tort contingency fee cases. As Congress was undoubtedly
also aware, tort clients with high likelihoods of success will attract no
lawyers if the likely awards are small. For regular civil rights cases,
that drawback is ameliorated by the adjusted count-the-hours
approach for computing counsel compensation. The PLRA was
passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton on April 26,
1996.474
Justice Gorsuch ignored this evidence in his opinion for the
Court, which was a weak defense of the holding because it gerrymandered words out of the statute. In our view, he would have written
a stronger textualist opinion if he had pointed to the drafting history,
which helps explain how Congress was adopting the contingency fee
model and why section 803 looks so clumsy. The republican evidence
ought to be persuasive to anyone who cares about interpreting statutes with attention to Congress’s plan and not just one’s normative
views about whether prisoner civil rights lawsuits should be
encouraged by liberal fee-shifting.
C. Resolving Ambiguity: Consensus Positions and Unanswered
Questions

12/23/2021 09:17:08

474 Prison Litigation Reform Act §§ 801–802, 110 Stat. at 1321–66 to –70 (1996)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
475 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 568 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison)) (arguing that the executive’s lack of indefinite
wartime detention authority is consistent with the views of the founders); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–21 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)
and THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)) (arguing that state sovereignty reflects the
views of the founders).
476 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 32, at 977–78 (finding via surveys that
congressional staffers viewed committee and conference reports as the most reliable
legislative evidence).
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Republican evidence may be useful not only to find text, determine relevant usage, and disconfirm judicial assumptions, but also to
illuminate widely held consensus positions. This is the use Justice
Scalia made of The Federalist Papers: He cited them to understand the
evolving public consensus surrounding the Constitution’s ratification.475 As empirical work has shown, Congress itself views legislative
evidence reflecting bipartisan positions as most reliable.476 More
importantly, consensus positions on a core problem are, by definition,
outside the cherry-picking critique associated with conventional legislative history. Even if one worries that it is difficult to find a consensus, concretely defining the legislative problem (the “mischief”)
can disconfirm some views and show how some supposed “ordinary
meanings” reflected outlier positions. When reviewing the evidence,
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one does not aim for a comprehensive story about a statute, but
instead focuses insistently on how the text related to the problem
Congress was trying to solve.
1.

Pride at Work: Consensus Positions

477

12/23/2021 09:17:08

See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 546–47 (Mich. 2008)
(Kelly, J., dissenting).
479 See id. at 547 (describing CPM’s emphasis that the amendment was about “defining
marriage as the union of one man and one woman”); Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch
in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 22 (citing Dawson Bell, Proposal 2: Gay
Marriage Ban Easily Wins in State, Elsewhere, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 2004, at 9A
(noting that the amendment excludes civil unions from its definition of marriage)).
480 Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 546–47 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Staszewski,
supra note 70, at 25–26 (outlining the dispute over the amendment’s statement of
purpose).
478
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Justice Markman, in National Pride at Work, concluded that
employment benefits for domestic partners amounted to state recognition of an “agreement” that was a “marriage or similar union.”477
He twisted the text into an unrecognizable shape. But if there is
doubt, it should have been resolved by the public debate on the
problem the voters saw the amendment solving. The amendment’s
advocates advertised the core problem as marriage and civil unions
and repeatedly conceded that the amendment would not affect
domestic partnership registries, much less contract benefits.478 We recognize that the constitutional amendment here reflected direct
democracy at work, and public debates may raise different issues from
evidence of representative debate, but in this case consensus was
strong, applying not only to public knowledge but also to representations made to government officials by gay marriage opponents.
Citizens for the Protection of Marriage (CPM), the amendment’s
sponsoring organization, maintained that the amendment would
strengthen the state’s statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage and
would head off civil unions, a well-recognized “marriage-lite” institution granting all or almost all the legal benefits of marriage—such as
spousal immunities, inheritance rights, and so forth—to same-sex
couples.479 CPM’s spokespersons represented that protecting marriage had nothing to do with domestic partnerships or contract rights.
At a hearing before the board that had to approve the amendment for
the ballot, CPM’s counsel stated that there “would certainly be
nothing to preclude [a] public employer from extending [health-care]
benefits, if they so chose, as a matter of contract between employer
and employee, to say domestic dependent benefits . . . [to any] person,
. . . as a matter of contract.”480 CPM’s official campaign brochure said
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2.

Bostock v. Clayton County: Resolving Ambiguity

Hard cases arise because of ambiguity and the generality
problem; text and purpose can both be stated at narrow or general
481
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Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 547 (emphasis added).
Staszewski, supra note 70, at 24 & n.28 (collecting CPM primary sources).
483 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Aug.
7, 2001, at A14 (endorsing the Federal Marriage Amendment but conceding that “[t]o try
to prevent legislatures from enacting permission for civil unions by constitutional
amendment would be to reach too far”); accord WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
CHRISTOPHER R. RIANO, MARRIAGE EQUALITY: FROM OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS 259–63
(2020).
484 The only amicus briefs filed in support of the Attorney General were perfunctory
filings by outliers. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Family Forum in Support of
Intervening Defendant, Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d 524 (No. 133554).
485 In any event, representations by opponents of laws or amendments cannot be used to
establish the core meaning of a provision, especially when those representations are
refuted by the proposal’s supporters. See Nourse, By the Rules, supra note 115, at 118–28.
482
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that “Proposal 2 is [o]nly about marriage,” namely, “a union between
husband and wife. Proposal 2 will keep it that way. This is not about
rights or benefits or how people choose to live their life.”481 Its premier television commercial had the same message. CPM’s communications director and the two primary drafters disclaimed the measure’s
potential effect on domestic partnership benefits, dismissing the opposition’s warnings as a “scare tactic” or “diversion from the real issue,”
to preserve marriage.482 This was not an unusual position. Supporters
of the Federal Marriage Amendment, which came to a vote in
Congress the same year as the Michigan amendment, explicitly disclaimed any intent to preempt domestic partnership benefits.483 Even
after the Michigan Attorney General sued to cancel benefits, the
Catholic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ, and the National
Association of Evangelicals—all opponents of same-sex marriage and
civil unions for faith-based reasons—declined to support the antihealth-benefits position.484
The record shows that everyone, including critics, agreed that the
core problem was marriage and civil unions, not contracts. While marriage equality supporters opposing the marriage amendment claimed
that it swept too far, even their most exaggerated claims did not reach
private contracting.485 At a minimum, this evidence disconfirms the
claimed democratic or even populist pedigree of Justice Markman’s
interpretation: He was imposing his own meaning on that ratified by
the voters in 2004. His opinion reflected the worst features of “judicial” populism—claiming to find the “ordinary meaning” of a statute
no ordinary reader would adopt, imagining a public in the image of
the judiciary.
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See Eskridge-Koppelman Amicus Brief, supra note 276, at 2–4.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., NAN D. HUNTER & COURTNEY G. JOSLIN,
SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 601–750 (4th ed. 2018) (summarizing and excerpting
the cases expansively applying Title VII to a wide range of sex-stereotyping claims).
488 On the breadth of Title VII in the 1964 debates, see Cary Franklin, Inventing the
“Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1320–29 (2012). For
broadening over time, see Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. L.
REV. 995, 1108–09 (2015).
489 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam).
490 Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
487
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levels, and there may be an element of choice among alternatives in
both cases. A central problem with the new textualism—which refuses
to look at evidence from statutory production—is that it motivates
judges to find one “plain meaning” that closes off further kinds of
inquiry. The pressure to locate a plain meaning yields spectacles
where opposing camps both implausibly claim the mantle of unambiguous meaning—precisely what occurred in Bostock.486 Reluctance to
admit ambiguity and nuance is one of the worst effects of the consumption economy created by the new textualism. It assures
gerrymandering.
In our view, there are two plausible interpretations in the
Bostock case. On the one hand, discrimination “because of sex” might
be read to protect women or men (based on sex-as-biology-assignedat-birth) against workplace exclusion. Or it might be read to bar
employers from considering an employee’s sex in any way or from
imposing sex- or gender-stereotypes on employees.487 The second
interpretation, but not the first, would have provided Bostock with a
claim for relief. Republican evidence makes clear that, by 1991, a legislative consensus had assimilated the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s and Court’s interpretation protecting men
and women from discrimination because of sex stereotyping.488 Even
“original public meaning” inquiries must take account of the formal
evolution of a statute—not just its interpretation by federal administrators and employers on the ground, but also binding statutory precedents and amendments adding relevant text of the law.
This resulting consensus reflected an ongoing conversation
among legislators, administrators, and judges. In 1971, the Supreme
Court held in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation 489 that an
employer could not discriminate against women with small children,
notwithstanding the employer’s showing that most of its hires were
women; the employer’s claim was rejected because it was making
hiring decisions based on “stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes.”490 Congress was surely aware of this authoritative interpreta-
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tion when it expanded Title VII in the 1972 amendments.491 In 1978,
Congress applied the Phillips sex-stereotyping theory to override the
Court when it refused to accommodate a subgroup of women discriminated against because they were pregnant.492 Under Title VII as
amended, pregnant workers must be “treated the same [as other
employees] . . . [on the basis of] their ability or inability to work.”493 In
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,494 the Court held that a woman allegedly denied promotion because she was not sufficiently “feminine”
stated a claim under Title VII: “[W]e are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group.”495
When it enacted a comprehensive 1991 liberalization of Title VII,
Congress overrode part of Hopkins, broadening the statute to include
claims motivated in part on the basis of sex, but acquiesced in the
Court’s holding that sex stereotyping violated Title VII.496 There was
a substantial political consensus, including support from big business,
that the sex stereotyping Ann Hopkins suffered was “very impermissible” under Title VII.497 After 1991, the Supreme Court used the sexstereotyping idea to apply the statute to situations that were not contemplated in 1964—including homosexual hazing of new men on the
job.498
On this public record, it would be unreasonable to think that Title
VII only applied narrowly when women as a class were treated differently from men as a class. Instead, judges, administrators, and legislators had come to see the core problem as “sex stereotyping,” and the
43734 nyu 96-6 Sheet No. 51 Side A
12/23/2021 09:17:08

491 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-13).
492 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (overriding Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
493 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see also S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 3 (1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948,
at 4 (1978).
494 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
495 Id. at 251 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 266 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the plurality that Hopkins had made out a
proper claim of sex discrimination).
496 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
497 Eskridge, Title VII, supra note 10, at 374–76 (quoting hearing testimony from the
National Retail Federation). Both proponents and opponents of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
were aware of the Hopkins case’s focus on sex stereotyping. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC.
16,706 (1990) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy, the bill’s sponsor); S. REP. NO. 101-315, at
99 (1990) (statements of Sens. Orrin Hatch, Strom Thurmond & Dan Coats) (agreeing that
Hopkins was a sex-stereotyping precedent); H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, at 29 (1990)
(describing the firm’s refusal to promote Hopkins based on a “sex stereotypical”
judgment).
498 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (Scalia, J.).
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statute had been read broadly over time by different institutions and
by conservative as well as liberal interpreters. Justice Gorsuch relied
on precedent to support that view, but he would have written a
stronger opinion if he had considered republican evidence, including
Congress’s reaction to Supreme Court readings. When the Court
chose to read the statute narrowly, Congress rebuked the Court and,
in the comprehensive 1991 reform, insisted that it be read broadly.
Based on the republican evidence, the level of generality question has
a democracy-respecting answer.
CONCLUSION: AGAINST JUDICIAL POPULISM
INTERPRETATION

IN

STATUTORY

12/23/2021 09:17:08

499 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 239, 239–56 (1992); see also NOURSE,
MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 16 (discussing how textualism emerges from
skepticism about groups).
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We conclude by considering the theoretical lessons this examination of concrete cases shows for the rise of statutory populism.
Orthodox textualism represents the golden age of original public
meaning, which is now eclipsing republican evidence or driving it into
judicial closets in statutory interpretation cases. Much is at stake in
the move to a statutory populism purportedly grounded in the illusory, even constructed, common person’s interpretation. On the surface, textualism and its populist audience seem banal. The warning
signal that something is deeply wrong with this picture is false
humility. No one thinks doctors should impose the medical views of
the “ordinary person” simply because medical treatment applies to
the ordinary person. Ordinary people do not perform surgery or read
statutes. Members of the Supreme Court acting “as if” they were ordinary people (in a prior original time) invites a strange otherworldly
speculation by some of the world’s most extraordinary lawyers acting
as if they knew nothing about the law. Even if this knowledgealienation were possible—even if some of the most learned lawyers in
our society could lose their learning—we doubt that it would be
advisable.
First, populist embrace of ordinary meaning is inconsistent with
textualism’s internal claims. Populism purports to find a single popular
will or meaning even though the populace is made up of a massive
number of people. Textualism launched itself by contending it was
impossible to know what groups do; Congress was a “they,” not an
“it,” and for that reason should be ignored.499 And, yet, textualists
assume that the group known as the “people” or the “public” can be
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See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN,
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 4–5 (2011) (rebutting the critique of groups as
merely the sum of individual preferences).
501 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
502 See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
503 Urbinati, supra note 209, at 1078 (emphasis added).
504 See id. at 1071 (defining audience democracy).
505 GORSUCH, supra note 13, at 139.

AND
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known, and that it is an “it” not a “they.” This makes little sense in
terms of numbers: Surely it is easier to discern the official views of 535
representatives speaking collectively to the precise issue or the general plan than it would be to discern and document the views of millions of people who never read nor thought about the statute, and
most of whom were uninterested in its text, structure, or plan. As we
have said elsewhere, this essentially skeptical “group agency” critique
would mean that the decisions of the judiciary, corporations, and
churches should all be discounted because these institutions are made
up of many people. Skepticism about group agency is corrosive of all
institutions, including the institutions created in our Constitution for
self-governance.500
Second, an elite federal judge’s image of We the People is likely
to be self-reflexive and indifferent, or even hostile, to the most vulnerable members of society. As we said earlier, the textual meanings
favored by the Supreme Court are likely to have an upper-class
accent.501 Populist movements around the world divide rather than
unify.502 Why? Because the idea of “the people” is gerrymandered to
reflect a certain part of the population, which is less than the whole.
Populism has the tendency to favor some rather than others, demonizing those it considers elites or outsiders. As Nadia Urbinati frames
this issue, “populists [the world over] in power claim to be a simple
and objective representation of the people’s needs here and now.”503
Such movements are, in other words, premised on arriving at “audience democracy” by obliterating deliberative checks on the people’s
immediate whims.504 In statutory interpretation, the fear is that the
law will imagine the “ordinary meaning” of words in the vision of
some rather than all. As even Justice Gorsuch has warned, “judges
are, by and large, drawn from the majority or more powerful groups in
society,” so it should come as little surprise that if judges are biased,
that “bias will often harm minorities and disfavored groups.”505
Third, if one digs just a bit further, one sees something much
bigger, and deeply concerning, afoot. It is no coincidence that the rise
of the new textualism and original public meaning, with its populist
appeal to ordinary meaning and its contempt for legislative delibera-
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506 See Samuel Issacharoff, The Corruption of Popular Sovereignty, 18 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 1109, 1113–14 (2020) (arguing that populism in the United States and other countries
places immediate political gratification ahead of long-term investment in stable and
productive institutions).
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tions, has come at the same time this country and others face erosion
of public trust in the institutions of governance—including political
parties as well as legislatures.506 Like the pretend-populism of Putin,
Erodgan, Trump, and others, the pretend-populism of ordinary
meaning lays exclusive claim to delivering a legitimate rule of law
while dismantling the institutional foundations for it. This is why we
have deployed the provocative title “textual gerrymandering.” Just as
electoral gerrymandering manipulates the democratic process for
short-term political gain but results in long-term institutional decay,
textual gerrymandering manipulates the interpretive process for shortterm political gain but results in long-term institutional decay. Textualism purports to serve democracy, but its operation undermines the
republic.
Our Constitution creates institutions foundational for the
republic’s flourishing. Its wise structure starts with Congress (Article
I) and ends with the rule of law grounded upon the work of Congress
(Article VI’s supremacy for statutes and treaties, but silence as to
executive orders and judicial precedents). Congress is structured to
combine electoral accountability with deliberative process; this is the
essence of republican government, and our current governance crisis
owes much to the paralysis of the congressional process. When
Congress does successfully enact statutes, they must last for a long
time—and that requires a judiciary committed to a partnership that
advances legislative projects by applying them to inevitably changed
circumstances, including not just presidential usurpation, but also corporate evasion, new social groups, and technological revolution. A
jurisprudence of hypertextual cutting-and-pasting, clever word games,
and a labyrinth of canons is not a serious effort by judges to contribute
to governance or even the rule of law. As we have argued, when
judges and Justices—conservative or liberal—employ this method, it
degrades the role of deliberation and debate at a time when this mediating or republican role for the legislative branch is increasingly under
pressure from all sides.
If we are right, judicial populism in statutory interpretation poses
serious risks to the institutional foundations of the republic. Textualists believe that they are championing the ordinary person. Like other
populists, they applaud disruption of the given order. Implicitly, they
imagine Congress, and even anyone who knows anything about
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507 See, e.g., Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, supra note 61, at 199–211
(criticizing theories based on congressional “insiders”).
508 See Barbara Sprunt, Here Are the Republicans Who Objected to the Electoral College
Count, NPR (Jan. 7, 2021, 4:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-thecapitol/2021/01/07/954380156/here-are-the-republicans-who-objected-to-the-electoralcollege-count.
509 See Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 73, at 119.
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Congress, as a suspect “insider.”507 That approach, in our view, cannot
be squared with the traditional view of statutory interpretation in
which judges defer to the policy views of a republican government. It
is a recipe ripe for judicial aggrandizement. Like the populist senators
who disputed lawfully chosen electors in January 2021,508 judges who
appeal to partisan sentiment and denigrate the republican, deliberative process are undermining representative democracy.
The Bostock debate both exemplifies orthodox textualism and
unsettles it: How can textualism anchor the rule of law if there are
three answers to a textualist question? This should invite textualists,
and their critics, to more deeply understand textualism’s practice and
theory. There are large stakes here. If we are right, the new textualism, embraced by both liberals and conservatives, risks not only lawless gerrymandering, but also alienating interpretation from
democratic legitimacy. Choices about text and (con)text are being
made that remain unjustified by the rule of law, democratic values, or
good governance. As long as the new textualism, or the new original
public meaning, presents itself as a game of clever dictionary-shopping
and text-chopping, to the exclusion of other, more relevant evidence
of actual meaning, it risks becoming a pointless and destructive word
game. It is time for both liberal and conservative Justices to attend to
these problems. Once upon a time, Dean John Manning argued that
textualism had improved purposivism by narrowing the ability of
judges to depart from the text.509 Our project has flipped his idea: We
believe that textualism, in hard cases, would be improved by checking
one’s assumptions about ordinary meaning against actual republican
evidence.
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E.g., United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
E.g., Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226 (2021) (per curiam);
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchrs. Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1512 (2021); Va. Uranium,
Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
512 For statutory opinions that we consider model sources of reasoning from text,
(con)text, and republican legislative evidence, see, for example, Maine Cmty. Health
Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020) (Justice Sotomayor interpreting the
Affordable Care Act); County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020)
(Breyer, Clean Water Act); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (Kagan, Alaska Lands
Act); Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016
(2019) (Gorsuch concurrence, Treaty with Yakima Nation); Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA,
139 S. Ct. 873 (2019) (Kavanaugh, Copyright Act); Lamar, Archer & Cofrin v. Appling,
138 S. Ct. 1752 (2018) (Sotomayor, Bankruptcy Reform Act).
511
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Many of the Supreme Court’s decisions each Term involve interpretation of the Constitution or federal common law.510 Among the
statutory interpretation opinions, some are resolved by application of
the Court’s statutory precedents.511 However, each Term, there are a
fair number of statutory cases not governed by precedent or some
constitutional cases that depend upon reading statutes. What follows
are recent cases with notable textual gerrymanders, usually in
majority opinions.512
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 2321
(2021). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) prohibits any
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). The VRA is violated when “it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens . . . in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Id. § 10301(b) (emphasis added). Arizona
invalidated votes cast outside a voter’s registered precinct and made it
a felony for a third party to collect and deliver another person’s early
mail-in ballot; both rules had a disparate impact on minority voters.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion used dictionaries to select definitions
of “open” and “opportunity” and homed in on the phrase “in that” to
equate the concepts of equal openness and equal opportunity. Justice
Kagan’s dissent emphasized the broad language of section 2(a) and
used a different dictionary from the majority to define “abridgement”
and “opportunity.” Gerrymanders: Justice Alito focused on terms like
“open” and “opportunity” while ignoring terms like “abridgement”
and “results in” (packing), defined each term separately using dic-
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tionary definitions (cracking), and used the term “totality of the circumstances” as an invitation to include considerations without a basis
in the text or legislative history (stacking).
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271 (2021). The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides procedures governing when detained individuals may seek individualized bond hearings while they pursue withholding of removal from the country.
Respondents were detained noncitizens who had previously been
removed from the United States, returned without authorization, and
sought withholding of removal for fear of persecution if returned to
their home countries. They subsequently requested bond hearings,
which the government denied, arguing that the section of the INA
governing the post-removal “removal period”—which does not provide for bond hearings—applied to the situation, rather than the section governing the pre-removal period, which does provide for bond
hearings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (pending removal); § 1331 (postremoval). Justice Alito’s majority opinion ruled that the “withholding” of removal presumes a prior, final removal order. Justice
Breyer’s dissent argued that the pending withholding proceedings
meant the “removal period” had not yet begun. Gerrymanders
(majority and dissent): Justice Alito read an exceptions clause narrowly by applying it only to a portion of the provision (cracking);
Justice Breyer read the clause broadly but ignored the structure of the
statute and the clause’s relationship to the rest of the provision (suppression). Justice Breyer also failed to distinguish linguistically
between removal “to” another country (subject to withholding) and
removal “from” the United States (not subject to withholding).
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). The Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA) creates a mandatory minimum sentence
of fifteen years for anyone who is found guilty of illegally possessing a
firearm and has at least three prior convictions for a “violent felony.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e). A “violent felony” is one that “has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.” Id. § (e)(2)(B)(i). Did an offense requiring only a
reckless mental state qualify as a “violent felony”? A majority concluded that it does not. Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion boiled the
issue down to the meaning of “against” to connote a knowing or purposeful mental state. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion argued
that the phrase “against the person of another” is a term of art used to
distinguish between crimes against persons and those against property. Gerrymanders (plurality and dissent): Justice Kagan packed the
text by narrowing in on the word “against.” Justice Kavanaugh
stacked the (con)text, pointing to state and Model Penal Code provi-
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sions defining offenses against the person and reading that phraseology back into the text.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). Under the
Court’s precedents, “laws incidentally burdening religion are . . . not
subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause so long as
they are both neutral and generally applicable.” Id. at 1876. Applying
a general anti-discrimination city ordinance, Philadelphia discontinued a foster care contract with Catholic Social Services (CSS) until
the agency agreed to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, in violation of the agency’s religious beliefs about marriage. Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion held that the municipal contract’s antidiscrimination provision was not a “generally applicable” law and so
heightened scrutiny applied. It also held that Philadelphia’s antidiscrimination ordinance did not apply because foster care was not a
public accommodation. Arguing for overruling free exercise constitutional precedents, Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion rejected the
majority’s interpretation of the anti-discrimination ordinance and the
anti-discrimination contract provisions. Gerrymanders: As the concurring Justices maintained, Chief Justice Roberts stacked his reading of
the municipal contracting rules. He also narrowed the city’s broad definition of “public accommodations” (cracking-and-packing).
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels
Association, 141 S. Ct. 2172 (2021). To provide allowances for small
refineries in the renewable fuel program, Congress provided that “[a]
small refinery may at any time petition” for an exemption “for the
reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Petitioner refineries received an exemption, but
after it lapsed, they reapplied for the exemption. Justice Gorsuch’s
majority opinion held that an exemption did not need to be continuous to be extended, placing an emphasis on the phrase “at any time.”
Justice Barrett’s dissent contended that in accordance with plain
meaning, ordinary usage, and statutory structure, an extension can
only be given to an exemption that is presently occurring. Gerrymanders (majority and dissent): Justice Gorsuch applied a broad meaning
to “extension” and “at any time” (cracking-and-packing). Justice
Barrett supported her definition of “extension” by picking selected
definitions from dictionaries.
Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021). The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) prohibits “obtain[ing] or
alter[ing] information in [a] computer that the accesser is not entitled
so to obtain or alter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). Van Buren, a police
officer, was convicted under the CFAA after he violated department
policy by running a license-plate search in exchange for money. Justice
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Barrett’s majority opinion interpreted the CFAA to cover only information that is off-limits to the individual. Since the officer had access
to the license-plate database, the statute did not cover him. Justice
Thomas’s dissent argued that the provision extended to information
accessed for a prohibited purpose, emphasizing that the officer was
not entitled to use the database for personal gain. Gerrymanders
(majority and dissent): Justice Barrett looked to dictionaries and other
federal statutes’ use of “so” (stacking) and split the word “entitled”
from the subsequent phrase “so to obtain” (cracking). Justice Barrett
also hyperfocused on the meaning of “so,” while Justice Thomas did
the same with “entitled” (packing).
Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021). Under federal
immigration law, nonpermanent residents placed in removal proceedings are eligible for discretionary relief if they can establish their continuous presence in the United States for at least ten years. Section
1229b(d)(1) of the U.S.C. (codifying the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)) states that this
relief “shall be deemed to end” when the immigrant is served a
“notice to appear” (NTA) in a removal proceeding initiated under
section 1229a. Can the government stop the time by providing the
immigrant with the statutory information in two separate notices?
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion held that “a” NTA under the
IIRIRA is a single document and must contain all of the requisite
details to confer jurisdiction to an immigration court. Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent argued that the “a” should be viewed inside the
defined term, highlighting other examples in which an article can be
used to modify a term that contains multiple installments.
Gerrymander: Justice Gorsuch drilled down on the use of quotation
marks around “notice to appear” rather than “a notice to appear” to
distinguish the customary and dictionary use of articles that allow for
serial installments and those like “a” that normally precede countable
nouns (cracking-and-packing). He further compared the use of “a”
with other statutory references to “the” NTA to suggest that Congress
was talking about a discrete document (stacking).
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) states that group health plans must provide women with “preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive
guidelines supported by” the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA). 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). HSRA initially
mandated employee access to contraception, but later interpreted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to require an exemption for any
employer with a religious objection. Justice Thomas’s majority
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opinion read “as provided for” to vest HSRA with broad discretion
over coverage issues, including exemptions. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
homed in on the mandate applicable to all preventive-care services
listed in section 300gg-13(a), namely, that group plans “shall, at a minimum, provide coverage.” Gerrymander: Justice Thomas read the general section 13(a) mandate out of the statute (suppression) and
created a confused reading of section 13(a) (stacking and cracking).
Even the government conceded it had no discretion for section
13(a)(4) coverage of children’s benefits.
United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation
Association, 140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020). The National Park Service
Organic Act says that lands in the National Park System include “any
area of land” that is “administered” by the Park Service. 54 U.S.C.
§ 100501. Another statute bars pipelines traversing “lands in the
National Park System.” 30 U.S.C. § 181. Justice Thomas’s majority
opinion ruled that “lands in the National Park System” do not include
the Appalachian Trail, even though it is administered by the Park
Service, based upon comparison of the Trails Act with other statutory
schemes and federalism and nondelegation canons. Justice Sotomayor
dissented. Gerrymanders: Justice Thomas avoided the explicit terms of
the statute by stacking the deck with canons and other laws.
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020). The Convention
Against Torture (CAT) allows noncitizens to challenge deportation by
demonstrating they would likely be tortured in their home jurisdictions. Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion ruled that federal courts
of appeal have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s factual challenge
to a CAT order. Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that other provisions
in the statute limit the reviewability of CAT claims to legal and constitutional questions. Gerrymanders (majority and dissent): Justice
Kavanaugh relied on other statutes (stacking), while Justice Thomas
claimed whole act consistency (suppression).
County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
The Clean Water Act forbids “any addition” of a pollutant from “any
point source” to “navigable waters” without an appropriate permit.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion ruled that pumping millions of gallons of treated water each day into wells that emptied into groundwater conveying contaminants into the ocean was a regulable
“addition” of a “pollutant” to “navigable waters” (e.g., the ocean).
Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that no permit was needed because
pollutants were “added” from the point source to the groundwater,
and then from the groundwater to the ocean. Gerrymander (dissent):
Justice Thomas argued for a very narrow rule by hyper-focusing on
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“addition” and “to” and importing libertarian content into those
words (packing and cracking).
Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020). Under federal immigration law, the government may remove a lawful permanent resident
who commits a serious crime. Green card holders may apply for cancellation of removal in order to stay in the country if they meet certain
criteria, including seven years of continuous residence. Under the
“stop-time rule,” cancellation of removal is precluded if, during the
initial seven years of residency, a lawful permanent resident commits
an offense that renders them “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1181(a)(2) or “removable” under § 1227(a)(2), (a)(4). Can a green
card holder be precluded from cancellation of removal by offenses
different from those crimes that triggered the removal in the first
place? Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion held that Barton was
precluded from cancellation of removal by a crime that rendered him
“inadmissible” but was not an offense in the “removable” category.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent argued that a lawful permanent resident
should only be precluded from cancellation of removal by an offense
that renders them “removable.” Gerrymander: Justice Kavanaugh
conflated the terms of art “inadmissible” and “removable,” thereby
rendering the “removable” provision surplusage, and ignored the
broader statutory scheme that reinforces the distinction between them
(suppression).
Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), authorizes
courts to set aside agency decisions that are “arbitrary and capricious.” The Secretary of Commerce inserted a question for the decennial Census asking respondents to say whether they are citizens.
Speaking for distinct 5–4 coalitions in different parts of the opinion,
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion reasoned that the decision was not
“arbitrary and capricious” (joined by conservatives) but was invalid
because it was “pretextual” (joined by liberals). Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that nonarbitrary decisions must be upheld, as the APA
does not impose a “pretext” test. Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that
the citizenship question was arbitrary. Gerrymanders: In textual suppressions, Chief Justice Roberts added a nontextual test for “pretext”
(alarming Justice Thomas) and ignored statutory rules demanding
streamlined questionnaires (alarming Justice Breyer).
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Under the Gun
Control Act, must the government, to successfully prosecute an
undocumented immigrant in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2) and § 922(g), prove the defendant had actual knowledge of
both his unlawful alien status and his possession of a firearm? Abro-
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gating decisions in every court of appeals, Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion held that, in adding “knowingly” to section 924(a)(2),
Congress meant to add a scienter requirement to both parts of section
922(g). Justice Alito’s dissent argued that “knowingly” should only
apply to impute scienter to gun possession and not to immigration
status. If one reads section 924(a)(2) to demand that the government
show actual knowledge of all non-jurisdictional elements of crimes
defined in section 922(g), this presumption must apply not merely to
undocumented immigrants, see § 922(g)(5), but also to persons barred
from owning guns because of mental illness under section 922(g)(4)
and to persons whose prior crimes were “domestic abuse,” see
§ 922(g)(9). Gerrymanders: Justice Breyer selectively applied the scienter requirement to only two of the section 922(g) categories
(cracking-and-packing) and was strong-arming the text via the lenity
canon presuming a scienter requirement for criminal laws.
Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356
(2019). The fourth exemption to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) regime shields from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial
or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion
ruled that business information was “confidential” if the business
treated it as secret, while Justice Breyer’s partial dissent would have
understood “confidential” as also entailing harm if information were
released. Gerrymanders: Justice Gorsuch gerrymandered dictionaries
and comparable statutes to transform an ambiguity into plain meaning
(stacking).
Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 139 S. Ct. 1853
(2019). The America Invents Act (AIA) created three new avenues
through which “persons” can challenge the validity of another party’s
patent after it is issued. Is the Postal Service a “person” that can avail
itself of these novel procedures? Invoking the canon presuming sovereign immunity from suit, Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion held
that the canon also applied when the government claimed to be a
“person” bringing suit. Justice Breyer’s dissent relied on legislative
history, statutory purpose, and the many places where “person” in the
AIA includes the government. Gerrymanders: Justice Sotomayor
adapted the sovereign immunity canon to explain away instances
where “person” includes the government (suppression).
Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019). A term of supervised release is tolled when an offender “is imprisoned in connection
with a conviction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). The issue was whether pretrial
detention later credited as time served for a new offense had this
tolling effect. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion hyper-focused on
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“imprisoned” and “in connection,” read them broadly, and found a
tolling effect that added three and a half more years to Mont’s time in
prison. Relying on the natural meaning of the whole sentence, the present tense of the verb, the statutory scheme and goal, and the whole
code, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent would have limited the tolling to
imprisonment after the conviction. Gerrymander: Justice Thomas’s
opinion was a classic cracking-and-packing gerrymander.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019). The
Class Action Fairness Act allows liberalized removal of state class
actions to federal court by “any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). The
issue was whether a third-party defendant (brought into the case by a
defendant) could take advantage of that authorization. Distinguishing
between “defendants” and “third-party defendants,” à la the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion said no.
Relying on the broad text and the statutory plan, Justice Alito’s dissent would have allowed it. Gerrymanders: Justice Thomas slighted
the possibility that “third-party defendants” might be a subset of
“defendants” (cracking-and-packing) and the effect of his reading on
the statutory scheme as a whole (suppression).
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). The lower
court had referred a dispute to class arbitration, and the defendant
claimed that the contract was ambiguous as to the availability of class
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion supported the defendant’s refusal to
engage in class arbitration. Justice Kagan’s dissent argued that the
FAA required the terms of arbitration to follow state contract law,
which interpreted ambiguous contracts against the drafter (the defendant company). Gerrymander: Chief Justice Roberts read precedents
broadly and substantially ignored the FAA’s text (suppression).
Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019). The SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b)
makes it illegal to “make any untrue statement of a material fact” in
connection with the sale of a security. Defendant disseminated statements to investors he knew to be untrue but was not the “maker.” The
issue was whether he could be sanctioned under Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c), as well as under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, for
employing a “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” Relying on the
statutory text (and a bevy of dictionaries), precedent, and purpose,
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held the defendant culpable. Justice
Thomas’s dissent argued that Rule 10b-5(b) was the controlling provision, and the other provisions should not be read to overlap. Gerrymander (dissent): Justice Thomas used canons to avoid engagement
with the statute’s anti-fraud scheme and the Court’s precedents, suppressing statutory text.
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Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048 (2019). Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a foreign state may be
served by means of a mailing that is “addressed and dispatched . . . to
the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). Justice Alito’s majority opinion held
that service must be mailed to the minister’s address in the foreign
country; service to the country’s American embassy is not sufficient.
Justice Thomas’s dissent relied on the textual focus on serving the
“foreign minister,” not on a particular “address.” Gerrymanders
(majority and dissent): Justice Alito conceded that his reading was not
the only natural one, but Justice Thomas demonstrated that it was
substantially less “natural” than his (stacking and cracking). Justice
Thomas’s narrow stacking-and-cracking, however, slighted all the
other relevant sources of law (suppression).
Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019). An 1855 Treaty with the Yakama Tribe assured
its members “the right, in common with citizens of the United States,
to travel upon all public highways.” The State of Washington taxed
the transport of fuel by public highway to the Yakama Reservation,
and the Tribe objected. Justice Breyer’s plurality and Justice
Gorsuch’s concurring opinions ruled that the treaty preempted state
law. Both Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s dissents
argued that the treaty did not entitle the Tribe to special exemption
from nondiscriminatory taxes. Gerrymander: Justice Breyer’s plurality
opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion read “in common
with” out of the treaty (suppression).
BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019). The Railroad
Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) taxes an employee’s “compensation,”
defined as “money remuneration . . . for services rendered as an
employee to one or more employers.” 26 U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1). The
issue was whether lost wages awarded to an employee because of an
injury attributable to the employer’s negligence was “compensation.”
Justice Ginsburg’s majority agreed with the IRS that it was, based on
tax policy and analogous cases under other tax laws. Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent relied on the definition and the RRTA’s statutory history. Gerrymander: Justice Ginsburg read “services rendered” out of the definition (suppression).
Jam v. International Finance Co., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019). The
International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA) grants
international organizations such as the World Bank and the World
Health Organization the “same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed
by foreign governments.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). Did the Act grant
international organizations the virtually absolute immunity that the
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United States recognized for foreign states in 1945, or the restricted
immunity adopted by the later-enacted Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA)? Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion adopted
the limited immunity view, based on the present tense (“as is”) and
the reference canon. Justice Breyer’s dissent justified the absolute
immunity view based on text, background, and purpose. Gerrymanders (majority and dissent): Chief Justice Roberts molded the text by
using the reference canon, ignoring relevant legislative evidence. Both
opinions engaged in suppression, understating the importance of the
FSIA.
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129
(2018). The Patent Act creates liability for patent infringement if a
company ships components of a patented invention overseas to be
assembled there. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). Patent owners who prove
infringement under this provision are entitled to damages. Id. § 284.
Can a patent owner recover for lost foreign profits? Finding that the
presumption against extraterritoriality did not govern, Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion ruled that patent owners could recover for
lost foreign profits. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent found the canon irrelevant and argued from the whole act that foreign profits were not
recoverable. Gerrymanders: Justice Thomas’s opinion suppressed statutory text and whole act (con)text.
Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
The Railroad Retirement Tax Act taxes employee “compensation,”
which is confined to only “any form of money remuneration.” 26
U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1). Did employee stock options, easily convertible
into cash, count as taxable “compensation”? Justice Gorsuch’s
majority opinion argued plain meaning that stock was not compensation, while Justice Breyer’s dissent found the definition ambiguous
and the statutory history and purpose dispositive. Gerrymanders:
Justice Gorsuch picked narrow definitions from dictionaries and
slighted the statutory amendment that excluded some stock options
from “compensation” (suppression), while giving excessive weight to
different words used in the Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA) (stacking).
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018). The
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) requires states to make a
“reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the
official lists of eligible voters by reason of . . . a change in the residence of the registrant.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4). In Ohio, a failure to
vote in a single federal election began a process that might result in
removal. The issue was whether that process violated the NVRA’s
general rule prohibiting states from removing registrants “by reason
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of the person’s failure to vote.” § 20507(b)(2). Justice Alito’s majority
opinion found no violation; subsection (b)(2) applied when the sole
reason for removal was a failure to vote, and Ohio gave registrants
opportunities to remain on the voter rolls. Justice Breyer’s dissent
argued that failure to vote cannot trigger a process like Ohio’s and
that its process was not a “reasonable” way to monitor a change in
residence. Gerrymanders (majority and dissent): In dueling suppressions, Justice Alito neglected the relationship among subsections
(a)–(d), and Justice Breyer undervalued the Help America Vote Act
of 2002.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and its forerunner, the NorrisLaGuardia Act (NLGA), guarantee to workers the rights to organize
unions, to bargain collectively, and “to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion
held that this language did not override the Federal Arbitration Act’s
(FAA) allowance of employers to demand workers waive statutory
rights to court enforcement of FLSA violations. Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent argued that later statutes protected employees. Gerrymanders:
Justice Gorsuch ignored the repeal clause of the NLGA (suppression),
narrowly interpreted employee protections (cracking-and-packing),
and trumped labor laws with the FAA (stacking). An earlier gerrymander was the Court’s interpretation of the FAA to cover employment contracts, contrary to its text, purpose, and legislative history.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124–40 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018). The
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts from its overtime-pay
rules “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in
selling or servicing automobiles” at a dealership. 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(b)(10)(A). Did this exemption include “service advisors,”
namely, car dealership employees who consult with customers about
their auto-servicing needs? Chopping up the statutory definition into
tidbits defined as broadly as possible, Justice Thomas’s majority
opinion found that it did, while Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued to
the contrary based on a reading of the definition as a whole phrase
and illuminated by concrete legislative evidence. Gerrymanders:
Justice Thomas ignored the fact that the exemption only applied to
three kinds of employees (“salesman, partsman, or mechanic”) and
chose the broadest dictionary definition of “servicing,” detaching it
from the phrase “servicing a vehicle.”
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Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018). If a federal
district court dismisses federal and “supplemental” state claims under
18 U.S.C. § 1367, then subsection (d) allows a plaintiff to refile state
claims in state court within a time limit: “The period of limitations
shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days
after it is dismissed unless state law provides for a longer tolling
period.” Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion held that “shall be
tolled” meant the clock was stopped on the limitations period to file
the state claims. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent argued that “shall be tolled”
merely assured Artis of a thirty-day grace period after the dismissal of
the federal claim to file in state court. Gerrymanders (majority and
dissent): Each opinion pretended there was a plain meaning for a
badly drafted provision that slipped through Congress without careful
attention. Justice Gorsuch imported state grace period laws (stacking).
Justice Ginsburg read the entire provision through one word, “tolling”
(cracking-and-packing).
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